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Abstract
This thesis considers three cases in which trade in natural resources and other raw
materials can inform us about wider questions of economic development.
The first chapter, “Capturing the Value Chain: The Persistence of Trade Policy
in China After WTO Accession”, considers whether in the GATT/WTO era, devel-
oping countries are still able to actively conduct trade policy. In this study, I show
that after China’s entry into WTO, required import tariff reductions on downstream
sectors have been partly offset by an alternative policy with similar effects: export
restrictions on raw materials. I also find that larger rises in Chinese raw materials
export taxes after WTO accession have been associated with greater downstream
export growth.
The second chapter, “Winners and Losers from a Commodities-for-Manufactures
Trade Boom”, examines two contrasting outcomes of the ‘de-industrialization’ asso-
ciated with rising trade between China and other developing countries. In particular,
this chapter compares changes in labour market outcomes in Brazilian regions stim-
ulated by rising demand from China for raw materials, with Brazilian regions whose
manufacturing sectors have been harmed by Chinese import competition. While
there was slower growth in manufacturing wages and greater rises in local wage in-
equality in ‘loser’ regions between 2000 and 2010, ‘winner’ regions experienced higher
wage growth, lower takeup of cash transfers and positive effects on job quality.
The third chapter,“Access to Raw Materials and Local Comparative Advantage:
The Effects of India’s Freight Equalization Policy”, considers the importance of
access to raw materials for industrial development. It does so by looking at the
effects of a Indian policy that aimed to remove regional comparative advantages
associated with proximity to raw materials, by equalizing prices of steel across India.
The results suggest that in practice, this policy may have had only a limited effect
on access to raw materials across Indian states.
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Chapter 1
Capturing the Value Chain: The
Persistence of Trade Policy in
China After WTO Accession
[A] WTO deal – one which included surprising concessions on the Chi-
nese side – was successfully brokered at the end of 1999. However, we
note that there is a difference between signing a trade treaty and fully
implementing its provisions. ... Our interviews of expatriate managers
in China strongly indicate that these individuals believe tariff cuts will
be at least partially undone by the simultaneous construction of more
subtle non-tariff barriers....
– Branstetter and Feenstra (2002)
China’s industrial strategy is to leverage and exploit the differences in the
international and domestic markets for raw materials and downstream,
processed products, using restraints on exports as the linchpin.
– US government submission to China - raw materials (WTO 2011)
1.1 Introduction
A striking stylized fact about the international economy of the last several decades
is the dramatic worldwide decline in the most widely observed instrument of trade
policy: the import tariff. Much of this decline has been credited to the GATT/WTO
process of multilateral trade negotiations, in which governments have committed to
the implementation of ever smaller tariffs. But does the demise of the import tariff
signal a retreat from activist trade policy among governments, or has trade policy
simply persisted in other forms instead?
Long-established results in international trade theory suggest that other policy
instruments may partially or entirely reproduce the effects of import tariffs. This
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may be accomplished even with policies that only indirectly affect imports; for in-
stance, symmetries between the effects of export taxes and import tariffs in general
equilibrium have been known to economists at least since the work of Lerner (1936).
Yet while we have excellent data on import tariffs across products, countries and
time, there is little systematic information on countries’ usage of the other instru-
ments that could substitute for tariffs in the implementation of their trade and
industrial policies. This gap in the data leaves us unable to fully judge the extent
to which such policies remain an active feature of the global economy, or establish
the effectiveness of GATT/WTO negotiations in actually changing governments’
behaviour.
This issue is of particular relevance to developing countries, for whom the in-
struments of trade policy, especially import tariffs, have historically been important
tools of industrial strategy. While some observers have suggested that there is still
much scope for less developed countries to implement industrial policies in the cur-
rent multilateral system (e.g. Rodrik 2004), others have portrayed multilateral trade
agreements as overly restrictive in this respect (e.g. Chang 2002). Here, I consider
whether participation in WTO, and the accompanying restrictions on policy choice,
have served as an effective constraint on developing countries’ industrial strategies.
In particular, I study the persistence of trade policy in China – a developing
country with a well-known history of interventionist economic policy, and the most
important recent entrant into WTO – after its WTO accession. China’s 2001 entry
into WTO allowed it to benefit from improved access to foreign markets, including
permanent most-favoured-nation status in the United States. At the same time, in
order to secure the agreement of incumbent members to its WTO accession, China
was also required to agree to changes in its own policies. For example, like other
WTO members, China pledged as a condition of its accession to permanently keep
its import tariffs below agreed maximum levels. This required cuts to its pre-WTO
tariffs, and a resulting change in the pattern of protection across Chinese industries.
However, although these tariff cuts have been successfully completed, China has
recently been the subject of trade disputes involving several other policies, such
as domestic content requirements, preferential loans and discriminatory tax treat-
ment. The above quote from Branstetter and Feenstra (2002) raises the question of
whether such policies may have served to partly restore China’s pre-WTO pattern of
industrial protection. As noted above, economic theory suggests that China could
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use various instruments to achieve the trade or industrial policy goals previously
accomplished with import tariffs. Here, I consider one particularly important class
of instruments for which comprehensive and readily quantifiable data on Chinese
policies is available: export taxes.
In particular, I construct panel data on the joint export tax equivalent of two
instruments – VAT rebates for exported products and export duties – for which,
like import tariffs, product-level policy schedules are published regularly in China.
As shown in Figure 1.1, which plots the standard deviation across products of both
import tariffs and these export tax equivalents over time, I find that compression
in China’s tariff schedule due to its WTO accession commitments has been followed
by a rise in variation in export taxes across products. Moreover, I document in the
empirical analysis below that these post-accession changes in China’s export taxes
are systematically related to its pre-WTO schedule of import tariffs, and thus to the
tariff cuts required by its WTO accession (which are highly correlated to China’s
pre-WTO tariff levels).
This relationship between China’s pre-WTO pattern of protection and its post-
accession export taxes may usefully be viewed through the lens of the value chain.
First, while the industries with the largest pre-WTO tariffs were producers of goods
relatively downstream in the value chain, China’s subsequent export tax rises have
been concentrated on raw materials (Figure 1.2). As I show below, a simple two-
country theoretical framework with two stages of production suggests that import
tariffs on downstream products and export taxes on raw materials may both serve to
protect domestic downstream sectors. By imposing export taxes on raw materials,
an exporter of these goods (such as China, which is a major producer of a wide
range of raw materials) can generate a wedge between their domestic and world
prices, supporting domestic downstream firms by providing them with an input cost
advantage. Indeed, the US and EU have twice taken China to the WTO’s dispute
settlement mechanism over its export restrictions on raw materials with the claim
that these are used to support downstream industries.
It is also the case that across raw materials industries, lower import tariffs before
China’s WTO entry are highly predictive of subsequent increases in export taxes. I
find that a raw materials sector with a one point lower tariff in 1999 was subject to
a 0.9 point larger increase in export taxes after China’s WTO accession on average.
This implies that downstream sectors indirectly protected through relatively lower
13
input tariffs before WTO accession were subsequently supported via larger increases
in export taxes on inputs from the same industries.
I next consider whether export tax rises across raw materials industries are also
related to the pre-WTO tariffs of the downstream users of those raw materials.
Dividing raw materials into broad categories (such as metal, wood and plastic), I
calculate both the mean and the maximum of the 1999 tariffs of the downstream in-
dustries associated with each material. I find evidence that raw materials industries
with higher maximum pre-WTO downstream tariffs experienced larger increases in
export taxes, while the same is not true for industries with higher mean downstream
tariffs before China’s WTO entry. I interpret this as suggestive evidence that China’s
post-accession trade policy might be driven by the targeting of a relatively small
subset of strategic downstream industries.
Overall, the results imply that the changes in China’s export taxes are likely
to have partly restored China’s pre-WTO pattern of industrial protection. Using
the effective rate of protection (ERP) of an industry as a summary measure of
the protection afforded by trade policies incident on both an industry itself and its
inputs, I show that a one percentage point decline in ERP due to China’s tariff cuts
is associated on average with a 0.36 percentage point rise in ERP due to changes in
its export taxes at the industry level. Given the above evidence that trade policy
substitution in China may have been strategic in nature, and the fact that it has
probably encompassed a wider range of policy instruments than the two studied
here – some of which I also document below – the incomplete substitution from
import tariffs to export taxes implied by this back-of-the-envelope estimate seems
reasonable.
After establishing this relationship between China’s export taxes and its import
tariffs, I check whether China’s export taxes have been effective in actually changing
its industrial structure, using data on Chinese production and exports. I first find
that higher export taxes have been associated with diversion of sales to the domestic
market. In particular, in panel regressions with industry and year fixed effects, I
observe that export taxes are negatively and significantly associated with the share of
exports in an industry’s total sales. This result is robust to an IV strategy suggested
by the first part of the empirical analysis: rewriting the empirical specification in
long differences and instrumenting for China’s post-accession changes in export taxes
with its pre-accession tariff levels.
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I then examine whether increases in export taxes on raw materials after China’s
WTO entry have been associated with rises in the exports of goods using these
materials. To do so, I exploit information on materials usage embodied in the Har-
monized System (HS) product classification to identify input-output relationships
at the product level, linking primary raw materials such as copper ore to processed
intermediates such as copper springs. I then apply this information to panel data on
trade flows covering 2002 to 2012, and observe a positive and statistically significant
relationship between upstream export taxes and exports of products further down-
stream. This finding is also robust to the instrumental variables strategy outlined
above.
While this study is concerned with a single country and event, the issue of trade
policy substitution is relevant well beyond China’s WTO accession. As early as 1984,
Baldwin suggested in the first Handbook of International Economics that non-tariff
barriers “have been used more extensively by governments to attain the protectionist
goals formerly achieved with tariffs.” Since then, a handful of other empirical studies
have found evidence of substitution from import tariffs to other policies in developing
countries including India (Bown and Tovar 2011) and Turkey (Lima˜o and Tovar
2011), as well as in the US (Ray and Marvel 1984) and across countries (Bown and
Crowley 2014).1 However, these studies all consider substitution between import
tariffs and other import-side measures (such as anti-dumping duties); the study of
substitution between import-side and export-side policies in the same country is an
innovation of this study.2
In fact, although there is a long theoretical literature on symmetries between
import tariffs and export taxes, beginning with Lerner’s classic contribution in 1936,
very few papers have actually observed an empirical relationship between tariffs and
export taxes.3 This dearth of empirical papers on a long-studied theoretical topic is
partly due to the fact that global data on export taxes is sparse. The construction of
detailed panel data on export taxes in China, allowing for comparisons with trends
1See Feinberg and Reynolds (2007), Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) and Moore and Zanardi
(2011) for other cross-country analyses. Anderson and Schmitt (2003) present a theoretical study
of substitution between import-side policies.
2Some observers have drawn parallels between cuts in import tariffs in one country and the
negotiation of agreements requiring its trading partners to place quotas on exports (‘voluntary
export restraints’, or VERs). See Yu (2000) for a theoretical discussion.
3Golub and Finger (1979) observe a cross-country relationship of this kind, noting parallels
between import tariffs on downstream goods in developed countries and export taxes on raw
materials in their less developed trading partners. See also Latina et al. (2011).
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in import tariffs, is thus a contribution to this literature.4
The relationship between the trade policies studied here and the value chain also
situates this chapter in a literature linking growth in exports of manufactures to
advantageous access to raw materials. In particular, parallels with the case of the
United States around the turn of the twentieth century, as studied by Wright (1990)
and Irwin (2003), are notable. Wright finds that intensive exploitation of a wide
range of local resource endowments played an important role in US manufacturing
success during this period, while Irwin reaches similar conclusions in a more focused
study of the American iron and steel industry. According to Irwin, the rise in US
exports of iron and steel around 1900 was driven in part by the exploitation of a
large new deposit of iron ore, whose output was kept within the US due to high
transportation costs and vertical integration. Like the US at that time, present-day
China is a global leader in the production of many raw materials, but my analysis
suggests that privileged access to those inputs for Chinese manufacturers has been
generated, at least in part, by state-imposed restrictions on their export.
Finally, because of China’s size and the importance of its WTO accession to the
world economy, studies of the effects of China’s WTO entry such as this one are of
particular interest to scholars of both economic development and international trade.
Existing papers have focused mainly on the effects of tariff cuts on local outcomes
(e.g. Chen and Ravallion 2004, Brandt et al. 2012a), rather than their implications
for local policies. The apparent presence of policy substitution in China suggests
that these and other studies might underestimate the direct effects of China’s tariff
cuts if they do not take domestic policy responses into account.
The remainder of the chapter is laid out as follows. Section 1.2 outlines a sim-
ple theoretical framework. Section 1.3 provides background information on China’s
WTO accession, including its commitments regarding import tariffs, and discusses
the sources and summary statistics of the export tax data. Section 1.4 presents an
empirical analysis of the relationship between China’s export taxes and import tar-
iffs, while Section 1.5 examines whether export taxes on raw materials have actually
affected China’s export patterns. Section 1.6 then draws conclusions.
4Eisenbarth (2014) and Gourdon et al. (2014) also use data on Chinese VAT export rebates
and export duties, but do not integrate these policies into a single export tax equivalent or explore
their implications for the effects of import tariffs. Chandra and Long (2013) calculate the elasticity
of Chinese exports to VAT rebate rates using firm-level data on VAT payments. Solleder (2013)
has recently compiled data on export taxes from twenty countries, including two years of data on
export duties in China.
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1.2 Theoretical framework
In this section, I present a simple theoretical framework that will serve to elucidate
the key mechanisms by which import tariffs and export taxes can achieve similar
economic effects, and to motivate the empirical analysis below. As mentioned in the
introduction, the historical background to this model is the concept of symmetry
between import tariffs and export taxes originating from Lerner (1936). In its most
basic form, this states that in a two-country, two-product framework in which each
country has an import and an export good, a government may achieve identical
changes in resource allocation and real income by imposing either a tariff on imports
or a tax on exports.5 However, the empirical relevance of this insight has been cast
in doubt by the large number of goods actually traded and their complex input-
output relationships (about which the available information is relatively coarse),
leading Grossman and Horn (2013) to suggest that it is “not a practical possibility
to compute a system of export taxes that would come anywhere near having the
same effects” as a given set of import tariffs.
I therefore explore a more limited concept of symmetry between a few simple
‘rule-of-thumb’ policies in the presence of a two-stage value chain, highlighting two
types of policies – downstream tariffs and upstream export taxes – that I will later
show are broadly representative of China’s pre- and post-accession trade policy
regimes. I posit a two-country economy with two industries, in which both countries
produce in both industries, and limit the symmetric outcome of interest to the
‘pattern of protection’, defined here as the pattern of employment of domestic factors
across industries relative to the free trade equilibrium. I then evaluate the real
income implications of the policies achieving identical patterns of protection, in
order to draw conclusions about policy choice.
Consider a world with two countries, home (H) and foreign (F ), hereafter in-
dexed by c. There are also two industries, upstream (U) and downstream (D). Each
country produces one distinct product in each of the two industries (an Armington
(1969)-type framework). A key assumption of the model will be that these goods
are imperfectly substitutable in production (for upstream goods) and consumption
(for downstream goods). Many firms in each country are assumed to produce in
each industry under conditions of perfect competition. Each country also has an
5See McKinnon (1966) for an extension of Lerner symmetry to an economy with intermediate
goods.
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endowment L of a single factor (labour) that is mobile across industries but not
countries, and is inelastically supplied to firms. Trade in goods between the two
countries is assumed to be costless in the absence of trade policy.
For simplicity, I will assume that production of upstream goods requires only
labour l and that there are constant returns to scale, so that quantity produced for
a given firm in either country c is qcU = zU l
c
U . However, production of downstream
goods requires a Cobb-Douglas combination of labour and the two upstream goods
mHU and m
F
U , with elasticity of substitution across upstream inputs of σU > 1:
6
qcD = zD
(
(mHcU )
σU−1
σU + (mFcU )
σU−1
σU
) σU
σU−1β
(lcD)
1−β
Finally, the two downstream goods are consumed by labourers in each country ac-
cording to constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences with elasticity of
substitution σD > 1:
U c =
(
(xHcD )
σD−1
σD + (xFcD )
σD−1
σD
) σD
σD−1
Given the model’s symmetry assumptions, the allocation of labour across in-
dustries is identical in H and F in the free trade equilibrium: a share 1 − β
of each country’s labour force is employed in production of downstream goods,
LHD = L
F
D = (1 − β)L. Moreover, because of the imperfect substitutability of
products at each stage of the value chain, the two countries engage in bilateral trade
of both upstream and downstream goods.
Now consider the implications for domestic industrial structure of the imposition
by H of a unilateral trade policy, by characterizing the change in the allocation of
labour in H relative to the free trade equilibrium. First, imagine that starting from
free trade, H adopts either a small ad valorem import tariff tD ≡ τD − 1 > 0 on
imports of downstream goods produced by F , or a similar tariff tU ≡ τU − 1 > 0
on imports of upstream products. Also assume that all tariff revenue is returned to
consumers in H as a lump sum. Then either of these policies result in movement of
6This assumption about the relationship between the two countries’ upstream products in the
downstream production function is a simple analogue of the ‘CES aggregate’ approach taken in
recent quantitative trade models such as di Giovanni et al. (2014) and Caliendo and Parro (2015).
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labour in H into the sector on which tariffs are imposed, i.e:
dLHD
dτD
> 0,
dLHD
dτU
< 0
However, this shift in industrial structure occurs via different mechanisms in each
case. To see this, define the expenditure share of the product of country c in stage
k on that industry by country c′ as scc
′
k . Then the familiar direct effect of either
import tariff is to increase sHHk at the expense of s
FH
k . In the case of a downstream
tariff:
sHHD =
w(1−β)(1−σD)
w(1−β)(1−σD) + τ 1−σDD
which increases in τD, where w is the relative wage w
H/wF . The increase in do-
mestic demand for H downstream goods then leads to a rise in w, reducing the
competitiveness of both of the goods produced by H in both markets because of
higher input costs. The net effect is to shift labour into the downstream industry in
H and out of the downstream sector in F by the same amount, i.e. to generate a
‘relocation effect’ on industrial location:
dLHD =
1
4
β(1− β)σUσDL
βσU + (1− β)2(σD − 1) + (1− β)dτD > 0
dLFD = −dLHD < 0
Now instead consider a tariff imposed by H on imports of upstream goods. Like
the downstream tariff, such a tax has a direct effect on the competitiveness of the
goods that are taxed, in this case reducing the market share in F of upstream goods
produced by H. However, imposition of τU affects relative input costs in the two
countries not only via changes in relative wages, but also by generating a wedge
between the local price indices of upstream inputs in the two markets:
PHU
P FU
=
(
w1−σU + τ 1−σUU
w1−σU + 1
) 1
1−σU
> 1
This input price disadvantage for downstream firms in H serves to depress the
relative competitiveness of their output at home and abroad, since:
sHHD = s
HF
D =
w(1−β)(1−σD)
w(1−β)(1−σD) +
(
PHU
PFU
)β(σD−1)
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which decreases in PHU /P
F
U .
Together, the direct encouragement of the upstream industry in H via protection
from import competition and the indirect discouragement of its downstream industry
through changes in relative input prices again lead to a shift in industrial structure
relative to free trade:
dLHD =
(
1
4
β(1− β)L− 1
4
β(1− β)σUσDL
βσU + (1− β)2(σD − 1) + (1− β)
)
dτU < 0
dLFD = −dLHD +
1
2
β(1− β)LdτU > 0
However, trade policy no longer generates a simple ‘relocation effect’, since now
dLHD + dL
F
D > 0. This is because an upstream import tariff induces substitution
away from higher-cost CES bundles of raw materials and towards labour among
downstream firms in H, distorting the global allocation of labour across industries.
In contrast, a downstream import tariff taxes the final stage of production, which
embodies the output of both stages of the value chain, thus avoiding such an inter-
stage reallocation.
Next consider analogously defined ad valorem taxes νD and νU on exports of
downstream and upstream goods produced by H respectively, again assuming lump-
sum redistribution of government revenue to consumers. Starting from the free trade
equilibrium, either of these taxes may be shown to induce movement of labour in H
into the untaxed sector, i.e.:
dLHD
dνD
< 0,
dLHD
dνU
> 0
A downstream export tax decreases foreign demand for H downstream goods,
leading to a fall in w, which increases the competitiveness of both goods produced
by H in each country. This results in the opposite ‘relocation effect’ to that caused
by a downstream import tariff:
dLHD = −
1
4
β(1− β)σUσDL
βσU + (1− β)2(σD − 1) + (1− β)dνD < 0
dLFD = −dLHD > 0
An upstream export tax, however, also increases the relative price of upstream
goods in F , resulting in an input price advantage for the downstream industry in H;
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i.e. PHU /P
F
U < 1. This not only stimulates production of H downstream goods, but
as with an upstream import tariff, also leads to a distortion in the global allocation
of labour across industries:
dLHD =
(
1
4
β(1− β)σUσDL
βσU + (1− β)2(σD − 1) + (1− β) +
1
4
β(1− β)L
)
dνU > 0
dLFD = −dLHD +
1
2
β(1− β)LdνU < 0
where again dLHD + dL
F
D > 0.
Thus, in this simple two-industry framework, labour is shifted into the down-
stream industry by a higher import tariff on D or lower import tariff on U , but by
a lower export tax on D or higher export tax on U . In other words, the import
tariffs and export taxes that generate the same patterns of protection are imposed
on different industries. Moreover, either a higher export tax or lower import tar-
iff on the upstream industry may increase the input price advantage (or decrease
the disadvantage) of the downstream industry using those inputs. Both of these
predictions of the model will be relevant to the empirical analysis below.
An additional result of the model is also notable: a downstream import tariff
achieving the same shift of labour into the downstream sector as an upstream export
tax does so at a lower cost (i.e. larger benefit) to aggregate domestic real income.7
If governments prioritize the protection of downstream industries (as suggested by
the ubiquity of tariff schedules affording greater protection to downstream sectors)
but take account of real income when choosing the instrument by which this is
accomplished, this result provides a possible reason for the popularity of import
tariffs as compared to export taxes in practice.8
The proportional effect of a downstream tariff on real income in H is determined
by the gain in nominal income Y H (via wage growth and government revenue), offset
by the rise in the consumer price index in H, PHD (due to tariffs on F goods and
7The downstream export subsidy or upstream import subsidy achieving the same allocation of
labour also do so at a higher cost to real income relative to a downstream import tariff. This is
a less surprising result, given the well-known negative effects of trade subsidies on domestic terms
of trade.
8See Balassa (1965) and Cadot et al. (2004) for empirical evidence on ‘tariff escalation’ covering
two different time periods. Cadot et al. (2004) also outline a political-economy rationale for the
systematic favouritism of downstream sectors, based on Grossman and Helpman (1994). For cross-
country evidence that export taxes are rarely used in practice, but used more often on upstream
goods, see Solleder (2013). Finally, see Ethier (2004) for an alternative rationale for the rarity of
export taxes, which he suggests constitutes a puzzle for the terms-of-trade-based theory of trade
agreements proposed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999).
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higher nominal labour costs for firms in H), relative to free trade:
dY H
Y H
− dP
H
D
PHD
=
(
dw +
1
2
dτD
)
−
(
1
2
dτD +
1
2
dw
)
=
dLHD
βσUL
> 0
Thus, for the tariff that leads to dLHD = kL, the associated change in real income in
H is k/(βσU) > 0.
However, the implications of an export tax achieving dLHD = kL on real income
in H are as follows:
dY H
Y H
− dP
H
D
PHD
=
(
dw +
1
2
βdνU
)
−
(
1
2
dw +
1
4
βdνU
)
=
k
βσU
+
(
1
2
β − 1
4
)
dνU︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue
−1
4
(
1− β
σU
)
dνU︸ ︷︷ ︸
distortion
−1
4
βdνU︸ ︷︷ ︸
pass−through
=
k
βσU
− 1
4
(1− β)
(
σU + 1
σU
)
dνU
Given that dνU > 0, this is an unambiguously smaller gain in real income than in
the case of a downstream import tariff. The difference between the two gains is due
to three separate effects, highlighted in the equations above.
The first effect, of ambiguous sign, results from the fact that government revenue
from the two instruments depends on the share of value added in the free-trade
economy accruing from the upstream stage. If the two stages are of equal importance
to gross domestic product under free trade – i.e. if β = 1
2
– then the revenue
implications of a tax on either sector are identical.
The second effect, which is negative, derives from the aforementioned distortion
to the world allocation of labour across stages induced by an upstream export tax
but not a downstream import tariff, which reduces real income in both countries.
This effect decreases in σU because this distortion has a smaller impact on real
income if the raw materials from F are more substitutable for those in H, since
downstream firms in F can more readily replace higher-cost raw materials from H
with local raw materials rather than hiring more labour.
The final effect, also negative, is due to the fact that part of the price increase re-
sulting from the export tax is paid for by consumers in H via imports of downstream
goods from F . To better understand this pass-through effect, imagine instead an
analogous model of two final goods with equal Cobb-Douglas consumption shares
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and identical production functions linear in labour. In such a model, the effects on
sectoral distribution and real income of an import tariff on one sector and an export
tax on the other are identical. This is in part because the implications of each of
the policy instruments for government revenue and production choices are the same.
But it is also because of the key insight of Lerner’s (1936) original symmetry result:
that an import tariff, which raises both relative nominal wages and local prices, and
an export tax, which depresses relative nominal wages and causes price increases
abroad, result in the same shift in a country’s terms of trade. In the two-stage
model here, this symmetry does not hold because the price increases resulting from
an export tax instead accrue partly in H itself.
1.3 Background and data
In this section, I first provide background information on China’s accession to WTO
and the resulting cuts in its import tariffs. I then introduce my data on Chinese
export taxes and outline the recent history of the two policies from which I construct
this dataset.
1.3.1 China’s WTO accession
After finalizing WTO accession agreements with the United States in 1999 and the
European Union in 2000, China entered WTO in December 2001. China already
held most-favoured-nation (MFN) status in each of its main trading partners at
the time of its entry into WTO, so the schedule of import tariffs that it faced in
these countries did not change after its WTO membership. However, China gained
market access abroad through a decline in trade policy uncertainty: perhaps most
importantly, China’s MFN status in the US was subject to annual renewal before
2001, but was made permanent upon China’s accession to WTO.9
As a WTO member, China became bound both by WTO rules and by additional
specific commitments made as conditions of its accession. Like other countries join-
ing WTO, one of China’s key commitments was to permanently set its import tariffs
at or below levels agreed in international negotiations. For almost all products, this
9Handley and Lima˜o (2013) and Pierce and Schott (2013) find that uncertainty related to the
difference between US MFN tariffs and the non-MFN tariffs that would otherwise have prevailed
for China has explanatory power for the evolution of US manufacturing employment after 2001.
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bound tariff rate was equal to or smaller than China’s applied tariff in 1999, the year
in which agreement on tariffs on industrial products was reached, and so tariff cuts
were required in order to meet this condition.10 The schedule for implementation
of China’s bound tariffs extended to 2010, with most tariffs to be reduced to their
bound rates by 2005.
In practice, China’s nonagricultural applied tariffs were indeed reduced to their
bound levels after its WTO accession. As a consequence, China’s mean applied
tariff across nonagricultural products decreased from 16% in 1999 to 9% in 2012, as
shown in Figure 1.3.11 Importantly, because negotiated tariff cuts were highly corre-
lated to initial tariff levels (with a correlation coefficient of approximately 0.8 across
nonagricultural products), these cuts led to a compression of China’s tariff schedule.
Figure 1.3 accordingly shows that the standard deviation of China’s applied tariffs
across products declined along with the mean. A key question to be explored in
the empirical analysis below is whether the resulting decrease in the variation in
protection across Chinese industries was offset by changes in other policies.
1.3.2 Export taxes in China
In order to examine whether China’s post-accession export policies are systemati-
cally related to its pre-WTO pattern of import tariffs, I have gathered detailed panel
data on two policies that may readily be combined into a single export tax equiva-
lent: value-added tax (VAT) rebates for exporters and export duties. As noted by
Feldstein and Krugman (1990), in an international system where countries charge
VAT on imports (as do China and other countries with value-added taxes), the
nondistortionary policy is for countries to also fully rebate VAT on exports, so that
the effective VAT rates charged on domestically produced and imported goods are
equalized within each country. This means that incomplete rebates of VAT consti-
tute a tax on exports. However, in China, the official VAT rebate rates for Chinese
exporters, which are set at the product level, are often lower than the rate of VAT
10Throughout the chapter, I restrict the analysis to nonagricultural products (or industries),
and also omit important agricultural inputs (fertilizers and pesticides); see the data appendix for
details. This is because liberalization of trade in agricultural products, where nontariff barriers
tend to be particularly important, often involved replacement of nontariff barriers with tariff-based
protection during this period rather than tariff cuts (Branstetter and Lardy 2008).
11Note that in a small number of cases, China’s pre-accession applied tariffs were already lower
than its bound tariffs. Summary statistics of China’s 1999 applied tariffs and its bound tariffs may
be found in Panel A of Table 1.1.
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charged (which is either 13% or 17% for most goods).
I therefore gather data on VAT rates and rebate rates at the product level and use
this data to calculate export tax equivalents of China’s export VAT rebate policies
for each product and year (see the data appendix for details). The data is taken
from policy updates that are periodically disseminated to firms in electronic format
from official sources and used to calculate and apply for tax rebates. The set of these
updates starting from 2004 is available from the web site www.taxrefund.com.cn,
and data for 2003 may be found at www.cnnsr.com. To this I add product-level data
for 2002 from the 2001-2002 Export Commodity Code and Tax Rebate Rate Quick
Reference Handbook (State Administration of Taxation 2002). Finally, I extrapolate
the 2002 product-level data back to 1994 using more aggregate summaries of pre-
2002 changes in rebate policies from the China Master Tax Guide published by
Deloitte Touche Tomatsu (2005).12
As shown in Figure 1.4, which charts the mean and standard deviation of these
export tax equivalents between 1994 and 2012, there have been many changes to
China’s export rebate policies over this period. When VAT was put at the center of
China’s taxation system in 1994, a policy of full export VAT rebates for most nona-
gricultural goods was maintained. However, the widespread practice of claiming
rebates for goods that were not actually exported resulted in excessive fiscal obliga-
tions for the central government, and official rebate rates were significantly reduced
soon afterwards (Branstetter and Lardy 2008). This led to a steep rise in the aver-
age export tax equivalent of rebate policies, but because this cut in rebates applied
across the board, variation across products in export taxes did not rise accordingly.
Rebate rates were raised again in the late 1990s in response to the negative export
demand shock associated with the Asian financial crisis, and China’s export VAT
rebate policy was then relatively stable until 2003.
However, an official notice in October 2003, less than two years after China’s
WTO accession, announced a significant reform of rebate rates to be effective in
January 2004.13 This was the first in a series of notices frequently amending China’s
export rebate rates over the following several years. Figure 1.4 shows that these pol-
icy changes often increased the average export tax equivalent of VAT rebate policies,
but sometimes instead served to support exports through decreases in mean export
12Summary statistics of export tax equivalents of these policies for 2002 and 2012 (the two years
of data used in much of the empirical analysis below) are displayed in Panel B of Table 1.1.
13Caizheng bu, guojia shuiwu zongju caishui (2003) no. 222.
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taxes (especially at the time of the late-2000s global recession). However, unlike
the pre-WTO policy changes, the 2003 notice and subsequent reforms consistently
increased the variation in export taxes across products.
In addition to charging export taxes via incomplete rebates of VAT to exporters,
China also directly imposes duties on some exported products. The lists of goods
subject to export duties and the corresponding rates are published by China annually
together with its schedule of import tariffs in the Customs Import and Export Tariff
of the People’s Republic of China. I have collected product-level data on export
duties from this publication for the years 1997 to 2012 and calculated the joint
export tax equivalent of export duties and VAT export rebate policies for each
product and year (see the data appendix for details).
While neither export duties nor incomplete VAT rebates for exporters are prohib-
ited under WTO rules, China’s WTO accession agreement allows for export duties
only on a small group of products, ruling out such duties on other goods “except
under exceptional circumstances” (WTO 2001). Until 2004, China’s schedule of ex-
port duties only included a subset of the goods identified in its accession agreement.
However, starting in 2005, China began imposing ‘temporary’ export duties on some
other products. These export duties still affect a relatively narrow range of goods
(approximately 5% of nonagricultural six-digit products in 2012), but have become
increasingly coordinated with China’s VAT export rebate policies. Thus, although
they have been quite sparingly applied, Figure 1.5 shows that rising export duties
have made an important additional contribution to the increasing variation in ex-
port taxes across products since China’s WTO accession. Inclusive of both policies,
the standard deviation across nonagricultural goods of China’s export taxes rose
from 3.3% to 9.3% between 2002 and 2012, as shown in Panel B of Table 1.1.
Since its accession to WTO, a number of China’s policies have been the subject
of disputes addressed through the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism; China has
been the respondent in 19 separate cases brought by other WTO members. Two of
these disputes have involved its export duties, along with a set of quantitative export
restrictions (to be discussed in Section 1.4.2) that are prohibited under WTO rules:
China - Measures related to the exportation of various raw materials (brought to the
dispute settlement mechanism by the US, EU and Mexico in 2009) and China - Mea-
sures related to the exportation of rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum (brought
by the US, EU and Japan in 2012). In both cases, WTO panels ruled that the poli-
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cies identified by the complainants were inconsistent with China’s WTO accession
commitments.14 In response to the ruling in the first case, China altered some of its
export policies, including some export duties, in 2013. The empirical analysis below
will cover the period before these changes, i.e. until 2012. However, because these
changes left most export duties untouched and did not affect China’s VAT policies,
the empirical results below change very little when the sample period is extended.
1.4 Export taxes and import tariffs: protection
through the back door?
In this section, I examine the link between China’s export taxes and its import
tariffs, with the goal of determining whether the changes in Chinese export taxes
since its WTO accession tend to reproduce its pre-WTO pattern of protection. I first
study the link between export taxes and pre-WTO import tariffs across industries,
considering in particular how the relationship between the two policies interacts with
industries’ stage of production. I then check whether products subject to export
taxes are actually exported by China, consider whether my results may instead be
explained by export taxes’ likely effects on China’s terms of trade, and take other
import and export policies into consideration in the analysis. Finally, I summarize
the extent to which the changes in China’s export taxes have offset the effects of
the tariff cuts associated with its WTO accession.
1.4.1 Export taxes, pre-WTO import tariffs and stage of
production
I begin by considering whether the changes in China’s export taxes after WTO
accession are systematically related to its pre-WTO pattern of industrial protection,
as defined by its schedule of import tariffs in 1999. I use China’s 1999 tariffs because
this was the final tariff schedule released by China before agreement was reached on
the nonagricultural tariff cuts required for its WTO accession; however, the results
below are robust to using other pre-WTO base years. Because there is a high
14China had argued that its policies were covered by Article XX of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, which allows for exceptions from GATT/WTO rules for measures “relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” or “necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health”.
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correlation between China’s 1999 tariffs and its subsequent tariff reductions, the
results are similar when tariff cuts are substituted for pre-WTO tariff levels in the
analysis. I will directly consider the extent to which China’s export tax rises have
offset its tariff cuts in Section 1.4.3. Export taxes are defined below as the joint
export tax equivalent of both China’s VAT export rebate policies and its export
duties unless stated otherwise.
I conduct the analysis in this section at the industry level, defining industries
at the four-digit level according to the Chinese industrial classification.15 This level
of aggregation allows me to capture the concept from my theoretical framework
of industries encompassing both import and export products, while maintaining a
reasonably large sample size of 402 nonagricultural industries. The average four-
digit industry consists of approximately nine six-digit products, and the majority
of these industries include both products for which China was a net importer and
goods for which China was a net exporter in 2002 (the first full year after its entry
after WTO). The results in this section also hold when the unit of analysis is defined
at higher or lower levels of aggregation.
Some of the key changes over time in the relationship between China’s export
taxes and its pre-WTO import tariffs may be seen in the two scatter plots in Figure
1.6. In this figure, the position of each point represents the simple average across
products of an industry’s import tariffs in 1999 relative to the simple average of
its export taxes in 2002 (in the left-hand panel) or 2012 (in the right-hand panel).
Meanwhile, the colour of each point represents the position of the industry in a
simple two-stage value chain. For this, I use the United Nations Broad Economic
Categories (BEC) classification of traded products to identify HS products that
are either final goods, parts or accessories, and define the remainder of goods as
raw materials (see the data appendix for details). If more than half of a four-digit
industry’s products are raw materials, I classify it as a raw materials industry. As
a result, 174 of the 402 industries in the sample (43%) are categorized as producers
of raw materials, while all others are defined as downstream industries.
The figure shows that while raw materials industries had generally lower tariffs
in 1999, export taxes rose by much more for raw materials than for downstream
industries on average between 2002 and 2012. Moreover, export taxes increased
15An example of a four-digit industry is ‘Manufacture of glass apparatus’, which lies within the
two-digit category ‘Manufacture of non-metal products’.
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most for the raw materials industries for which average pre-WTO import tariffs
were lowest. The overall result is a striking negative relationship across industries
between 2012 export taxes and pre-WTO tariffs, with very few industries subject to
both large 1999 tariffs and large 2012 export taxes.16 Importantly, these patterns
are not driven by the concentration of large 2012 taxes and/or 1999 tariffs in a
narrow range of industrial categories: the top quartile of 1999 import tariffs spans
21 of 35 two-digit industries, while 20 of 35 two-digit industries include at least one
of the four-digit industries in the top quartile of 2012 export taxes.
Before considering the interaction between export taxes, import tariffs and stage
of production in more depth, I first note two additional facts that are not apparent
from Figure 1.6. First, although Figure 1.6 portrays a large change in the relation-
ship between China’s export taxes and its pre-WTO tariffs between two points in
time, the transition between these two states took shape gradually over several years.
To show this, I summarize the relationship between 1999 tariffs and export taxes in
each year t between 1997 and 2012 using a series of simple regression specifications:
exporttaxti = α
t + βttariff 1999i + 
t
i (1.1)
I then plot the estimated coefficients βˆt from this series of regressions in Figure 1.7;
the full set of results may be found in Table 1.2. The figure shows that the rela-
tionship between export taxes and 1999 tariffs became progressively more negative
in each year between 2003 and 2010, while both before and after this period, βˆt
remained relatively stable.
I next use a similar summary measure of the link between export taxes and 1999
tariffs to show that their relationship is the result of both of the two policies studied
here. I first define ∆exporttaxi ≡ exporttax2012i − exporttax2002i and regress this
long-difference variable on the same right-hand side as above. As shown in column
(1) of Table 1.3, I find that a one percentage point larger 1999 tariff is associated
with a one-half point smaller export tax rise from 2002 to 2012. I then run two
additional regressions redefining the left-hand-side variable of equation (1.1) as the
change (again between 2002 and 2012) in the export tax equivalent of one of the two
16Of the 100 industries in the top 25% of each of these two distributions, only three are shared
in common. By the binomial theorem, conditional on the 1999 pattern of tariffs, the probability
of randomly and independently drawn export taxes resulting in three or fewer industries in the
intersection of these two sets is 0.000000002%.
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policies only, holding the export tax due to the other policy equal to zero. These
specifications show that a one point higher tariff in 1999 is associated with a 0.3
point lower rise in the export tax equivalent of China’s VAT rebate policies (column
(2)), and a 0.14 point smaller increase in export duties (column (3)) from 2002 to
2012. Both of these estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level, using
p-values derived from wild bootstraps as in Cameron et al. (2008) due to the small
number of clusters (two-digit industries).17
To consider more carefully the role of the value chain in the relationship be-
tween pre-WTO import tariffs and post-accession export tax changes, I again use
the UN BEC classification to create a further division of the downstream part of
the value chain into producers of capital goods and other downstream industries.
While both of these types of downstream industries produce parts, accessories and
finished goods, capital goods industries sit uneasily into a simple vertical definition
of the value chain because of the role of capital in the production process. Moreover,
because imported capital often embodies important technological inputs into pro-
duction, industries producing capital goods are rarely protected with high import
tariffs, which means that 1999 tariffs may not be a good proxy for Chinese support
to these industries. I similarly divide upstream industries into sectors producing
primary raw materials (e.g. mining of iron ore) and semiprocessed raw materials
sectors (e.g. production of steel).
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 display how pre-WTO tariffs and post-accession export tax
rises vary across these four categories. Table 1.4 shows that of the 37 primary raw
materials industries, 33 were subject to export tax increases in the top quartile
between 2002 and 2012, while none of the industries at this stage of production fell
into the top 25% of 1999 tariffs. Meanwhile, 54 of the 90 downstream industries not
producing capital goods were in the top quartile of 1999 tariffs, while only two of
these 90 sectors were in the top 25% of post-accession export tax increases. Overall,
96 of the 101 industries in the top 25% of export tax rises were producers of either
primary or semiprocessed raw materials, while of the top 25% of industries by 1999
tariffs, 68 of 100 were producers of downstream goods.
Table 1.5 displays the results of regressions of 1999 tariffs and changes in ex-
port taxes from 2002 to 2012 on indicators for whether an industry is a producer of
17The estimated coefficient in column (1) is larger than the total of these two estimates because
the joint export tax equivalent of the two policies generally exceeds the sum of the export tax
equivalent of each policy separately; see data appendix for details.
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primary raw materials, semiprocessed raw materials, or capital goods; the omitted
category is other downstream industries. Column (1) shows that on average, China’s
1999 applied tariffs were 8 percentage points lower on semiprocessed raw materials
industries and 19 percentage points lower on primary industries as compared to tar-
iffs on industries producing final consumption goods. Export tax rises, on the other
hand, vary in the opposite way with the value chain: these were 7 points higher
for the semiprocessed stage and 22 points higher for the primary stage on average
as compared to industries producing products for final consumption. Notably, this
inverse relationship between the two policies is not present for capital goods indus-
tries. While capital goods industries have relatively lower pre-WTO import tariffs
than those of sectors producing final consumption goods, export taxes on this subset
of industries remained relatively low after 2002. As discussed above, this may be
because capital-producing industries were protected via other means before China’s
WTO accession, so that pre-WTO import tariffs may not fully represent the position
of these sectors in China’s pattern of industrial protection.
Having established that pre-WTO import tariffs and post-accession export taxes
differ across stages of production in a way that is broadly in line with two of the
simple policies considered in my theoretical framework, I now step outside that
framework to consider variation in incidence across industries within stages of pro-
duction. This variation is much higher for raw materials: while among downstream
industries the average increase in export taxes from 2002 to 2012 is 1.5% with a
standard deviation of 2.7%, the corresponding mean and standard deviation across
raw materials industries is 12.0% and 11.1% respectively. The scatter graph above
(Figure 1.6) suggests that much of the variation across industries in raw materials
export taxes may be explained by average pre-WTO tariffs on the same industries;
I first check this hypothesis, and then discuss its implications.
To do this, I run a regression of changes in China’s export taxes after WTO
accession on its 1999 tariffs, but restricted to raw materials industries only:
∆exporttaxi = α + βtariff
1999
i + i (1.2)
The results may be found in column (1) of Table 1.6. This shows that a raw materials
industry with a one point lower tariff in 1999 was subject to a 0.9 point larger
increase in export taxes after China’s WTO accession on average. Moreover, this
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simple specification has substantial explanatory power for export tax rises on raw
materials industries, with an R2 of nearly 0.5. In columns (2) and (3), I check that
this result is not simply driven by variation across the early stages of the value chain,
by re-estimating specification (1.2) separately for primary and semiprocessed raw
materials industries. I find that the negative and statistically significant relationship
in column (1) also holds within each of these two sets of industries, and again explains
much of the variation in export tax increases in each case.
Given that I have defined industries so that they tend to encompass both import
and export products, this finding has implications both for the pattern of protection
across raw materials industries themselves and for the protection afforded to down-
stream sectors. The direct effect is that raw materials industries whose products
were less protected from import competition by tariffs before WTO were then sub-
ject to higher taxes on exported goods after accession. However, also recall from the
theoretical framework that downstream industries may be supported indirectly via
lower upstream import tariffs or higher upstream export taxes, either of which may
affect the gap between the domestic and world prices of raw materials. The results in
Table 1.6 thus imply that the same downstream industries receiving greater protec-
tion through lower import tariffs on raw materials inputs in 1999 were subsequently
supported through larger increases in export taxes on inputs from the same indus-
tries, after the distribution of tariffs across raw materials sectors was compressed by
WTO accession.18
To what extent do the two main findings of the analysis so far – that China’s
export taxes have risen for upstream industries in general, and have increased by
more in upstream sectors with initially lower tariffs – explain the distribution of
export tax increases across industries? These two results may be summarized by
estimating a single specification on the full sample of nonagricultural industries,
including both of the two main explanatory variables discussed above – pre-WTO
tariffs and a dummy for raw materials industries – along with an interaction term:
∆exporttaxi = α+βrawmaterialsi+γtariff
1999
i +θ(rawmaterialsi∗tariff 1999i )+i
(1.3)
Table 1.7 shows that this parsimonious specification explains 62% of the variation
18While the mean of China’s 1999 tariffs on raw materials industries was 12.1% and their standard
deviation was 8.3%, these were reduced to 6.9% and 4.8% respectively by 2012.
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in the post-WTO changes in export taxes across industries, measured according to
R2. I will use this preferred specification as the baseline for the robustness checks
of Section 1.4.2.
Notably, the estimated βˆ displayed in the first row of Table 1.7 suggests that
there is no relationship between export tax rises and pre-WTO tariffs across down-
stream industries. This is confirmed in columns (4) and (5) of Table 1.6, which show
the results of running specification (1.2) separately for capital goods industries and
other downstream industries. In both cases, the result is a precisely estimated zero.
In other words, it is not the case that export taxes have emerged on downstream
industries on which China set relatively low import tariffs before its WTO entry.
Instead, to the extent that China’s pre-WTO pattern of protection across down-
stream industries has been restored by the export taxes observed here, this is due to
policies directly incident on raw materials, but with indirect effects on downstream
sectors.
The role of indirect effects on downstream sectors in shaping post-accession
changes in China’s export taxes is further explored in Table 1.8. Here, I consider
whether variation in raw materials export tax rises may be explained by the pre-
WTO tariffs of the downstream industries using those inputs, controlling for the
1999 tariff on the raw materials industry itself. In particular, I run the following
regression for the set of raw materials industries:
∆exporttaxi = α + βtariff
1999
i + β
Dtariffdownstream,1999i + i (1.4)
A challenge in estimating this specification is to calculate downstream pre-WTO
import tariffs for each raw materials industry. Although China publishes an input-
output table, its sectors are relatively coarse and often aggregate raw materials
and downstream industries into a single category (e.g. paper pulp, paper and paper
products; rubber and rubber products). I thus define eight main types of materials
(chemicals; leather and furs; metal; nonmetallic minerals; plastic; rubber; textiles;
wood and paper) and identify the raw materials sectors corresponding to these
materials in China’s 2002 input-output table, whether or not these sectors also
include downstream industries.19 I then associate each of the remaining input-output
19I exclude raw materials industries producing fuels from this analysis, since the procedure used
here does not classify these as the main constituent of any downstream sectors. I also drop a small
group of sectors producing aquatic products.
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sectors with a particular material according to the maximum of the input shares of
each of these raw materials categories in the production of that sector’s goods.
Finally, I assign four-digit industries to materials using a concordance of industries
and input-output sectors. For instance, this procedure associates rail transportation
equipment with metal; all four-digit industries constituting the input-output sector
‘Rail transportation equipment’ are then defined as downstream of all of the raw
materials industries producing metals.20
In Table 1.8, I estimate specification (1.4), measuring downstream tariffs alterna-
tively according to their mean or their maximum across the downstream industries
associated with a particular material. I consider the maximum tariff because of the
possibility that China’s trade policy is driven by the strategic targeting of a small
subset of downstream industries rather than a more general preference for produc-
tion in a wide range of favoured industries, as suggested by the right-skewed nature
of China’s pre-WTO tariffs (see Figure 1.6). Column (1) of Table 1.8 shows that
surprisingly, a higher mean downstream tariff in 1999 is associated with a smaller
increase in upstream export taxes between 2002 and 2012. However, this result is
driven entirely by the inclusion of capital goods industries, since the estimated coef-
ficient switches sign and loses statistical significance when mean downstream tariffs
are calculated using other downstream industries only (column (2)).
On the other hand, column (3) suggests that raw materials industries with higher
maximum pre-WTO downstream tariffs subsequently experienced larger rises in ex-
port taxes. As shown in column (4), this result is robust to the exclusion of capital
goods industries in the calculation of maximum downstream tariffs. While these
findings should be treated with some caution due to the coarseness of the input-
output measure I have used, they indicate that China’s post-accession export taxes
on raw materials may have been influenced by a relatively narrow group of strategic
downstream industries.
20See data appendix for details. I define more detailed data on input-output linkages in Section
1.5.2; however, that data mostly provides information on linkages between primary and semipro-
cessed raw materials rather than downstream goods and is thus inappropriate for this exercise.
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1.4.2 Additional results
Relevance of export taxes
Even if export taxes have risen since China’s WTO accession, this is empirically
relevant only if the goods subject to high export taxes are products actually exported
by China. I check the relevance of China’s export taxes in two ways: first by
examining the share of China in world trade for products with high 2012 export
taxes, and then by comparing estimated revenue from China’s 2012 export taxes to
the revenue that would result from the reinstatement of its 1999 import tariffs.
I first use international trade data for 2012 from UN COMTRADE to calculate
the share of Chinese exports in the total value of world trade by product. I find
that among the six-digit nonagricultural products for which 2012 export taxes are
greater than or equal to 10% (which encompasses approximately 25% of these goods),
Chinese exports constitute more than 10% of world trade for one third. Among raw
materials products above the 10% export tax threshold, China’s exports exceed 10%
of total world trade in 31% of cases. China is thus a large player in world trade
for a wide variety of the products on which it has placed high taxes, despite the
presumed negative impact of these taxes on export volumes (which is examined in
Section 1.5).
I next examine whether China’s 2012 export taxes and 1999 import tariffs are
incident on trade flows of similar size. To do this, I first note that the simple average
across six-digit nonagricultural products of China’s 2012 export taxes (7.3%) is 44%
of the simple average of its 1999 import tariffs (16.1%). I then multiply China’s 2012
exports and imports (by value) by 2012 export taxes and 1999 tariffs respectively,
and find that the resulting estimated export tax revenue is 34% of what tariff revenue
would have been if 1999 tariffs applied to 2012 trade flows.21 Since export taxes
presumably have a negative effect on exports, I repeat the same exercise using
trade flows from 1999 instead of 2012, and find that the counterfactual export tax
revenue is 40% of estimated import tariff revenue. This back-of-the-envelope exercise
suggests that post-accession export taxes apply to trade flows of comparable size to
those on which pre-WTO import tariffs, if restored in 2012, would be incident.22
21I first deduct export taxes due to VAT policy from reported Chinese exports by value, so as
to avoid double-counting.
22Note that this calculation ignores the differences in the applicability of these policies to goods
imported or exported via China’s different modes of trade (e.g. processing trade vs. ‘ordinary
trade’).
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Terms-of-trade motivation
The fact that China is so important in world trade in so many of the products subject
to export taxes suggests that the distribution of these taxes across products might
be shaped by potential terms-of-trade gains, rather than their effects on the pattern
of industrial protection. For example, export taxes on rare earth elements might
be designed to exploit China’s near-monopoly on global rare earths production.23 I
thus check the robustness of the results of the preferred specification of Section 1.4.1
(equation (1.3)) to the inclusion of China’s share of world trade in 2012 as a control.
Because China’s trade share, and the resulting terms-of-trade motivation for an
export tax, tends to vary across products within each industry, I run this robustness
check at the product level. Also, since Chinese exports in 2012 are presumably
affected by its export taxes, I instrument for China’s 2012 trade share with its share
of world trade in 2002.
The results of this robustness check may be found in Table 1.9. Column (1) re-
produces regression (1.3) at the product level; the estimated coefficients are similar
to those from the equivalent industry-level regression. Column (2) then displays
the results of a simple IV regression of 2012 export taxes on 2012 Chinese trade
shares. The estimated coefficient suggests that an increase in China’s share of world
trade by 10% is associated with a 0.4% lower export tax, and this result is statis-
tically insignificant. Moreover, as shown in column (3), including this covariate in
specification (1.3) (again instrumented with China’s 2002 share of world trade) has
a negligible effect on the baseline results of column (1). When I also include the
square of China’s 2012 share of world trade and use both China’s 2002 share and
its square as instruments (column (4)), the results are unchanged.
Other policies
I next revisit the concern that export taxes and import tariffs might not be rep-
resentative of the full suite of policies implemented by China during the period of
interest. Unfortunately, it would be infeasible to gather information on all of the
Chinese policies relevant to the pattern of protection across industries. However,
there are some other import and export policies for which product-level information
23The Vice Chairman of China’s Inner Mongolia province (Zhao Shuanglian) suggested otherwise
in a September 2009 press conference: “We are certainly not focusing on the short-term benefits
of raising the rare earth price. Our wish is for Baotou in Inner Mongolia to become the world’s
‘Rare Earths Valley’, the world’s rare earths industrial base.” (china.com.cn 2009)
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is also available, and here I investigate whether consideration of these additional
policy instruments supports the conclusions of the empirical analysis above.
In addition to a schedule of bound tariffs, China’s WTO accession agreement
also included a list of products for which non-tariff barriers to imports were to be
removed. Treating this list as a proxy for the full set of China’s pre-WTO non-
tariff import restrictions, I add this variable and its interaction with an indicator for
raw materials industries to specification (1.3). The results, which may be found in
Table 1.10, show that as with pre-WTO import tariffs, the relationship between non-
tariff import barriers and changes in export taxes across raw materials industries is
negative and statistically significant, while this association is insignificantly different
from zero across downstream sectors.
On the export side, I collect data on all other policies identified by the WTO
Trade Policy Reviews of China (World Trade Organization 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012) as
‘policies affecting exports’ for which product-level schedules are available.24 I source
data on the set of products requiring export licenses or subject to export quotas, and
goods which may only be exported by designated (usually state-owned) firms, from
the annual official notices relating to these measures for 2002 to 2012.25 I also collect
information from ad hoc official notices on the list of products prohibited from export
via processing trade, beginning with a 2004 notice declaring that “[a]djustments and
updates will be made annually to the list of prohibited processing trade goods ...
in accordance with the country’s economic development and industrial policies.”26
Approximately half of Chinese exports by value leave the country via processing
trade, a system by which inputs from abroad may be imported duty-free, processed
and then re-exported, again duty-free.
To check whether the post-accession changes in these policies have been coordi-
nated with rises in export taxes, I tabulate increases in their incidence separately for
six-digit nonagricultural products in different quantiles of total export tax growth,
and display the results in Figure 1.8. The figure shows clear evidence of coordination
24This includes information on goods whose export is prohibited by China (see data appendix);
however, I simply drop any good whose export is prohibited in any year throughout the empirical
analysis. Also, some policies that are classified as ‘policies affecting exports’ in the WTO reviews
but that do not vary primarily at the product level, such as tax concessions to foreign-invested
enterprises, are not considered here.
25I gather data only for unilateral policy measures; export quotas related to the multilateral
Multifiber Arrangement are thus not included here. See the data appendix for details.
26Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu, guojia huanjing baohu zongju gonggao (2004) no. 55. In prac-
tice, subsequent updates were not announced on a strictly annual basis.
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of China’s various product-level export policies. While only a miniscule proportion
of products were prohibited from export via processing trade as of 2005, this share
had risen to 78% for goods in the top 5% of post-accession export tax increases, 43%
for the next 20% and 4% for the bottom 75% of products by 2012.27 Meanwhile,
among six-digit products whose total export tax increase between 2002 and 2012
was in the top 5%, the share of goods subject to license requirements, quotas or
state trading increased from 14% in 2002 to 25% in 2012. The other products in
the top quartile of export tax rises saw a rise in the coverage ratio of these policies
from 4% to 7%, while only 3% of the bottom three quartiles were covered by such
an export restriction in 2012, a rise of one percentage point from 2002.
1.4.3 Extent of substitution
I have established in Section 1.4.1 that the changes in China’s export taxes after its
WTO entry are systematically related to its pre-WTO pattern of industrial protec-
tion. I now attempt to summarize the extent to which China’s post-accession export
tax reforms have offset the effects of the tariff reductions required by its WTO entry.
In particular, the goal of this subsection is to examine the offsetting changes in the
pattern of protection across Chinese industries induced by the two sets of policy
reforms.28
To do this, I employ a simple summary measure of the protection resulting from
the trade policies incident on both an industry itself and its inputs: the effective rate
of protection (ERP) as defined by Corden (1966).29 This measure allows for both a
higher tariff on an industry and lower tariffs on sectors upstream of that industry
to increase the protection afforded to the industry. I first define the ERP for each
industry resulting from China’s 1999 tariff schedule using the Chinese input-output
matrix. I then calculate the ERPs implied by China’s schedule of bound tariffs,
reassigning bound tariff rates to be equal to 1999 tariffs whenever tariff bindings
actually exceed China’s applied tariffs in 1999.30 I also use a formulation for ERPs
27In fact, product-level changes in VAT rebate policies and processing trade eligibility have
sometimes been made in the same official notice.
28Note that China’s bound tariffs were an outcome of negotiations that involved both incumbent
WTO members and the Chinese government itself, and may thus reflect a mix of the trade policy
preferences of the two parties. This means that the results of this exercise should not necessarily be
interpreted straightforwardly as a relationship between a set of policy changes imposed by China’s
trading partners and a unilateral Chinese response.
29See the data appendix for details of my calculations of ERPs.
30Because there are very few cases where bound tariffs exceed China’s 1999 applied tariffs, this
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proposed by Corden for export-side policies, in which protection may be derived
from a lower export tax on an industry or a higher export tax on its inputs, to
calculate the ERPs implied by China’s 2002 and 2012 export taxes. Finally, I take
the difference for each industry between the ERPs implied by bound tariffs and
the ERPs resulting from 1999 tariffs, and compare this to the change in protection
resulting from the transition between the 2002 and 2012 schedules of export taxes,
using the following regression specification:
∆ERP (exporttax)i = α + β∆ERP (tariff)i + i (1.5)
Table 1.11 displays the results of this regression. This suggests that the post-
accession changes in China’s export taxes have indeed offset the effects of its import
tariff cuts on the pattern of protection, but only in part. In particular, a one
percentage point decline in ERP due to tariff cuts is associated on average with a
0.36 percentage point rise in ERP due to changes in export taxes at the industry
level.
This finding of incomplete substitution between the two types of policies is un-
surprising for several reasons. First, the left-hand side measure is incomplete, both
in the sense that not all of China’s export-side policy instruments are taken into ac-
count (as discussed in the previous subsection), and because changes to other non-
export policies such as domestic content requirements and preferential loans may
also have altered the post-accession pattern of protection. Second, if the primary
motivation for China’s export taxes is to target a subset of strategic downstream
industries, as suggested by the results in Table 1.8, we might not necessarily expect
to observe one-for-one substitution in protection on average across all industries.
Finally, the result is consistent with the implication of the theoretical framework
that export taxes on raw materials are a costlier means (in terms of real income)
of protecting downstream industries as compared to import tariffs on downstream
goods. A government valuing both aggregate real income and a particular pattern
of protection might thus be expected to decrease the relative protection afforded to
downstream industries when import tariffs become unavailable as an instrument of
trade policy.
adjustment makes little difference to the results.
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1.5 Export taxes and exports: capturing the value
chain?
Having shown that China’s export taxes on raw materials are systematically related
to its pre-WTO pattern of protection, I now consider whether increases in export
taxes have resulted in changes in China’s actual export patterns. I first evaluate
whether industries subject to larger export taxes consequently sell a greater share
of their output on the domestic market. I then consider this section’s main question
of interest: whether Chinese export taxes on raw materials have been effective in
stimulating exports of downstream goods.
1.5.1 Effects on exports as a share of sales
If export taxes on raw materials are actually effective in supporting domestic down-
stream industries, we should observe a diversion of sales of local raw materials to the
domestic market. I thus begin this section by examining whether industries subject
to higher rises in export taxes have experienced falls in the share of exports in total
sales. To do this, I draw upon industry-level tabulations of China’s annual firm-level
survey of industrial production for 2002 to 2007.31 I use reported sales by value and
export value (both in current Renminbi) from the survey data to calculate the pro-
portion of exports to foreign markets in firms’ sales in each industry and year.32 I
then run the following panel regression of the export share of sales on export taxes,
controlling for import tariffs as well as year and industry fixed effects:
exports/salesit = α + βexporttaxit + γtariffit + θi + φt + it (1.6)
The results of this regression, with and without import tariffs on the right-hand
side, are displayed in Table 1.12. As shown in column (1), I find that during this
period, the estimated impact of a one percentage point increase in export taxes is
to decrease the share of exports in total sales by 0.28 percentage points; this result
is statistically significant at the 10% level. Controlling for import tariffs yields very
similar results (column (2)). While the estimated effect of tariffs is insignificantly
31This data, collected by China’s National Bureau of Statistics, includes all non-state industrial
firms with sales above five million Renminbi and all state-owned industrial firms. See the data
appendix for details.
32Because the end of the Multifiber Arrangement probably had a significant impact on textiles
and apparel exports during this period, I drop all textiles and apparel industries from the sample.
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different from zero, its sign is consistent with the prediction that higher import
tariffs stimulate domestic sales, thus increasing the denominator of the left-hand-
side variable. Finally, I check in column (3) whether the main result holds across
raw materials industries, by dropping all downstream industries from the sample.
This slightly reduces the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on export taxes to
-0.22, but it remains statistically significant at the 10% level.
While the evolution of China’s import tariffs during this period is shaped by the
schedule of tariff cuts agreed before its WTO accession, export taxes might have
responded endogeneously to changes in exports or sales, making this specification
susceptible to problems of joint causation. However, the results of Section 1.4 sug-
gest a natural instrumental variables strategy for the subsample of raw materials
industries. Since changes in export taxes after WTO entry are highly correlated to
pre-WTO tariffs for these industries, I can instrument for the change in export taxes
using 1999 tariffs in the following long-difference specification spanning the length
of the sample period (2002 to 2007):
∆exports/salesi = α + β∆exporttaxi + γ∆tariffi + i (1.7)
The results of estimating this specification on the subsample of raw materials
industries may be found in Table 1.13. The OLS results in column (1) are little
different from those of the panel regression in column (3) of Table 1.12, although
the coefficient on the change in export taxes is now significant at the 5% level. In
column (2), I use 1999 tariffs and their square as instruments for ∆exporttaxi, which
produces a first stage with a Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic of approximately
50. The IV results are very similar to the OLS results, and indicate that a one
percentage point increase in export taxes reduces the share of exports in total sales
by 0.26 percentage points.
1.5.2 Effects on exports
Next, I directly consider the effects of export taxes on Chinese exports, using a
more disaggregate source of data – product-level information on trade flows – in
order to facilitate identification. If China’s export taxes have been effective, I should
observe a negative relationship between export taxes on a product and exports of
that product, but a positive relationship between upstream export taxes and exports
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of downstream products. I thus use panel trade data by product p and year t to
estimate the following baseline specification:
ln exportspt = α+ βexporttaxpt + β
Uexporttaxupstreampt + θp + φt + η
′Xpt + pt (1.8)
All regressions include product and year fixed effects. In most specifications,
I also add a set of time-varying regression controls Xpt, including import tariffs,
upstream import tariffs and the logarithm of the value of world trade by product
and year. The sample covers 2002 to 2012, the period over which my data on
export taxes is observed at the product level. Because the left-hand-side variable
is the logarithm of export value, observations with zero trade flows are dropped,
and so the coefficients should be interpreted as pertaining to the intensive margin of
trade. Since Chinese exports are equal to zero in fewer than 3% of the product-year
observations in the sample, this is a reasonable specification here. Along with the
trade policy data discussed above, I use annual product-level trade flow data from
UN COMTRADE for 2002 to 2012 (see data appendix for details).33
As with the analysis of specification (1.4) in Section 1.4.1, the key challenge in
assembling the data on upstream trade policies for this exercise is to define input-
output relationships between products with minimal measurement error. A natural
choice (which will serve as a robustness check below) would be to use data from
China’s input-output table, but as stated earlier, this information is quite coarse:
input-output sectors aggregate a wide range of raw materials (e.g. ‘Mining of non-
ferrous metal ores’) and sometimes include multiple stages of production (e.g. paper
pulp, paper and paper products). Moreover, the broadly defined materials (such as
chemicals and metal) used in Section 1.4.1 to link raw materials and downstream
industries are too aggregate for the purposes of identification here.
I thus instead define input-output linkages between goods using a different source:
information on materials usage embodied in the Harmonized System product clas-
sification. In particular, I identify all nonagricultural primary raw materials in the
HS classification (such as ‘copper ores and concentrates’) using the UN BEC data
discussed in Section 1.4.1, and then find all other (nonprimary) HS products for
which at least one of these raw materials is mentioned in the product description
33I again exclude textiles and apparel, by dropping all products in section 11 of the HS product
classification (which covers textiles and apparel) from the sample.
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(such as ‘copper springs’). For this, I use both the English-language descriptions
of six-digit products and Chinese-language descriptions of products at the more de-
tailed eight-digit level to identify six-digit goods containing these materials; further
details may be found in the data appendix.
This results in a total of 42 raw materials for which both primary and nonprimary
products can be found. The sample consists of the nonprimary products, for each
of which I define the upstream export tax (or import tariff) as the export tax (or
import tariff) on the primary raw material with which the good is associated.34
For the regressions below, I keep only nonprimary products linked to exactly one
material, so that I can cluster all standard errors by primary raw material. This
leaves a total of 588 products in the sample.
Importantly, most of the nonprimary products identified by this exercise are
semiprocessed raw materials such as metals or chemicals rather than parts, acces-
sories or final goods.35 This is a convenient outcome for two reasons. First, this
means that the goods in this sample vary greatly in both their export taxes and
their upstream export taxes, facilitating identification of both β and βU . Second,
as shown in Table 1.6, export taxes on both primary and semiprocessed raw mate-
rials industries are highly correlated with their 1999 tariffs, which will allow for the
simultaneous instrumentation of both of the export tax variables as long differences
in Table 1.16 below. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.14, I run regression (1.8)
with and without controlling for import tariffs and total world trade. Both of the
key coefficient estimates are statistically significant and of the predicted sign in each
of the two columns. The estimated coefficients in column (2) indicate that a rise
in export taxes of one percentage point is associated with a 6.80 percentage point
decline in the value of Chinese exports, while a one point rise in upstream export
taxes is associated with a rise in exports of 0.82 percentage points. Given the in-
direct nature of the effect of upstream export taxes, the difference in magnitudes
between these two coefficients seems reasonable.
In column (3), I replace year fixed effects with section-year fixed effects in the
regression specification. This means that the results are based on a comparison
34This sometimes spans more than one six-digit product (for example, fluorspar is divided into
two six-digit HS products according to calcium fluoride content), in which case I use the simple
average of export taxes (import tariffs) across these products as the upstream export tax (import
tariff).
35It is for this reason that I do not use this input-output data in the analysis of the link between
upstream export taxes and downstream import tariffs in Section 4.1.
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of product-level trends in exports within each of the sections of the HS product
classification, such as chemicals (‘Products of the Chemical and Allied Industries’)
or metals (‘Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal’). Twelve HS sections (out of
a total of 21) are represented in the sample used here. The main results remain
similar to those in the baseline specification in column (2), though the estimated
coefficient on upstream taxes drops from 0.82 to 0.59.
One issue with this data is that a large proportion (41%) of the goods in the
sample are linked to a single primary raw material, iron ore. This is due to the
detailed subdivision of iron and steel products in the HS classification. In column
(4), I thus rerun the regression with section-year fixed effects dropping all products
of this raw material; this does not substantially change the coefficient estimates.
I include the results of several robustness checks in Table 1.15. Since export taxes
are likely to affect the prices of both exports and downstream exports, in column (1)
I instead run the regression using log export quantity instead of log export value.
This makes little difference to the coefficients, although the p-value of the estimated
effect of upstream export taxes now slightly exceeds 0.1. Also, while it is important
to account for trends in world demand that are unrelated to China, the control for
world export value is potentially endogenous because Chinese exports often form a
substantial share of total world trade. I thus estimate a specification without this
control, in which I instead use China’s log share of world trade as the left-hand-side
variable. This also results in little change to either of the coefficients of interest, as
shown in column (2) of Table 1.15.
I next return to the original specification but add indicator variables for other
export-side policies – prohibition of exports via processing trade, and the incidence
of either an export license requirement, export quota or state trading requirement –
to the right-hand side. Column (3) of Table 1.15 shows that the coefficients on the
export tax variables are not substantially affected by this new specification, and that
the estimated coefficient on export processing prohibitions is negative and significant
as expected. However, other export policies are positively associated with exports,
suggesting that the choice of these policies may be endogenous to expected export
growth.36
As in the previous section, I deal with the potential endogeneity of export policies
36Dropping Chinese exports to the US from the baseline regression, so as to address the possibility
that these trends are driven by the changes in US trade policy uncertainty discussed in Footnote
9, also yields extremely similar coefficient estimates, as shown in column (4) of Table 1.15.
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to exports by instrumenting for the export tax variables with pre-WTO tariffs in a
long-difference specification:
∆ ln exportspt = α + β∆exporttaxpt + β
U∆exporttaxupstreampt + η
′∆Xpt + pt (1.9)
Here, I take differences between 2002 and 2012 (the two endpoints of the sample) and
instrument for changes in export taxes and upstream export taxes with quadratics
in 1999 tariffs and upstream 1999 tariffs. As noted above, this is feasible because
most of the ‘downstream’ products in the sample are actually semiprocessed raw
materials, for which export tax changes and 1999 tariffs are highly correlated.
The results of OLS and instrumental variables estimation of specification (1.9)
may be found in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.16 respectively. The coefficients
on export taxes and upstream export taxes in the long-difference specification in
column (1) are somewhat larger in magnitude than those from the panel regressions,
and the effect of upstream export taxes is now statistically insignificant. However,
the IV estimates in column (2) are both statistically significant, and in the case of
upstream export taxes, substantially larger in magnitude than the corresponding
OLS estimate. The results now suggest that a one percentage point rise in export
taxes on a primary raw material between 2002 and 2012 is associated with a 4.63
percentage point increase in exports of downstream products using that material on
average.
Although the above empirical analysis of the indirect effects of export taxes
benefits from the precision of product-level input-output data, this comes at the
cost of the omission of most downstream products from the sample. In Table 1.17, I
thus also present results from panel regressions in which upstream taxes and tariffs
are instead calculated using information from China’s 2002 input-output table (as
discussed in the data appendix). I first reproduce the results of specification (1.8)
(adding section-year fixed effects) using the same sample of products as above, but
this alternative data on upstream policies. As column (1) of Table 1.17 shows, this
results in much larger estimates of the effects of upstream export taxes: the relevant
coefficient estimate is 6.55, as compared to 0.59 in column (3) of Table 1.14.
While this estimate is surprisingly high given the indirect nature of the effect,
it would nonetheless be encouraging if it remained consistent across different sub-
samples of products. In columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.17, I therefore run the same
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regression using two different samples: the full sample of nonagricultural products
and the subsample of final goods, parts and accessories (i.e. omitting both primary
and semiprocessed raw materials). In both cases, this results in a coefficient esti-
mate on upstream export taxes that is similar to that of column (1) and statistically
significant at the 1% level, clustering standard errors by input-output sector.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have studied the persistence of trade policy in China after its
2001 entry into the World Trade Organization. While the conditions of its WTO
accession required China to make cuts to its import tariffs that led to heterogeneous
reductions in protection across sectors, I have documented the recent emergence of
export taxes that are likely to have partly restored China’s pre-WTO pattern of
industrial protection. China’s export taxes are mainly incident on raw materials,
and I have used product-level input-output data to show that larger rises in these
export taxes after WTO accession are associated with greater downstream export
growth.
To what extent might China’s policy of export restrictions on raw materials
be adopted by other developing countries? China’s situation with respect to raw
materials production is an exceptional one, thanks to its large size, capital stock and
land endowments. For instance, as documented by the British Geological Survey
(2010), China was the world’s leading producer in at least 37 categories of minerals
and metals in 2008, in 12 of which it produced more than half of total world output.
In practice, many countries are net importers of most of their raw materials, and very
few countries produce a significant proportion of world output in such a wide range
of upstream sectors. For most developing countries, then, a systematic policy of
restrictions on raw materials exports would probably have a more limited aggregate
effect.
China is nonetheless not the only country to adopt such a policy as an apparent
strategy for industrial development. For example, a ban on the export of 41 un-
processed minerals from Indonesia became effective in January 2014, and associated
regulations set out the extent to which each mineral must be processed in order
to be eligible for export.37 More targeted raw materials export restrictions have
37At a G20 meeting soon after the initial enactment of these regulations, Indonesia’s Minister
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been documented in such diverse settings as Tudor England and nineteenth-century
Egypt. In the former case, export restrictions on raw wool and unfinished cloth were
implemented in order to relocate downstream production from continental Europe
(Chang 2002), while in the latter, state policies equivalent to export taxes offered
advantageous cotton and flax prices to domestic producers of textiles as part of a
push for industrialization (Panza and Williamson 2013).
More generally, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, economic theory
suggests that developing countries may achieve their trade and industrial policy
goals via a wide variety of possible policies, of which the restriction of raw materials
exports is only one. The full impact of multilateral negotiations in reshaping trade
and industrial policy worldwide will remain an open question as long as comprehen-
sive information on these many other possible policy instruments remains sparse.
of Trade spoke of “...the aspiration to move up trade’s value chain, starting from providing raw
materials, then processing raw materials into semi-finished and end products in order for developing
countries, such as Indonesia, to be able to enjoy the benefit of the added value.” (Indonesia Ministry
of Trade 2012)
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1.A Data appendix
Import tariffs and non-tariff barriers
Data for 1997 to 2011 on China’s applied import tariffs and data on China’s bound
tariffs is sourced from the UNCTAD TRAINS and WTO Tariff Analysis Online
databases. Data for 2012 on China’s applied import tariffs is transcribed from the
2012 volume of the annual official publication Customs Import and Export Tariff of
the People’s Republic of China. Information on the set of products for which China’s
accession agreement specifies that non-tariff barriers were to be removed is sourced
from the documents associated with China’s WTO accession available on the WTO
web site.
Export duties
Data sources are discussed in the main text. According to Chinese regulations, for
a published export duty rate tpx for a product p (hereafter this p is dropped), the
tax owing on export sales of that product is calculated according to:
tx
tx + 1
· exportsalesFOB
Here, the free on board (FOB) price is the price at which goods are sold abroad
(i.e. the price of goods after clearing customs). This implies a tax rate of tx on
export sales in terms of pre-duty prices.
VAT export rebates
Data sources are discussed in the main text. For each product and time period, the
data specifies a VAT rate, a rebate rate and the type of rebate policy applied to
the product. Different policy types imply different calculations of equivalent export
taxes based on the associated Chinese regulations (see e.g. Deloitte Touche Tomatsu
2005, Chan 2008).
First note that firms whose sales are entirely domestic normally pay VAT on
value added (at rate tpv for product p), by paying VAT on sales while claiming credit
for the VAT paid on purchases of inputs; i.e. they are charged ‘output VAT’ while
claiming credit for ‘input VAT’. This corresponds to the following formula (again
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omitting p):
tv · sales
tv + 1
− inputV AT
Nonzero rebate, not tax-exempt
Consider a firm which produces the goods it sells abroad, and which exports in
a single product category for which the rebate rate is not zero. Such a firm may
calculate its VAT payable as the difference of output VAT on local sales and input
VAT on local purchases as above, plus a third term d:
d = (exportsalesFOB,p −
∑
p′
bondedp
′
)(V ATratep − rebateratep)
where bondedp
′
corresponds to purchases of imported inputs in sector p′ that do not
go through customs, which may be nonzero if the firm participates in processing
trade.
Say that the firm does not purchase bonded imports, and that its input purchases
may be unambiguously allocated across inputs used for goods sold domestically and
inputs used for exported goods. Then the tax applicable on exports is:
exportsalesFOB,p · (V ATratep − rebateratep)− inputV AT
Under the assumption that the nondistortionary policy is a full rebate of VAT
on exports, this would imply an export tax bill on a given product with VAT rate
tv and rebate rate r of:
(tv − r) · exportsalesFOB
While the firm’s actual tax bill will differ from this depending on its input VAT,
the firm may be assumed to take reimbursement of input VAT into account when
purchasing inputs; i.e. the reimbursement of input VAT may be considered to be
a component of input prices. This implies a tax rate of tv−r
1−(tv−r) on pre-tax export
sales.
Note that if the firm does not produce the goods exported, but instead buys
these from another firm for export, then input VAT (here, the amount of VAT paid
by the firm producing the goods to be exported) is rebated to this firm according to
the prevailing rebate rate, so that it should be the pre-tax rather than the FOB price
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that is used in the calculation above. I abstract from this distinction by assuming
that all exporters are the producers of the goods exported.
Zero rebate, not tax-exempt
Products with a zero rebate rate are treated as products sold domestically, so that
the applicable formula for tax payable is:
tv · sales
tv + 1
− inputV AT
Again assuming that that the nondistortionary policy is a full rebate of VAT on
exports, this implies a tax rate of tv on pre-tax export sales.
Exempt from taxes
A small subset of products are classified as ‘exempt from taxes’, which means that
they pay no output VAT on exports, but their input VAT is not reimbursed. I thus
model the applicable export tax in this case as equal to exporters’ input VAT. I
use the 2002 Chinese input-output table, in which I observe pre-tax gross output
and input shares, to calculate the rate of implied export tax per unit of pre-tax
gross output for a given input-output sector. I then use a concordance between
HS products and 2002 Chinese input-output sectors (see below for details of this
concordance) to apply these export tax rates to each product in the ‘tax-exempt’
category. This assumes uniformity of production functions across products within
input-output industries.
The export tax rate per unit of output for a given input-output sector k is thus
calculated to be: ∑
k′
βkk
′ tk
′
v
1 + tk′v
where βkk
′
is the observed expenditure share per unit currency of (pre-tax) output
of sector k on inputs from sector k′.
Constructing export tax equivalents
Here, I calculate the export tax rate jointly implied by the two policies above, for
each of the three types of VAT export rebate policies.
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Nonzero rebate, not tax-exempt
The applicable export taxes are:
tx
tx + 1
exportsales+ (tv − r) · exportsales
We may calculate the tax rate on pre-tax export sales using:
ppretax = pFOB − tx
tx + 1
pFOB − (tv − r) · pFOB
=⇒ pFOB =
(
1− tx
tx + 1
− (tv − r)
)−1
ppretax
=⇒ pFOB =
(
tx + (tv − r) + tx(tv − r)
1− (tv − r)− tx(tv − r) + 1
)
ppretax
So the applicable export tax rate on pre-tax export sales is tx+(tv−r)+tx(tv−r)
1−(tv−r)−tx(tv−r) .
Zero rebate, not tax-exempt
The applicable export taxes are:
tx
tx + 1
exportsales+
tv
tv + 1
exportsales
We may calculate the tax rate on pre-tax export sales using:
ppretax = pFOB − tx
tx + 1
pFOB − tv
tv + 1
pFOB
=⇒ pFOB =
(
1− tx
tx + 1
− tv
tv + 1
)−1
ppretax
=⇒ pFOB =
(
tx + tv + 2txtv
1− txtv + 1
)
ppretax
So the applicable export tax rate on pre-tax export sales is tx+tv+2txtv
1−txtv .
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Exempt from taxes
The export tax rate on pre-tax sales due only to non-reimbursement of input VAT
may be calculated as:
pV AT = ppretax +
∑
k′
βkk
′ tk
′
v
1 + tk′v
pV AT
=⇒ pV AT = 1
1−∑k′ βkk′ tk′v1+tk′v p
pretax
Export duties then imply that:
pFOB = pV AT +
tx
1 + tx
pFOB
=⇒ pFOB =
(
1− tx
tx + 1
)−1 1
1−∑k′ βkk′ tk′v1+tk′v
 ppretax
=⇒ pFOB =
tx +∑k′ βkk′ tk′v1+tk′v
1−∑k′ βkk′ tk′v1+tk′v + 1
 ppretax
So the applicable export tax rate on pre-tax export sales is
tx+
∑
k′ β
kk′ tk
′
v
1+tk
′
v
1−∑k′ βkk′ tk′v
1+tk
′
v
.
Prohibitions of exports via processing trade
Data for 2005 to 2012 on products prohibited from export via processing trade is
assembled from the set of ad hoc official notices updating the list of prohibited
products; I observe these notices starting in 2004. I define the policies prevailing
on January 1 of each year as the data for that year, with the exception of 2008,
when I also include major changes to the list of prohibited products that took effect
in mid-January. The data is observed at the ten-digit product level, and I define
a six-digit HS product as subject to a prohibition if at least one of its constituent
ten-digit goods is subject to such a prohibition. The full list of notices is as follows:
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu, guojia huanjing baohu zongju gonggao (2004) no. 55
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2005) no. 26
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2005) no. 50
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu, huanbao zongju gonggao (2005) no. 105
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu, huanbao zongju gonggao (2006) no. 63
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu, guojia huanjing baohu zongju gonggao (2006) no. 82
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Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu, huanbao zongju gonggao (2007) no. 17
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2007) no. 110
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2008) no. 22
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2008) no. 121
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2009) no. 37
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu lianhe gonggao (2010) no. 63
Export licenses, quotas, state trading and designated trading
Data for 2002 to 2012 on products requiring export licenses, subject to export quotas,
or subject to designated trading or state trading requirements is taken from the
annual official notices announcing this list of products. I do not include textiles
and apparel products affected by the Multifiber Agreement or subsequent bilateral
agreements. I also exclude goods on lists of dual-use products subject to export
quotas or lists relating only to small-scale border trade. Some categories of goods
are moved from the ‘main’ list to the list of dual-use products during the sample
period, and I do not include these products in any year. I do include a separately
published list of tobacco products that are subject to export restrictions throughout
the period. The data is observed at the ten-digit product level, and I define a six-
digit HS product as subject to one of these policies if at least one of its constituent
ten-digit goods is subject to the policy. The full list of notices is as follows:
Duiwai maoyi jingji hezuo bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2001) no. 17
Duiwai maoyi jingji hezuo bu gonggao (2001) no. 44
Duiwai maoyi jingji hezuo bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2002) no. 59
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2003) no. 64
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2004) no. 78
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2005) no. 85
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2006) no. 100
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2007) no. 101
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2008) no. 100
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2009) no. 125
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2010) no. 128
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2011) no. 98
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Export prohibitions
Data for 2002 to 2012 on goods prohibited from export is assembled from a set of
ad hoc official notices. I drop any product (at the level of aggregation used in the
relevant official notice) subject to an export prohibition in any year from the data
used in the empirical analysis in all years. The full list of notices is as follows:
Duiwai maoyi jingji hezuo bu gonggao (2001) no. 19
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu, linyeju gonggao (2003) no. 27
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu, linyeju gonggao (2004) no. 40
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu, guojia huanjing baohu zongju gonggao (2005) no. 116
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2006) no. 16
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2006) no. 35
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2006) no. 87
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2008) no. 96
Shangwu bu, haiguan zongshu gonggao (2009) no. 110
Concordance between products and industries
To define variables at the industry level, I use a National Bureau of Statistics concor-
dance between four-digit Chinese industries and eight-digit HS products (according
to the 2005 Chinese product classification) kindly provided to me by Loren Brandt,
Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Luhang Wang and Yifan Zhang. After aggregating to
the six-digit level, I drop any six-digit products that are concorded to more than
one two-digit industry, since I cluster at the two-digit industry level in the empirical
analysis. I then average the relevant data across the six-digit products concorded
to each industry.
Definition of nonagricultural products and industries
I omit from the empirical analysis all eight-digit HS products defined as ‘agricultural
products’ in China’s official schedule of bound tariffs (available from the WTO web
site); these are the products covered by the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture. So
that I do not exclude agricultural products but include their major raw materials,
I also drop fertilizers and pesticides from the analysis. I use a 2005 concordance of
Chinese industries to HS products from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (see
above) to identify fertilizers and pesticides products in the HS data as those produced
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by the three-digit industries ‘Fertilizer manufacture’ and ‘Pesticide manufacture’. I
use the same concordance to classify industries into agricultural and agricultural
raw materials industries, according to whether at least half of their products are
agricultural goods or agricultural raw materials.
Definition of raw materials and capital goods
I define raw materials as HS products identified by the UN Broad Economic Cate-
gories (BEC) classification as neither ‘consumption goods’ nor ‘capital goods’ (ac-
cording to its correspondence with the System of National Accounts, which is in-
cluded in the BEC documentation), nor as ‘parts and accessories’. I also divide
raw materials products into primary or semiprocessed raw materials according to
whether they are classified in BEC as primary goods. I then use a 2005 concordance
of Chinese industries to HS products from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (see
above) to classify industries as raw materials industries, and then into primary or
semiprocessed raw materials industries, according to whether more than half of their
products are in these categories. Capital goods and capital goods industries are clas-
sified similarly, defining both final capital products and their parts and accessories
as capital goods.
Downstream import tariffs
Data for 2002 to 2012 on downstream import tariffs (for the analysis of Table 1.8 in
Section 1.4.1) is derived using China’s 2002 input-output table. I begin by concord-
ing four-digit industries to input-output sectors using a concordance from Brandt et
al. (2012b). I then classify each input-output sector concorded to at least one raw
materials industry as a producer of one of nine broad categories of materials: chem-
icals, fuels, leather and furs, metal, nonmetallic minerals, plastic, rubber, textiles,
and wood and paper (with the exception of ‘Manufacture of synthetic materials’,
as discussed below; also, sectors producing aquatic products are dropped from this
analysis). For all other nonagricultural input-output sectors, I sum the input shares
(from the 2002 input-output table) of each of these groups of raw materials input-
output sectors, and define the main constituent material of each sector according to
the maximum of these nine input shares. This procedure generates a concordance
between four-digit industries and the nine broad materials categories. However, a
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few industries for which the constituent material is explicitly stated in the name of
the industry (including the industries concorded to the input-output sector ‘Man-
ufacture of synthetic materials’, such as ‘Manufacture of plastic in primary forms’)
are hand-concorded to that material. For each raw materials industry producing a
given material, the mean downstream tariff is defined as the simple average of the
tariffs of all downstream industries using that material, while the maximum down-
stream tariff is defined as the maximum of the tariffs of all downstream industries
using that material. Fuels are not associated with any downstream industries by
this procedure and so are omitted from the analysis.
Effective rates of protection
Data on effective rates of protection by industry is derived using definitions from
Corden (1966) and China’s 2002 input-output table. I first concord products to
input-output sectors using information from a 2005 concordance of Chinese indus-
tries to HS products from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (see above). Am-
biguous or missing concordances are coded using a concordance of products to 2007
input-output sectors from China’s 2007 input-output table, or by hand when nec-
essary. I define export taxes (or import tariffs) for each input-output sector as the
simple average of export taxes (or import tariffs) across the six-digit products in
that sector. For bound tariffs, I first reassign product-level tariff rates to be equal
to 1999 applied tariffs whenever bound tariffs exceed 1999 applied tariffs. I then
calculate each sector’s input tariff or input export tax by using the shares of each
input sector in the gross output of that sector as weights. I also take information on
the share of value added in gross output for each input-output sector from China’s
2002 input-output table. Finally, I use a concordance of four-digit industries to
input-output sectors from Brandt et al. (2012b) to assign input tariffs, input export
taxes and value added shares to each four-digit industry in each year. I calculate the
effective rate of protection due to tariffs for an industry as the difference between
its tariff and its input tariff, divided by its value added share. Similarly, I calculate
the effective rate of protection due to export taxes for an industry as the difference
between its input export tax and its export tax, divided by its value added share.
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Industry-level sales and export data
Data for 2002 to 2007 on industry-level exports and sales as reported by firms in
current Renminbi are based on industry-level tabulations of China’s annual firm-
level survey of industrial production, as collected by China’s National Bureau of
Statistics. This data includes all non-state industrial firms with sales above five
million Renminbi and all state-owned industrial firms. Exports (sales) for each
industry are defined as the total of exports (sales) for all firms in the industry,
excluding those reporting negative output, sales, exports or employment. Since the
2002 survey data uses a older industrial classification, I concord these sectors to
industries as defined after 2002 using the concordance provided by Brandt et al.
(2012b).
Trade flows
Data for 2002 to 2012 on trade flows is sourced from the UN COMTRADE database,
using FOB data provided by China as the source for information on Chinese exports
by value and quantity. Data on world trade flows is also sourced from the UN
COMTRADE database, and is equal to the total of all export flows reported by
exporters. For all trade quantity data, I use only information on net weight in
kilograms where available.
Upstream import tariffs and export taxes
Data for 2002 to 2012 on upstream import tariffs and export taxes (for the analysis
of Section 1.5.2) is derived in two ways. The first method uses product descriptions
in the 2002 English-language six-digit HS classification and the 2002 to 2006 Chinese
eight-digit product classifications (which are equivalent at the six-digit level). I first
identify all primary six-digit products using the UN BEC classification, ignoring
agricultural primary products and primary products in section 11 (i.e. textiles). I
then identify all nonprimary HS products for which at least one of these primary
raw materials is mentioned in the product description, with the goal of finding
products made of that raw material. I thus exclude products with references such as
‘other than (material)’ and other irrelevant products such as machines for cutting
the material. Using these criteria narrows the data to products made of 42 different
primary raw materials. I include in the final dataset only nonprimary products
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whose descriptions refer to exactly one of these materials, so that I may cluster by
primary raw material. I then define upstream export taxes (or import tariffs) as
the average export tax (or import tariff) across the six-digit HS products associated
with a particular raw material (e.g. roasted and unroasted molybdenum ores).
The second method uses China’s 2002 input-output table. Products are con-
corded to input-output sectors using information from a 2005 concordance of Chinese
industries to HS products from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (see above).
Ambiguous or missing concordances are coded using a concordance of products to
2007 input-output sectors from China’s 2007 input-output table, or by hand when
necessary. I define export taxes (or import tariffs) for each input-output sector as
the simple average of export taxes (or import tariffs) across the six-digit products
in that sector. I then calculate each sector’s upstream tariffs by using the shares of
each input sector in the total intermediate usage of the downstream sector, omitting
the diagonal, as weights.
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1.B Figures
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Figure 1.1: Standard deviation of China’s applied import tariffs and export tax
equivalents of China’s export VAT rebate policies and export duties across nonagri-
cultural products, 1997 to 2012
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Figure 1.2: Mean of export tax equivalents of China’s export VAT rebate policies
and export duties across nonagricultural products by stage of production, 1997 to
2012
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Figure 1.3: Mean and standard deviation of China’s applied import tariffs across
nonagricultural products, 1997 to 2012
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Figure 1.4: Mean and standard deviation of export tax equivalents of China’s export
VAT rebate policies across nonagricultural products, 1994 to 2012
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Figure 1.5: Mean and standard deviation of export tax equivalents of China’s export
VAT rebate policies and export duties across nonagricultural products, 1997 to 2012
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Figure 1.6: Scatter plots of 2002 and 2012 export tax equivalents of China’s VAT
rebate policies and export duties and 1999 applied tariffs by industry
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Figure 1.7: Coefficients of annual industry-level regressions of export tax equivalents
of China’s export VAT rebate policies and export duties on 1999 applied tariffs, 1997
to 2012
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Figure 1.8: Product-level coordination between export tax rises and changes in other
export policies, 2002 to 2012
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1.C Tables
Table 1.1: Summary statistics of Chinese trade policies
A. Import tariffs
1999 applied Bound
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Import tariffs 0.161 0.098 0.093 0.060
B. Export tax equivalents of VAT export rebate policies and export duties
2002 2012
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
VAT export rebate policies 0.019 0.020 0.063 0.063
Export duties 0.002 0.023 0.007 0.036
Total export tax equivalent 0.021 0.033 0.073 0.093
C. Export processing prohibitions
2005 2012
Share of products covered Share of products covered
Export processing prohibitions 0.0003 0.158
D. Other export policies
2002 2012
Share of products covered Share of products covered
Export licenses 0.020 0.042
Export quotas 0.019 0.017
State or other designated trading 0.008 0.007
Any of the above 0.022 0.043
These summary statistics include the mean and standard deviation across nonagricultural products of the
policies in Panels A and B and the proportion of six-digit nonagricultural products covered by the policies
in Panels C and D. See data appendix for information on data sources for all policy variables.
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Table 1.3: Changes in export taxes and pre-WTO tariffs by in-
strument
Dependent variable: Export tax 2012 - export tax 2002
(1) (2) (3)
Taxes calculated using: Both VAT policy Export
policies only duties only
Tariff 1999 -0.51*** -0.30*** -0.14***
(0.17) (0.10) (0.05)
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Observations 402 402 402
Clusters 35 35 35
R2 0.25 0.22 0.16
This table displays the results of regressions of changes in Chinese export
taxes between 2002 and 2012 on China’s 1999 import tariffs. The unit of
observation is a four-digit industry. In column (1), the dependent variable
is the difference between the 2012 and 2002 joint export tax equivalent of
China’s export VAT rebate policies and its export duties. In column (2), the
dependent variable is the difference between the 2012 and 2002 export tax
equivalent of China’s export VAT rebate policies only. In column (3), the
dependent variable is the difference between 2012 and 2002 export duties.
Robust standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the two-digit
industry level. p-values derived from wild bootstraps (as in Cameron et al.
2008) are in square brackets. Small p-values are represented by *** (less
than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
Table 1.4: Large changes in export taxes and 1999 tariffs by stage of production
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: Top 25% of Top 25% of All industries
1999 tariffs export tax changes
Primary raw materials 0 33 37
Semiprocessed raw materials 32 63 137
Capital goods industries 14 3 138
Other downstream industries 54 2 90
Total 100 101 402
This is a frequency table classifying industries by their stage in the value chain according to the
UN Broad Economic Categories classification; see data appendix for details. Column (1) includes
industries in the top quartile of China’s 1999 applied tariffs. Column (2) includes industries in
the top quartile of rises in the export tax equivalent of China’s export VAT policy and export
duties between 2002 and 2012. Column (3) includes the full sample of nonagricultural industries.
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Table 1.5: Changes in export taxes and pre-
WTO tariffs by stage of production
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Tariff Export tax
1999 change
Primary -0.19*** 0.22***
raw materials (0.02) (0.03)
[0.002] [0.000]
Semiprocessed -0.08*** 0.07***
raw materials (0.02) (0.02)
[0.002] [0.000]
Capital goods -0.08*** -0.01
industry (0.01) (0.01)
[0.002] [0.44]
Observations 402 402
Clusters 35 35
R2 0.31 0.52
The dependent variable in column (1) is China’s 1999
applied tariffs, and in column (2) it is the difference
between 2012 and 2002 export taxes. Both regres-
sions include dummies for primary raw materials indus-
tries, semiprocessed raw materials industries and cap-
ital goods industries. The omitted category is other
downstream industries. The unit of observation is a
four-digit industry. Both regressions are estimated us-
ing ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors (in
round brackets) are clustered at the 2-digit industry
level. p-values derived from wild bootstraps (as in
Cameron et al. 2008) are in square brackets. Small
p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less
than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 1.6: Changes in export taxes and pre-WTO tariffs within stage of production
Dependent variable: Export tax 2012 - export tax 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: All raw Primary Semiprocessed Capital Other
materials raw materials raw materials goods downstream
Tariff 1999 -0.92*** -2.00** -0.66*** -0.002 -0.04
(0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.02) (0.04)
[0.002] [0.013] [0.004] [0.90] [0.30]
Observations 174 37 137 138 90
Clusters 29 11 22 8 22
R2 0.47 0.46 0.32 0.00 0.01
This table displays the results of regressions of the difference between 2012 and 2002 Chinese export taxes
on China’s 1999 applied tariffs. The unit of observation is a four-digit industry. The sample in column
(1) includes all raw materials industries, in column (2) all primary raw materials industries, in column
(3) all semiprocessed raw materials industries, in column (4) all capital goods industries and in column
(5) all other downstream industries. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust
standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the two-digit industry level. p-values derived from wild
bootstraps (as in Cameron et al. 2008) are in square brackets. Small p-values are represented by *** (less
than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
Table 1.7: Changes in export taxes, stage of production and
pre-WTO tariffs
Dependent variable: Export tax 2012 - export tax 2002
(1)
Tariff 1999 -0.001
(0.02)
[0.95]
Raw materials 0.22***
industry (0.03)
[0.000]
Raw materials -0.91***
* tariff 1999 (0.18)
[0.004]
Observations 402
Clusters 35
R2 0.62
This table displays the results of a regression of the difference between
2012 and 2002 export taxes on 1999 applied tariffs, a dummy for raw
materials industries and their interaction. The unit of observation is
a four-digit industry. The regression is estimated using ordinary least
squares. Robust standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at
the two-digit industry level. p-values derived from wild bootstraps (as
in Cameron et al. 2008) are in square brackets. Small p-values are
represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than
10%).
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Table 1.8: Changes in raw materials export taxes and downstream pre-WTO tariffs
Dependent variable: Export tax 2012 - export tax 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Downstream tariff Mean tariff Mean tariff Max tariff Max tariff
calculated using: (incl capital) (not incl capital) (incl capital) (not incl capital)
Tariff 1999 -0.82** -0.90** -0.81*** -0.80***
(0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15)
[0.015] [0.015] [0.003] [0.003]
Downstream -0.61*** 0.05 0.15*** 0.15***
tariff 1999 (0.09) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03)
[0.007] [0.50] [0.005] [0.005]
Observations 164 164 164 164
Clusters 8 8 8 8
R2 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.52
This table displays the results of regressions of changes in Chinese export taxes between 2002 and 2012 on
China’s 1999 import tariffs in the same industry and in downstream industries. The unit of observation is a
four-digit industry. The sample includes all raw materials industries. In columns (1) and (2), downstream
tariffs are calculated as the mean of the tariffs on the downstream industries associated with a given ma-
terial; in column (2), capital goods industries are excluded from this calculation. In columns (3) and (4),
downstream tariffs are calculated as the maximum of the tariffs on the downstream industries associated
with a given material; in column (4), capital goods industries are excluded from this calculation. Robust
standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered by material. p-values derived from wild bootstraps (as in
Cameron et al. 2008) are in square brackets. Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less
than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 1.9: Robustness to including share of Chinese exports in
world trade
Dependent variable: Export tax 2012 - export tax 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
Tariff 1999 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Raw materials 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18***
product (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Raw materials -0.71*** -0.72*** -0.70***
* tariff 1999 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
China share -0.04 0.01 -0.08
of world trade 2012 (0.04) (0.02) (0.0614)
Square of China share 0.13
of world trade 2012 (0.08)
Observations 3,662 3,662 3,662 3,662
Clusters 76 76 76 76
KP F stat 716.6 699.6 78.6
R2 0.43
The dependent variable in all regressions is the difference between 2012 and
2002 export taxes. Column (1) displays the results of an OLS regression of
this variable on 1999 applied tariffs, a dummy for raw materials industries
and their interaction. Column (2) displays the results of an IV regression
of this variable on the share of Chinese exports in total world exports by
value in 2012, instrumented with the share of Chinese exports in total world
exports by value in 2002. Column (3) displays the results of an IV regression
incorporating all of the above independent variables and using the same
instrument for China’s 2012 world trade share. Column (4) displays the
results of an IV regression also adding the square of the share of Chinese
exports in total world exports, using China’s 2002 world trade share and its
square as instruments. The unit of observation is a six-digit HS product.
Robust standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the two-digit
HS product level. Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), **
(less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 1.10: Export taxes, import tariffs and non-tariff bar-
riers to imports
Dependent variable: Export tax 2012 - export tax 2002
Tariff 1999 0.01
(0.03)
[0.64]
Import NTB cut -0.02
(0.01)
[0.15]
Raw materials 0.22***
industry (0.03)
[0.000]
Raw materials -0.90***
* tariff 1999 (0.17)
[0.002]
Raw materials -0.10***
* import NTB cut (0.02)
[0.004]
Observations 402
Clusters 35
R2 0.64
The table displays the results of a regression of the difference be-
tween 2012 and 2002 export taxes on 1999 applied tariffs, the share
of products on which China’s WTO accession agreement specifies that
non-tariff barriers to imports were to be removed, a dummy for raw
materials industries, and the interactions of each of the first two right-
hand-side variables with the raw materials dummy. The unit of ob-
servation is a four-digit industry. The regression is estimated using
ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors (in round brackets)
are clustered at the two-digit industry level. p-values derived from
wild bootstraps (as in Cameron et al. 2008) are in square brackets.
Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than
5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 1.11: Offsetting changes in effective rates
of protection
Dependent variable: ∆ ERP via export taxes
∆ ERP -0.36***
via tariffs (0.12)
[0.002]
Observations 402
Clusters 35
R2 0.07
The table displays the results of a regression of the dif-
ference in effective rates of protection (ERP) between the
2002 and 2012 schedules of Chinese export taxes on the
change in ERPs between China’s 1999 tariff schedule and
its schedule of bound tariffs (adjusting bound tariffs to
equal 1999 tariffs when 1999 tariffs exceed bound tariffs).
The unit of observation is a four-digit industry. The re-
gression is estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust
standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the
two-digit industry level. p-values derived from wild boot-
straps (as in Cameron et al. 2008) are in square brackets.
Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), **
(less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 1.12: Export taxes and share of exports in total sales
Dependent variable: Share of exports in total sales
(1) (2) (3)
All All Raw materials
industries industries only
Export tax -0.28* -0.27* -0.22*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
[0.07] [0.07] [0.054]
Tariff -0.22 -0.32
(0.23) (0.36)
[0.42] [0.45]
Industry FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Observations 1,908 1,908 810
Clusters 30 30 26
R2 0.05 0.05 0.11
This table displays the results of panel regressions of the share of exports
in sales on export taxes and import tariffs. All regressions also include
industry and year fixed effects. The unit of observation is a four-digit
industry. Columns (1) and (2) display the results of regressions including
the entire sample of industries, while column (3) displays the results of a
regression including only raw materials industries. Textiles and apparel
industries are omitted from the sample. Robust standard errors (in round
brackets) are clustered at the two-digit industry level. p-values derived
from wild bootstraps (as in Cameron et al. 2008) are in square brackets.
Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or
* (less than 10%).
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Table 1.13: Export taxes and share of exports in total
sales - long-difference IV regressions
Dependent variable: ∆ Share of exports in total sales
(1) (2)
Sample: Raw materials Raw materials
only only
OLS IV
∆ Export tax -0.20** -0.26*
(0.05) (0.08)
[0.01] [0.05]
∆ Tariff -0.33 -0.27
(0.58) (0.60)
[0.58] [0.65]
Observations 135 135
Clusters 26 26
KP F stat 50.3
R2 0.04
This table displays the results of long-difference regressions of the
share of exports in total sales on export taxes and import tariffs
using data from 2002 and 2007. The unit of observation is a four-
digit industry. The sample includes raw materials industries only.
Column (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares, while column
(2) is estimated using two-stage least squares. In column (2), I
instrument for the change in export taxes between 2002 and 2007
using import tariffs in 1999 and their square. Textiles and apparel
industries are omitted from the sample. Robust standard errors (in
round brackets) are clustered at the two-digit industry level. p-
values derived from wild bootstraps (as in Cameron et al. 2008) are
in square brackets. ‘KP F stat’ signifies the first-stage Kleibergen-
Paap Wald F statistic. Small p-values are represented by *** (less
than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 1.14: Export taxes and exports - panel regressions using HS descriptions
Dependent variable: Log export value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: All products All products All products Excluding iron
Export tax -6.62*** -6.80*** -7.46*** -5.57***
(1.15) (1.10) (1.03) (1.29)
Upstream export tax 1.03** 0.82** 0.59** 0.66**
(0.45) (0.34) (0.29) (0.26)
Product FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Section-year FE YES YES
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 6,371 6,371 6,371 3,707
Clusters 42 42 42 41
R2 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.32
This table displays the results of panel regressions of log export value on export taxes and upstream
export taxes. The unit of observation is a six-digit product-year. All columns include product fixed
effects. Columns (1) and (2) include year fixed effects and columns (3) and (4) include HS section-
year fixed effects. Columns (2), (3) and (4) also include import tariffs, upstream import tariffs and
log value of world exports as controls. Column (4) excludes all products with iron ore identified
as the primary raw material. Upstream export taxes and import tariffs are calculated using HS
product descriptions; see data appendix for details. Textiles and apparel products are omitted from
the sample. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors (in
round brackets) are clustered by primary raw material. Small p-values are represented by *** (less
than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 1.15: Export taxes and exports - robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Log export Log China share Log export Log export
quantity of world trade value value
Import partners: (all) (all) (all) (excl US)
Export tax -8.30*** -7.48*** -7.07*** -7.54***
(0.98) (0.98) (1.73) (1.01)
Upstream export tax 0.58 0.57* 0.46* 0.57**
(0.35) (0.29) (0.23) (0.27)
Export processing ban -0.46*
(0.24)
Other export policy 0.95**
(0.37)
Product FE YES YES YES YES
Section-year FE YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 6,325 6,371 6,371 6,367
Clusters 42 42 42 42
R2 0.28 0.21 0.42 0.41
This table displays the results of panel regressions of various dependent variables on export taxes
and upstream export taxes. The dependent variable in column (1) is log export quantity, the
dependent variable in column (2) is China’s log share of world exports, and the dependent variable
in columns (3) and (4) is log export value. The unit of observation is a six-digit product-year. All
columns include product and HS section-year fixed effects, and a set of controls including import
tariffs and upstream import tariffs. Column (1) also controls for log quantity of world exports.
Columns (3) and (4) also control for log value of world exports. Column (3) also includes indicators
for whether a product is subject to a prohibition of exports via processing trade or one of the other
export policies discussed in Section 4.2.3. Exports in columns (1) to (3) are calculated using all
of China’s trade partners, while exports in column (4) exclude exports to the US. Upstream taxes
and tariffs are calculated using HS product descriptions; see data appendix for details. Textiles
and apparel products are omitted from the sample. All regressions are estimated using ordinary
least squares. Robust standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered by primary raw material.
Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 1.16: Export taxes and exports - long-
difference IV regressions using HS descriptions
Dependent variable: ∆ Log export value
(1) (2)
OLS IV
∆ Export tax -10.45*** -12.37***
(1.71) (2.16)
∆ Upstream export tax 1.45 4.63***
(1.02) (0.99)
Controls YES YES
Observations 560 560
Clusters 40 40
KP F stat 13.7
R2 0.23
This table displays the results of long-difference regres-
sions of log export value on export taxes and upstream
export taxes using data from 2002 and 2012. The unit of
observation is a six-digit product. Additional control vari-
ables include long differences of import tariffs, upstream
import tariffs and log value of world exports. Upstream
export taxes and import tariffs are calculated using HS
product descriptions; see data appendix for details. Col-
umn (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares, while
column (2) is estimated using two-stage least squares. In
column (2), I instrument for the change in export taxes
between 2002 and 2012 and the change in upstream export
taxes between 2002 and 2012 using import tariffs in 1999
and their square and upstream import tariffs in 1999 and
their square. Textiles and apparel products are omitted
from the sample. Robust standard errors (in round brack-
ets) are clustered by primary raw material. Small p-values
are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%)
or * (less than 10%).
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Table 1.17: Export taxes and exports - panel regressions using input-output
table
Dependent variable: Log export value
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: Products in HS All Final goods,
descriptions sample products parts and accessories
Export tax -7.52*** -5.10*** -4.57***
(1.70) (1.11) (0.82)
Upstream export tax 6.55*** 6.99*** 8.22***
(1.42) (1.39) (2.60)
Product FE YES YES YES
Section-year FE YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 6,371 31,470 14,617
Clusters 38 69 46
R2 0.42 0.45 0.59
This table displays the results of panel regressions of log export value on export taxes and
upstream export taxes. The unit of observation is a six-digit product-year. All columns
include product and HS section-year fixed effects, and a set of controls including import tariffs,
upstream import tariffs and log value of world exports. The sample in column (1) is the same
as the sample used in the regressions of Table 1.14. The sample in column (2) is the full set of
nonagricultural products, while the sample in column (3) includes only downstream products
as defined in Section 4.1; i.e. final goods and their parts and accessories. Upstream taxes and
tariffs are calculated using the 2002 Chinese input-output table; see data appendix for details.
Textiles and apparel products are omitted from the sample. All regressions are estimated
using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the
input-output sector level. Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than
5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Chapter 2
Winners and Losers from a
Commodities-for-Manufactures
Trade Boom
[W]e need to iron out distortions in the trade relationship, in which
Brazil sells commodities and China manufactures.
– Sergio Amaral, former Brazilian trade minister (Bloomberg 2011)
2.1 Introduction
China’s recent emergence as a major force in the world economy is one of the largest
economic events of recent times. The combination of China’s exceptionally high
rates of economic growth, its increasingly deep engagement with the rest of the
world via international trade, and the sheer size of its stock of labour, land and
capital has generated a set of economic shocks whose influence stretches worldwide.
Much of the attention on the effects of China on the economies of other countries
has focused on the import competition shock associated with the massive growth
of the Chinese manufacturing sector. However, China is also an increasingly large
consumer of goods produced abroad: if China has been the source of a large supply
shock, it must also have been the source of a large demand shock. We will consider
the heterogeneous effects of these supply-side and demand-side ‘China shocks’ on
developing-country labour markets, by examining the case of Brazil.
For developing countries, the ‘China demand shock’ has taken a distinctive form:
increasingly, outside of the manufacturing supply chains of East and Southeast Asia,
the goods being sent to China by non-high-income countries are products of the
agricultural and extractive sectors. Panel A of Figure 2.1 shows that while there
has been a gradual rise in the share of agricultural and extractive sectors in the
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exports of non-high-income countries (excluding those in East and Southeast Asia)
to destinations other than China, the importance of these industries in their exports
to China has changed much more dramatically, rising from less than 20% in 1995
to nearly 70% in 2010. Meanwhile, developing countries’ imports from China have
become increasingly concentrated in manufactures: Panel B of Figure 2.1 shows that
the share of products of the agricultural and extractive sectors in the imports of
non-high-income countries from China, already small (6%) in 1995, had dwindled to
1% by 2010. This shift towards a commodities-for-manufactures trade relationship
with China has coincided with a sharp increase in China’s overall importance in
developing countries’ foreign trade (Panel A of Figure 2.2).
Just as the import side of this boom in trade with China has often been met
with suspicion by policymakers and commentators concerned about effects on local
industry (see e.g. Economist 2012), China’s rising demand for unglamorous agricul-
tural and mining products has similarly not always been treated with enthusiasm.
Before a visit to China in 2011, Brazil’s president pledged that she would be “work-
ing to promote Brazilian products other than basic commodities,” amid concern
that “overreliance on exports of basic items such as iron ore and soy” might result
in ‘de-industrialization’ (LA Times 2011).
In our study of Brazil, we examine the changing labour market outcomes of re-
gions producing manufactures affected by rising Chinese import supply and localities
specializing in raw materials demanded by China. We find that while labour markets
in ‘loser’ regions indeed appear to have suffered from Chinese import competition via
slower growth in manufacturing wages and rising wage inequality, it is also the case
that ‘winner’ regions have gained from Chinese export demand, through faster wage
growth, lower takeup of social assistance and shifts in the local economy towards
‘good jobs’.
Brazil provides an excellent context for a study of China’s impact on developing
countries’ labour markets for several reasons. First, the importance of China in both
the imports and exports of Brazil has risen steeply in recent years, as seen in Panel
B of Figure 2.2. In 2000, Brazil received approximately 2.3% of its imports by value
from China and sent 2.0% of its exports to China; by 2010, these shares were 14.5%
and 15.1% respectively. Second, the pattern of Brazil-China trade has followed the
broad trends outlined above for the wider set of non-high-income countries: Brazil-
ian exports to China are increasingly products of the agricultural and extractive
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sectors, while Brazilian imports from China have remained concentrated in man-
ufacturing (see Figure 2.3). Third, Brazil is particularly large and has a diverse
geography, generating a set of local labour markets that are highly varied in their
comparative advantages, and thus allowing for identification of the heterogeneous
effects of trade with China without relying on cross-country regressions. Fourth,
the Brazilian population census captures a variable of particular relevance in devel-
oping countries: informality. This is important both because the informal sector is
large – in Brazil, approximately half of the employed population in 2000 were either
informal salaried workers or self-employed – and because the (de-)formalization of
labour markets is a potentially important but understudied effect of trade shocks
affecting developing countries.
In order to identify the effects of demand and supply shocks originating from
China on local labour markets in Brazil, we use the shift-share methodology of Bartik
(1991), which has previously been applied to the study of trade shocks by Topalova
(2007), Autor et al. (2013) and others. This method compares locations with
different initial comparative advantages, tracing the fortunes of regions whose basket
of industries has been faced with steeper increases in Chinese supply or demand, as
compared to locations whose industries have been relatively unaffected by China’s
emergence. Because some agricultural, extractive and manufacturing industries have
been affected more than others by China, we are able to compare regions with
identical initial employment shares in each of these three broad categories. For
example, our identification strategy relies on comparisons of regions with the same
share of employment in agriculture in 2000 but different patterns of specialization
across crops. Our measures of Chinese supply and demand shocks are based on
changes in actual trade flows between China and Brazil, but we instrument for
these variables to ensure that our results capture neither Brazil-specific shocks nor
changes in world prices that are not directly due to China. We also run robustness
checks that account for the possibility that our results are driven by other region-
specific trends.
We consider the changes between 2000 and 2010 in several key characteristics
of local labour markets that can be observed using Brazilian census data: wages,
employment rates, in-migration rates, informality and occupational skill level, along
with participation in one of the largest cash transfer programs in the world, Bolsa
Famı´lia. We find that locations subject to larger increases in Chinese import com-
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petition experienced slower growth in manufacturing wages and in-migration rates
during this period, as well as a greater rise in local wage inequality. Our estimates
suggest that for a local labour market at the 80th percentile of the ‘China supply
shock’, wage growth in manufacturing sectors was lower by 2.4 percentage points
over the ten years between 2000 and 2010, while wage inequality rose by an addi-
tional 0.8% relative to average 2000 levels. On the other hand, the supply shock
does not appear to have been associated with a fall in employment rates. Instead,
there is some evidence of a rise in the employment rates of affected locations, though
this appears to have involved a shift in the local structure of employment towards
unskilled jobs in nontraded sectors and a decline in the share of the workforce in
skilled manufacturing jobs.
Meanwhile, in locations more exposed to rising demand from China, average
hourly wages increased more quickly during the period of study: a local labour
market at the 80th percentile of the shock to Chinese demand experienced wage
growth in the agricultural and extractive sectors that was four percentage points
higher over the course of the decade. This wage effect appears to have spilled over
to workers in other local industries, and to have occurred without an associated
increase in wage inequality. Bolsa Famı´lia takeup rates were also lower in 2010
in regions benefiting more from Chinese demand. Moreover, while there is little
evidence of an effect of demand from China on local employment rates, we do observe
positive effects on job quality: an increase in the share of formal employment at the
expense of informal jobs, and a rise in the proportion of the local workforce in skilled
agricultural or extractive sector occupations.
This chapter contributes to a growing literature on the worldwide effects of the
rise of China. This includes papers that have studied the impact of Chinese import
competition on economic variables such as manufacturing employment (Pierce and
Schott 2013, Autor et al. 2013), worker earnings (Pessoa 2014), skill upgrading
(Hsieh and Woo 2005, Mion and Zhu 2013), firm and product selection (Iacovone
et al. 2013) and innovation (Bloom et al. 2011). There are a much smaller number
of papers which, like this chapter, also take account of demand-side effects. Dauth
et al. (2014) take a reduced-form approach, examining the impact of rising imports
from and exports to China and Eastern Europe on local labour market variables
in Germany. Dauth et al. study a developed-country context in which agricultural
and extractive sectors are relatively unimportant, and so focus on the effects of
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these trade shocks on the manufacturing and services sectors. General equilibrium
analyses of China’s effect on the world economy (such as Hsieh and Ossa 2011 and
di Giovanni et al. 2014) also take account of both the supply and demand effects
of China on other countries, but these studies summarize the impact of China on
aggregate welfare rather than distinguishing between the potentially heterogeneous
impacts of rising Chinese import competition and export demand.
Our work also relates to the wider literature studying the impact of trade shocks
on labour markets. Several other papers investigate the effect of trade on workers
in Brazil (e.g. Gonzaga et al. 2006, Menezes-Filho and Muendler 2011, Helpman
et al. 2012, Kovak 2013, Dix-Carneiro 2014), with particular attention given to
Brazil’s early 1990s trade liberalization. Most research on trade and labour markets,
including much of the literature on Brazil, is limited to studying workers in formal
employment. Our work also fits into the smaller literature on trade and informality,
including Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Nataraj (2011), McCaig and Pavcnik (2014)
and Paz (2014). Finally, the chapter contributes to the literature on the local
labour market effects of shocks involving nonmanufacturing sectors; one particularly
relevant study is Arago´n and Rud (2013), who examine the local economic impact
of a Peruvian gold mine.
The chapter is organized as follows: we first describe our data sources and present
our identification strategy in Section 2.2. We then discuss the results of our empirical
analysis in Section 2.3, and draw conclusions in Section 2.4. Additional figures and
tables are included in an attached appendix.
2.2 Data and empirical strategy
This section describes the data used in the study and outlines our empirical strategy,
discussing our baseline OLS specification, instrumental variables and robustness
checks.
2.2.1 Data sources
We use individual-level labour market and socioeconomic data from the long form
Brazilian Demographic Census (Censo Demogra´fico) for 2000 and 2010, sourced
from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE); some specifica-
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tions also use individual-level data from the 1991 census. The data contains a
number of labour market variables, including employment status, monthly income
from employment and hours worked per week, along with information on migration
and other demographic variables; we will discuss the variables we use in our analysis
in greater depth below. We restrict our sample to the subpopulation most likely
to participate in the labour market, defining the workforce as every individual be-
tween 18 and 60 years old. We then aggregate the data to the geographical unit
‘microregion’, a level of aggregation that has been constructed by IBGE by grouping
Brazilian municipalities according to information on integration of local economies.
Our sample includes all of the 558 Brazilian microregions, each of which contains
an average of 10 municipalities.
We draw information on informality from a question in the census asking em-
ployed individuals about their job type: government worker; employee registered
at the Brazilian Ministry of Labour and Employment (com carteira assinada); em-
ployee not registered at the Ministry of Labour and Employment (sem carteira
assinada); self-employed; or in unpaid work. We include the final three categories
in our definition of the informal sector.1 We also use information on individuals’
occupations from the 2000 and 2010 censes, defining ‘skilled occupations’ and ‘un-
skilled occupations’ using the definition of occupational skill level from the 2008
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08). In particular, we
define a skilled occupation as one associated with skill level 3 or 4 in the ISCO-08
classification; this covers managers, professionals, technicians and associate profes-
sionals. While the occupational classification in the 2010 Brazilian census is almost
identical to ISCO-08, we need to use publicly available concordances between the
Brazilian occupational classification CBO-02 and ISCO-88, and between ISCO-88
and ISCO-08, to classify the occupations observed in the 2000 census into skilled
and unskilled occupations.
Our data on international trade in goods is from the BACI database developed
by Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII), which
reconciles the data separately reported by importers and exporters in the United
1Although a self-employed worker could be registered with the federal government, these cases
constitute a small fraction of all self-employed individuals. Publicly available administrative data
from the Relac¸ao Anual de Informac¸oes Sociais (RAIS) database – the official records of the Min-
istry of Labour and Employment – show that only 0.9% and 0.8% of the workforce were registered
as self-employed in 2000 and 2010, respectively. We observe total rates of self-employment of 18.3%
and 15.7% of the workforce in these two years’ censes.
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Nations Statistical Division’s COMTRADE database. CEPII BACI contains the
total annual value of bilateral trade at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System
classification for more than 200 countries from 1995 to 2010; we use data for 2000
and 2010 in the analysis below. The CEPII data is denominated in thousands of
current US dollars; we convert 2000 values to 2010 US dollars using the US GDP
deflator from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Our empirical strategy requires us to classify employed individuals in the 2000
census data and products in the 2000 and 2010 trade data into sectors. In the 2000
Brazilian census, individuals are asked to state their sector of activity according
to the 5-digit CNAE Domic´ılio classification.2 We thus construct a concordance
assigning products in the trade data to CNAE Domic´ılio sectors, which requires us
to combine some of the traded goods sectors in CNAE Domic´ılio when these cannot
be separately identified in the trade data. We are left with a total of 82 traded goods
sectors, including 32 agricultural and extractive sectors (22 agricultural sectors, 8
mining sectors, forestry and fishing/aquaculture) and 50 manufacturing sectors; see
Table 2.1 for a full list.3
2.2.2 Baseline specification
To estimate the heterogeneous impacts of supply and demand shocks at the mi-
croregion level, we first create sector-level measures of each shock and then define
exposure to a shock according to local comparative advantage across sectors, as
measured by the sectoral composition of employment in each microregion in 2000.
This is the ‘shift-share’ methodology of Bartik (1991), as applied to trade shocks
by Topalova (2007) and to the effect of China on US labour markets by Autor et
al. (2013). Given the existence of migration across microregions, which we will
show is correlated with the trade shocks we study, our regression results should be
interpreted as identifying effects of China on local labour markets as geographical
units varying in their initial comparative advantages, rather than effects on the set
of workers present in those labour markets in the year 2000.
2This is defined as the main sector of activity of the firm or other institution of an employed
person or the nature of the activity of a self-employed person.
3Several products from the Harmonized System classification, mostly waste or scrap (e.g. scrap
metal, used clothing) could not be concorded to the CNAE Domic´ılio classification; these products
make up less than 1% of Brazilian trade by value.
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Our baseline specification is as follows:
∆ym = βIISm + βXXDm +W
′
mγ + m. (2.1)
Here, ∆ym is the change in a given labour market outcome between 2000 and 2010 in
microregion m, ISm and XDm are microregion-level measures of the import supply
and export demand shocks due to China between 2000 and 2010, and Wm is a set
of controls.
To construct ISm and XDm, we first define an import (export) shock in sector
k as the difference in the value of Brazilian imports (exports) from China in sector
k between 2000 and 2010, ∆Ik = Ik,2010 − Ik,2000 and ∆Xk = Xk,2010 − Xk,2000,
denominated in thousands of 2010 US dollars. We then allocate each shock across
microregions according to the fraction of Brazil’s workers in sector k sited in a
given microregion m in 2000; i.e.
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Ik and
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Xk, where Lkm,2000 is
the number of workers in sector k and microregion m in year 2000, and Lk,2000 =∑
m Lkm,2000.
4 Since microregions differ in size, which affects each sector’s relevance
for the local labour market, we normalize the trade shock by the number of employed
workers in each microregion in 2000 (excluding workers employed outside the private
sector), giving us the expressions
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Ik
Lm,2000
and
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Xk
Lm,2000
.5 Finally, we
define the total local exposure per worker to each trade shock as the sum of these
expressions across sectors, so that our microregion-level measures of the import
supply and export demand shocks are, respectively:
ISm =
∑
k
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Ik
Lm,2000
XDm =
∑
k
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Xk
Lm,2000
.
As measured by ISm and XDm, the average Brazilian microregion received an
import competition shock from China of US$225 per worker and an export demand
shock of US$594 per worker.6 The dispersion of the export demand shock is also
4The underlying assumption here is that the trade shock is distributed uniformly across workers
in each sector.
5The means across microregions of the distributions of these sector-microregion-level variables
are shown in columns (3) and (5) of Table 2.1.
6These two figures differ in magnitude even though trade between China and Brazil was approx-
imately in balance in both 2000 and 2010; this is because both measures include a microregion-level
per-worker normalization.
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larger (with a standard deviation of 1.31 for XDm as compared to 0.27 for ISm),
though both distributions are highly skewed to the right, as shown in Figure 2.4.
The microregion at the 20th percentile of ISm received an import supply shock of
US$73 per worker, while the supply shock to the microregion at the 80th percentile
of ISm was US$313 per worker. The corresponding figures for XDm are US$38 and
US$647, respectively. Figure 2.5 shows that the two shocks affected different sets
of microregions, as the unconditional distributions of the two measures are nearly
orthogonal, with a correlation of 0.07.
Table 2.2 charts the characteristics of microregions in the top 20% of ISm and
XDm in 2000, while the geographical distribution of microregions in the top 20%
of each of the two measures are plotted in Figure 2.6. Table 2.2 shows that the
microregions most exposed to Chinese imports tended to have a lower proportion of
workers engaged in agriculture and a higher proportion working in manufacturing
in 2000 as compared to the average region, as well as a much smaller share of rural
residents. On average, these regions also had a larger working-age population, a
higher share of the workforce in private sector employment and a greater proportion
of workers in skilled occupations than the mean microregion. The average wage in
these regions in 2000 was also relatively high.7
Table 2.2 also suggests that the microregions most affected by Chinese export
demand were somewhat less populous than the mean microregion and much smaller
in population than high-ISm microregions in 2000. At the same time, microregions
with large values of XDm had an average share of the workforce employed in the
private sector, share of workers in formal jobs and average hourly wage somewhat
higher than that of the mean microregion, though again smaller than the top quintile
of ISm. They were relatively more rural than the high-ISm regions as of 2000,
and slightly less rural on average than the mean microregion. Unsurprisingly, the
average share of workers in the extractive sector was particularly high in these
microregions, though the overall size of the extractive sector relative to total local
employment was very small even in these locations. In terms of most other labour
market variables, regions in the top 20% of XDm were similar on average to the
mean Brazilian microregion in 2000, and in general they were more similar to the
7Unsurprisingly, the three microregions with the highest ISm are all major industrial centers:
Manaus, Sa˜o Jose´ dos Campos and Santa Rita do Sapuca´ı. The last of these regions is sometimes
referred to as the ‘Electronic Valley’ due to the size of its electronics industry.
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average microregion than were the locations in the top quintile of ISm.
8
Our baseline specifications also include a set of microregion-level controls Wm;
key among these are the share of each microregion’s workforce employed in agri-
cultural sectors, extractive sectors and manufacturing sectors in 2000.9 This means
that our results depend on comparisons between microregions with the same initial
economic structure (in terms of the distribution of local employment across these
three broadly defined categories) but specialized in different particular agricultural,
extractive and manufacturing sectors.
This strategy is feasible because the distribution of Brazil-China trade growth is
skewed across sectors on both the import and export sides. Approximately 40% of
the total growth in Brazil’s imports from China between 2000 and 2010 (i.e.
∑
k ∆Ik)
is accounted for by electronics (19%), machinery (13%) and electrical equipment
(8%). Meanwhile, just three sectors, all of which are agricultural or extractive
sectors, were responsible for 82% of the growth in Brazil’s exports to China between
these two years: mining of nonprecious metals (45%), soybeans (23%) and oil and
gas (14%).10 This breakdown actually understates the level of concentration of
Brazil’s exports to China, since its exports in the ‘mining of nonprecious metals’
sector are almost exclusively made up of exports of iron ore. This high degree of
concentration in a few commodities is a typical pattern of exports to China among
developing countries for whom trade with China is important.11
The controls in our baseline regressions also include the workforce size, the share
of the workforce employed in nontraded sectors, the share employed in informal
8The three microregions with the largest values of XDm include a major center for the offshore
oil industry (Macae´), an important outpost of the iron ore mining complex (Itabira) and a small
microregion specialized in soybean production (Na˜o-me-Toque, Rio Grande del Sul).
9Forestry and fisheries/aquaculture are defined here as agricultural sectors.
10To calculate these measures, we take the difference between the 2010 and 2000 values of Brazil’s
imports from China (or exports to China) in each sector and divide by the aggregate difference
between 2010 and 2000 Brazilian imports from China (or exports to China). The resulting figures
for each of the 82 traded goods sectors may be found in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.1. The value
of imports from China actually decreased in several sectors, but their total decline constitutes a
tiny proportion of the total difference in imports, so that the total of all positive values only slightly
exceeds 1; the same is true of exports to China. As noted above, some Harmonized System codes
(mostly waste and scrap) are not concorded to any sector; trade in these products is included in
the denominator but not listed in Table 2.1.
11According to the CEPII BACI data, in all 27 non-high-income countries outside East and
Southeast Asia for whom exports to China constituted a minimum of 10% of total exports by
value in 2010, at least 80% of exports to China were concentrated in three or fewer of the sectors
defined in this chapter (82 sectors plus a residual ‘waste and scrap’ category). In 16 of these 27
countries (including Brazil), at least 80% of exports to China were in agricultural and/or extractive
sectors; in a further five, at least 80% of exports were concentrated in up to two agricultural or
extractive sectors and either the ‘basic metals’ manufacturing sector or scrap metal.
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jobs, and the proportion of rural residents, all measured at the microregion level
for the year 2000, along with a cubic polynomial of 2000 microregion-level income
per capita. In all regressions, in order to allow for spatial correlation of errors
across microregions, we cluster standard errors at the level of the mesoregion. Like
the microregion, this geographical unit has been defined by IBGE according to
measures of local market integration; there are 138 mesoregions in Brazil. Also, in
order to prevent our regression results from being driven by outliers or very small
microregions, we assign values of ISm and XDm below the 1st and above the 99th
percentiles to the values of the 1st and 99th percentiles, and weight all regressions by
the share of the national workforce in each microregion. We include all 558 Brazilian
microregions in all regressions.
2.2.3 Instrumental variables and robustness checks
Our goal is to identify the causal effect of the two ‘China shocks’ on local labour
market dynamics in Brazil. However, regression equation (2.1) does not capture
causality in the presence of any additional shocks that are both relevant for our
dependent variables and correlated with our exposure measures ISm and XDm. In
particular, given the sector-level variation that underlies our identification strategy,
one potential issue would be the existence of Brazil-specific supply or demand shocks
in sectors in which Brazil also experienced a relatively large change in trade with
China. For example, changes in Brazil-China trade patterns might be capturing
sector-specific productivity growth or Engel effects in Brazil rather than changes in
China.
Several other studies of the cross-country transmission of shocks have addressed
this concern by using an instrumental variables strategy that exploits information
on trade between the shocks’ country of origin (in this case, China) and countries
other than the ‘destination’ country of interest (Brazil).12 For instance, one might
instrument our microregion-level import supply and export demand variables with
measures calculated in the same way as ISm andXDm, but using the change between
2000 and 2010 in imports from China (or exports to China) for a set of countries
that does not include Brazil. A key assumption underlying this approach is that
the changes in the pattern of trade between China and these other countries are
12This is a standard approach in the ‘China shock’ literature; see e.g. Bloom et al. (2011), Autor
et al. (2013) and Iacovone et al. (2013).
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unrelated to Brazil-specific shocks.
The main issue with this strategy is that it does not account for changes in
world prices or quantities traded that are not due to China: if the world price of a
given product rises due to other factors, or all countries trade more intensively in
the products of some sector due to a worldwide technology or demand shock, this
will be reflected in the trade flows of all countries. This is a particular issue for
our study given its focus on commodities, whose world prices were on an upward
trajectory over the course of the decade we study. If, for instance, the share of oil
by value increased in the import baskets of all countries between 2000 and 2010
due to rises in its world price, both our baseline regression specification and the IV
strategy described above would assign this effect to China. However, while China
likely played a pivotal role in changes in world prices in many sectors during this
period, we do not want to ascribe world price or quantity changes to China when
these actually resulted from other factors.
We thus adapt the IV approach described above by considering changes in
China’s sector-level imports and exports relative to those of other countries. To
do this, we first define I˜ikt and X˜ikt to be the total imports (exports) of country
i in sector k in year t from (to) all countries other than Brazil. We then run the
following auxiliary regressions, using data on I˜ikt and X˜ikt in 2000 and 2010 for all
countries available in the CEPII trade data except Brazil:
∆I˜ik
I˜ik,2000
= αk + ψChina,k + νik
∆X˜ik
X˜ik,2000
= γk + δChina,k + µik
The left-hand side of the two regressions above is the growth rate of the imports (ex-
ports) of a country in a given sector, net of its imports from (exports to) Brazil. The
sector fixed effect αk (or γk) then captures the mean growth rate, across countries,
of net-of-Brazil imports (or exports) in that sector. The regressions are weighted
by 2000 import (export) volumes, so that the values of these fixed effects are not
driven by large positive or negative growth rates in countries with small shares of
world trade. This means that the China-specific dummies ψChina,k and δChina,k rep-
resent the deviation in the growth rates of China’s imports and exports in sector k
excluding trade with Brazil, as compared to this weighted cross-country average.
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We then relate the resulting estimates ψˆChina,k and δˆChina,k to the microregion-
level shock measures defined in Section 2.2.2. We first multiply these estimates by
the values of Brazil-China imports and exports in 2000, redefining the sector-level
‘China shocks’ as ∆Iˆk ≡ Ik,2000δˆChina,k and ∆Xˆk ≡ Xk,2000ψˆChina,k. Our instrumen-
tal variables are then constructed at the microregion level using these new shock
measures in the same way as for ISm and XDm:
13
ivISm =
∑
k
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Iˆk
Lm,2000
ivXDm =
∑
k
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Xˆk
Lm,2000
.
If Chinese trade with the rest of the world (excluding Brazil) had evolved in
the same way as that of the (weighted) average country in each sector, all of these
shocks would be equal to zero. In practice, however, this is not the case: the two
vectors ∆Iˆk and ∆Xˆk, like the ‘raw’ measures ∆Ik and ∆Xk, vary widely across
sectors. Indeed, the raw shocks and these IV shock measures are highly correlated,
with correlation coefficients of 0.93 for the sector-level import supply shocks ∆Ik
and ∆Iˆk and 0.86 for the export demand shocks ∆Xk and ∆Xˆk. Scatter plots of
ISm against ivISm and XDm against ivXDm are shown in Figure 2.7.
Even if these instrumental variables were to fully capture the sectoral mix of
Chinese supply and demand shocks, it is naturally still possible that these shocks
were correlated to supply and demand shocks in Brazil during this period. The
variable ivXDm might be particularly vulnerable to this problem, since it is driven
mainly by export growth in two nonmanufacturing sectors (soybeans and iron ore).14
It could bias our results, for example, if Brazil discovered major new sources of
iron ore just as China began importing it in much larger quantities. Reassuringly,
however, there is evidence that the rise in Brazil-China exports in these two sectors
was mainly due to a Chinese demand shock. First, the share of Brazil in world
trade by value in the two sectors changed relatively little between 2000 and 2010:
13The averages across microregions of the sector-microregion-level variables analogous to those
in Section 2.2, but constructed using ∆Iˆk and ∆Xˆk, may be found in columns (4) and (6) of Table
2.1.
14While the oil and gas sector was responsible for 14% of the growth in exports from Brazil to
China between 2000 and 2010 (as noted in Section 2.2), its importance is greatly diminished in the
IV shock measure, since ∆Xˆoil accounts for only 2% of
∑
k ∆Xˆk. The point in the upper left of the
scatter plot of XDm against ivXDm (see Figure 2.7) is the offshore oil center (Macae´) mentioned
in Footnote 8.
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Brazil accounted for 23% of world exports of soybeans in 2000 and 27% in 2010,
and for 13% of world exports of nonprecious metal ores in 2000 and 17% in 2010.
Meanwhile, China’s share of world imports in these two sectors rose much more
steeply during this period: from 21% to 56% for soybeans, and from 10% to 45%
for nonprecious metal ores. Exports to China accounted for 98% of the growth in
the total quantity of soybeans exported from Brazil, and 87% of the growth in the
quantity of Brazil’s exports of nonprecious metal ores, between the two years.15
It is also possible that the outcomes we observe were driven by other circum-
stances specific to individual Brazilian regions. Indeed, the maps in Figure 2.6
suggest that the incidence of Chinese trade shocks is spatially correlated within
Brazil. We thus run a robustness check in which we add fixed effects for Brazil’s
five regions to our IV specification, so as to check whether the results are robust
to accounting for contemporaneous region-specific trends in the dependent variable
∆ym. That is, in this specification we investigate the within-region effects of the
two ‘China shocks’.
Finally, we also conduct an additional robustness check to address the concern
that any results we observe simply represent the continuation of local labour market
trends that began in years before our period of study. For example, Brazil underwent
a major trade liberalization episode in the late 1980s and early 1990s that is known
to have had a significant impact on affected local labour markets (see e.g. Menezes-
Filho and Muendler 2011, Kovak 2013); adjustments resulting from this shock might
still have been occurring between 2000 and 2010. Thus, in order to account for pre-
sample-period trends, we use data from the 1991 Brazilian census to add a lagged
dependent variable to the right-hand side of specifications for which this data is
available; that is, we control for microregion-level changes between 1991 and 2000 in
the outcome of interest. Because of likely correlation between the lagged dependent
variable and the residual m, we instrument for this variable using 1991 levels, as
suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981).16
15Notably, Bustos et al. (2013) present evidence of non-Brazil-specific technological change in
the soybean sector via the development in the US of a genetically modified soybean variety in 1996,
and suggest that the adoption in Brazil of this technology in the early 2000s led to increases in
agricultural productivity per worker, decreases in the labour intensity of agricultural production,
rising manufacturing employment shares and declining manufacturing wages in affected locations.
Bustos et al. also discuss a Brazil-specific technological change in the maize sector (milho safrinha)
which they find is associated with rises in labour intensity, declines in manufacturing employment
shares and increases in wages.
16Note that the consistency of our estimates then depends on the assumption that 1991 levels
are uncorrelated with m.
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2.3 Results
In this section, we provide empirical evidence of the heterogeneous effects of the
import supply shock and export demand shock from China on local labour markets
across Brazil. We begin by considering the effects of these shocks on average hourly
wages, wage inequality within local labour markets and takeup of the cash transfer
program Bolsa Famı´lia. We then look at the impact of the ‘China shocks’ on migra-
tion, employment rates and the pattern of employment across sectors. Finally, we
examine the evolution of ‘good jobs’ and ‘bad jobs’ in local labour markets affected
by the shocks, considering the proportion of the local workforce in formal and in-
formal jobs, and in skilled and unskilled occupations. The coefficients and standard
errors in all tables are normalized by multiplying by 100, so that they may generally
be interpreted as the effect of a US$1000 increase in imports or exports per worker
on changes in the dependent variable in percentage points.17
2.3.1 Wages and wage inequality
Table 2.3 displays the results of microregion-level regressions of differences in log
average hourly wages between 2000 and 2010 on ISm, XDm and controls. In Panel
A, the sample of wage-earners includes workers in all sectors, while Panels B, C
and D only consider workers in the agricultural and extractive, manufacturing and
nontraded sectors respectively. The OLS estimates in column (1) of Panel A suggest
that larger export demand shocks are associated with higher growth in wages over
these ten years, and that this effect is statistically significant. Columns (2) through
(5) of Panel A show that the result is qualitatively unchanged by our instrumental
variables strategy and robustness checks, including specifications with region fixed
effects (column (3)), a lagged dependent variable (column (4)) and both of these
two additional controls (column (5)). In our preferred specification, column (2), a
US$1000 per worker increase in exports to China is associated with higher decadal
growth in wages of approximately 1.76 percentage points.
Panels B through D suggest that the largest effect of rising export demand
from China was on the set of industries most directly affected by this shock: the
agricultural and extractive sectors. The baseline IV specification in column (2) of
17This interpretation is, of course, approximate when the dependent variable is measured as a
long difference of logarithms, but exact when the dependent variable is in long differences of shares.
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Panel B indicates that a microregion subject to the average demand shock of US$594
per worker saw wage growth in these sectors that was higher by 3.7 percentage
points over the course of the decade. Given that the average wage in agricultural
and extractive sectors increased by 52% during this period, a back-of-the-envelope
calculation would suggest that the estimated effect of the ‘China demand shock’ is
equal to 7.2% of the observed wage increase in these sectors. Panels C and D indicate
that growth in wages in agricultural and extractive sectors also spilled over to other
industries, as average wages in the manufacturing and nontraded sectors also grew
faster in microregions more exposed to Chinese export demand, though only the
result for manufacturing is statistically significant in our preferred specification.
Meanwhile, while the results in Panel A suggest that the Chinese import supply
shock is not associated with statistically significant changes in average wages overall,
Panel C indicates that it did have an effect for manufacturing, the sector most
directly affected by Chinese import competition. The IV results in column (2) of
Panel C indicate that a microregion exposed to the average import supply shock of
US$225 per worker experienced growth in manufacturing wages that was smaller by
1.7 percentage points over this period.
Table 2.4 breaks down the effects of the shocks on the growth in average wages of
workers in formal and informal jobs (Panels A and B), and in skilled and unskilled
occupations (Panels C and D). The wage effects of ISm appear to be concentrated
in the formal sector; the estimated coefficient on ISm is negative for the subcategory
of formal jobs and positive (though insignificant) for informal jobs. Also, although
the wage effect of Chinese import competition on workers in skilled occupations
remains insignificantly different from zero, higher values of ISm are significantly
associated with slower average wage growth for workers in unskilled occupations
in the baseline IV specification in Panel D. This result becomes smaller and loses
statistical significance after controlling for region-specific trends. Meanwhile, the
export demand shock is associated with positive wage growth for all four of these
categories – for both skilled and unskilled occupations, and for both formal and
informal jobs.
These heterogeneous effects of ISm on different subgroups of the workforce imply
that Chinese import competition may have affected levels of inequality. Indeed,
when we consider effects on local wage inequality in Panel A of Table 2.5, we find that
import shocks but not export shocks are associated with relatively higher growth in
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wage inequality, as measured by the microregion-level wage Gini coefficient. Since we
multiply all coefficients by 100, the estimate in column (2) implies that in locations
experiencing an import competition shock that was greater by US$1000, the wage
Gini coefficient rose by an additional 0.014 between 2000 and 2010; this is equivalent
to a 2.6% increase in wage inequality relative to average 2000 levels. The coefficient
on XDm is economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero in each of the
specifications; that is, we find no evidence that the demand-side shock contributed
to rises in local wage inequality.
In Panel B of Table 2.5, we consider the impact of the ‘China shocks’ on social
assistance in Brazil, by examining the distribution of takeup of the cash transfer
program Bolsa Famı´lia across microregions in 2010. While participation in Bolsa
Famı´lia was on a very large scale in 2010 – according to the census data, more than
7% of the Brazilian workforce received Bolsa Famı´lia in this year – the program
was implemented only after 2002. Thus, in this case, we use levels rather than long
differences on the left-hand side of our regressions, so that the dependent variable
is the proportion of the local workforce receiving Bolsa Famı´lia in 2010.18 The
results suggest that a larger export demand shock is associated with lower takeup of
Bolsa Famı´lia in 2010; according to the baseline IV specification, in a microregion
experiencing the average export demand shock of US$594, the proportion of the local
workforce receiving Bolsa Famı´lia in 2010 was lower by 0.15 percentage points. The
estimated effects of Chinese import competition on participation in Bolsa Famı´lia
are statistically insignificant in all three specifications.
2.3.2 Migration and employment
We next consider whether the two ‘China shocks’ are also associated with changes
in the pattern of migration across microregions, and microregion-level employment
rates. In Table 2.6, we display the results of regressions whose dependent variable
is the long difference in the proportion of the workforce that migrated into the
microregion within the five years before the census.19 Column (2) reports that the
change in the share of recent migrants in the local workforce was 0.89 percentage
18As of 2000, Brazil had a similar program on a much smaller scale, Bolsa Escola, with a Brazil-
wide participation rate of less than 1%. The results are not affected if we instead use differences
between Bolsa Escola takeup rates in 2000 and Bolsa Famı´lia takeup rates in 2010 as the left-
hand-side variable.
19These regressions thus examine changes in the microregion-level pattern of migration in the
five years before 2010 as compared to the five years before 2000.
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points lower on average in microregions experiencing a $1000 per worker higher
import supply shock; these results are robust across all five specifications. This
suggests that in-migration grew by 4.9% less in a microregion exposed to the average
increase in import supply from China. The analogous estimate for XDm is positive,
but much smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant in each of the four IV
specifications. The slowdown in local in-migration rates associated with Chinese
import competition is reminiscent of the findings of Kovak (2011), who observes a
migration response to the Brazilian trade liberalization of the early 1990s using 2000
census data.
Brazilians’ willingness to migrate – the census data indicates that the average
share of recent migrants across microregions was 8.3% in 2000 and 12.4% in 2010
– might have served to dampen the effects of the trade shocks on microregion-
level employment rates. Indeed, while the damaging impact of Chinese import
competition on employment status has been an important finding of studies of high-
income countries (e.g. Autor et al. 2013 for the US), Panel A of Table 2.7 shows that
we do not observe a negative correlation between ISm and changes in private sector
employment rates of Brazilian microregions from 2000 to 2010. On the contrary,
our preferred specification yields a positive coefficient that is marginally statistically
significant. The estimate is magnified and becomes significant at the 1% level in
the specifications with region fixed effects; this is a puzzling result. Meanwhile, the
effect of the ‘China demand shock’ on the change in the proportion of the local
workforce employed in the private sector is very small and statistically insignificant
in all five specifications.20
Panels B to D of Table 2.7 provide a breakdown of the changes in employ-
ment structure associated with the two ‘China shocks’, using the difference between
2000 and 2010 in the share of a microregion’s working-age population employed in
the agricultural and extractive, manufacturing and nontraded sectors as the depen-
dent variables. This analysis yields few statistically significant coefficient estimates.
However, Panel D suggests that the finding of rising employment rates in locations
competing with Chinese imports appears to have been driven by growth in the share
of the workforce employed in nontraded sectors. This result is similar to the find-
ings of Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), who observe movement of Brazilian
20When comparing these results to our findings on takeup of Bolsa Famı´lia in Table 2.5, it
is important to note that eligibility for Bolsa Famı´lia is not directly conditional on employment
status.
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formal sector workers from manufacturing into services after the early 1990s trade
liberalization.
2.3.3 Job quality
We now examine the effects of China’s emergence on the prevalence of ‘good jobs’
in affected microregions, using two measures of job quality: informality and occupa-
tional skill level. We first consider informality, which is widespread in the Brazilian
economy: in 2000, more than half of private sector workers were working in the
informal sector as defined in this chapter. Being part of the informal sector brings
disadvantages for workers and firms, since they are not granted some legal rights,
such as property rights, and do not benefit from some public services linked to
employment.
Table 2.8 shows that shocks to export demand from China are associated with a
shift towards ‘good jobs’ by this measure: a rise in formal-sector jobs at the expense
of the informal sector. The baseline IV results in Panels A and B suggest that a rise
in exports to China of US$1000 is associated with an average increase in the pro-
portion of a microregion’s workforce in formal jobs that is larger by 0.31 percentage
points and an average decline in the share of informal jobs that is greater by 0.24
percentage points, though the result for the informal share is statistically insignifi-
cant. The size of these effects is similar across all of the regression specifications in
each case.21
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, our measure of occupational skill level, which
is based on an international definition, is a dummy variable broadly distinguishing
between managerial, professional and technical workers and workers directly involved
in production. Panel B of Table 2.11 shows that the proportion of the workforce in
skilled occupations in the agricultural and extractive sectors rose more quickly in
areas more affected by Chinese demand, while this was not the case for unskilled
occupations in these sectors. Our estimates suggest that a microregion subject to the
mean Chinese export demand shock experienced 18.6% higher growth in the share of
the workforce employed in skilled agricultural or extractive sector jobs. The results
in Panel A indicate that this led to a positive effect of XDm on the share of workers
21Tables 2.9 and 2.10 show that the estimated effect ofXDm on the proportion of the workforce in
formal agricultural or extractive sector jobs is positive in all five specifications, while the estimated
impact of XDm on the share of the workforce in informal jobs in agricultural or extractive sectors
is negative in all five specifications. None of these results is statistically significant.
96
in skilled occupations overall, though this estimate is not statistically significant.
Meanwhile, Panel C of Table 2.11 shows that the proportion of the working-
age population employed in skilled manufacturing occupations saw a statistically
significant decline in locations with higher ISm: an increase of US$1000 in Chinese
imports was associated with a reduction of approximately 0.28 percentage points
in this share between 2000 and 2010 in the baseline IV specification. Given that
the average share of the workforce employed in skilled occupations in manufacturing
grew from 0.8% in 2000 to 1% in 2010, a back-of-the-envelope counterfactual exercise
suggests that the share of skilled jobs in the manufacturing sector would have grown
31% more on average if it were not for rising import competition from China. Taken
together with the results in Table 2.4, it thus appears that local labour markets were
affected by the ‘China supply shock’ through declines in both average unskilled wages
and skilled manufacturing employment shares.
Tables 2.8 and 2.11 also provide additional insight on the nature of the shift
towards the nontraded sector in locations more affected by Chinese import compe-
tition, as documented in Table 2.7. Table 2.11 indicates that growth in the share of
nontraded sector employment mainly occurred in relatively unskilled occupations,
while Table 2.8 suggests that these jobs were primarily in the formal sector. This
conclusion is supported by the results of regressions with the share of the workforce
in formal or informal agricultural/extractive, manufacturing or nontraded jobs on
the left-hand side, which may be found in Tables 2.9 and 2.10. Across all of the
IV specifications, only the regressions for formal jobs in nontraded sectors yield
statistically significant coefficient estimates for ISm.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of China’s ascent into one of the world’s
largest economies on local labour markets in Brazil. As in other developing coun-
tries, Brazil’s imports from China are dominated by manufactures while most of
the growth in its exports to China has been concentrated in agricultural and ex-
tractive sectors. We use data from the Brazilian demographic censes of 2000 and
2010 to provide empirical evidence of the heterogeneous effects on Brazilian labour
markets of shocks to both Chinese import supply and export demand. Using a
shift-share methodology, we compare trends in local labour markets with a similar
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initial employment structure (proportion of workers in agricultural, extractive and
manufacturing sectors) but differently exposed to these two ‘China shocks’ due to
specialization in different specific industries.
We find that local labour markets more affected by Chinese import competi-
tion experienced slower growth in manufacturing wages, greater increases in wage
inequality and a relative decline in the share of the workforce employed in skilled
manufacturing jobs. However, imports from China do not appear to have led to
either a fall in employment rates or higher takeup of social assistance (as measured
by participation in the Bolsa Famı´lia program of cash transfers) in affected regions.
Meanwhile, in local labour markets experiencing larger growth in Chinese export
demand, average hourly wages increased more quickly and without an accompany-
ing increase in wage inequality, while 2010 Bolsa Famı´lia participation rates were
lower. While there is little evidence of an effect of Chinese demand on local employ-
ment rates, we do observe positive effects on job quality: an increase in the share
of formal employment at the expense of informal jobs, and a rise in the share of the
local workforce in skilled agricultural or extractive sector occupations.
Overall, our findings suggest that growth in commodities-for-manufactures trade
spurred by the rise of China has created winners as well as losers. Even though the
increase in export demand from China has mainly involved the relatively unglam-
orous agricultural and extractive sectors, local labour markets specialized in these
industries appear to have flourished in the presence of this commodity export boom.
Moreover, while areas specialized in manufacturing sectors do seem to have suffered
from rising Chinese import supply, our findings of slower growth of in-migration
rates in more affected regions, along with shifts in the structure of local employ-
ment towards nontraded industries, also provide evidence of adjustment in response
to competition from China.
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Figure 2.7: Raw measures vs instrumental variables measures
The lines depict the results of simple regressions of ISm on ivISm (coefficient 1.286, s.e. 0.021 and
t-statistic 60.09) and XDm on ivXDm (coefficient 2.076, s.e. 0.053 and t-statistic 39.16).
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2.B Tables
Table 2.1: List of sectors and additional summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Import Export Import supply Export demand
share share from China to China
Mean IV Mean IV
Agriculture: rice - - - - - -
Agriculture: maize - 0.000 - - 0.000 -
Agriculture: other cereals 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - -
Agriculture: cotton 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.013 -
Agriculture: sugar cane - - - - - -
Agriculture: tobacco 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.015
Agriculture: soya - 0.229 - - 0.555 0.259
Agriculture: manioc - - - - - -
Agriculture: flowers and ornamentals 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
Agriculture: citrus fruits - 0.000 - - 0.000 0.000
Agriculture: coffee - 0.000 - - 0.000 0.000
Agriculture: cocoa - - - - - -
Agriculture: grapes - - - - - -
Agriculture: bananas - - - - - -
Agriculture: other 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
Agriculture: bovine animals - - - - - -
Agriculture: sheep - - - - - -
Agriculture: pigs - - - - - -
Agriculture: birds - - - - - -
Agriculture: beekeeping 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
Agriculture: silk 0.000 - 0.000 - - -
Agriculture: other animals 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
Forestry 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fishing and aquaculture - 0.000 - - 0.000 0.000
Mining: coal -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.018 0.000 -
Mining: oil and gas - 0.137 - - 0.219 0.015
Mining: radioactive metals - - - - - -
Mining: precious metals - - - - - -
Mining: other metals 0.000 0.453 0.000 -0.001 0.917 0.649
Mining: nonmetals for construction 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
Mining: precious stones 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Mining: other nonmetals 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Manuf: meat and fish 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.001
Manuf: fruits and vegetables 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000
Manuf: oils and fats 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.015
Manuf: dairy products 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
Manuf: sugar 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.019 -
Manuf: coffee 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
Manuf: other food 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: beverages 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: tobacco 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - -
Continued on next page.
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Table 2.1: List of sectors and additional summary statistics (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Import Export Import supply Export demand
share share from China to China
Mean IV Mean IV
Manuf: spinning and weaving 0.026 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: other textile products 0.029 0.000 0.014 0.001 0.000 0.000
Manuf: apparel 0.025 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000
Manuf: leather processing 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000
Manuf: leather products 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: footwear 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Manuf: wood products 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002
Manuf: pulp and paper 0.003 0.039 0.003 0.000 0.041 0.002
Manuf: paper products 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: printing and recording 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: coke 0.003 - 0.040 -0.119 - -
Manuf: refined petroleum 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: nuclear fuel - - - - - -
Manuf: paints and varnishes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: pharmaceuticals 0.018 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000
Manuf: cleaning and hygiene products 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: other chemicals 0.065 0.008 0.026 0.014 0.004 0.003
Manuf: rubber products 0.014 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000
Manuf: plastic products 0.025 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.000
Manuf: glass products 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
Manuf: ceramic products 0.009 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: other nonmetallic mineral products 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: basic metals 0.064 0.026 0.027 0.002 0.013 0.003
Manuf: metal products 0.029 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.000
Manuf: machinery 0.133 0.005 0.038 0.010 0.002 0.002
Manuf: domestic appliances 0.019 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.000
Manuf: computing 0.073 0.000 0.033 0.017 0.000 0.000
Manuf: electrical equipment 0.080 0.001 0.023 0.005 0.000 0.000
Manuf: electronics 0.192 0.001 0.065 0.024 0.000 0.001
Manuf: medical instruments 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: measuring instruments 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000
Manuf: optical equipment 0.061 0.000 0.030 0.006 0.000 0.002
Manuf: watches and clocks 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: motor vehicles 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
Manuf: motor vehicle bodies and parts 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001
Manuf: shipbuilding 0.018 - 0.016 0.000 - -
Manuf: railway products 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
Manuf: aircraft 0.000 0.011 0.000 - 0.012 0.005
Manuf: other transport 0.009 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 -
Manuf: furniture 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manuf: other 0.026 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000
This table displays the share of each sector in the total growth of Brazil’s imports and exports to China between 2000
and 2010 in columns (1) and (2), the means across microregions of the sector-microregion-level variables used to calculate
ISm and XDm in columns (3) and (5), and the means across microregions of the sector-microregion-level variables used
to calculate ivISm and ivXDm in columns (4) and (6).
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Table 2.2: Brazilian microregion-level summary statistics 2000
(1) (2) (3)
All Top quintile Top quintile
of ISm of XDm
Workforce (thousands) 170.952 417.095 138.593
Private sector workers 0.589 0.624 0.608
Agriculture 0.167 0.078 0.161
Extractive 0.002 0.002 0.004
Manufacturing 0.068 0.123 0.069
Nontraded 0.352 0.421 0.375
Formal jobs 0.177 0.299 0.205
Informal jobs 0.412 0.326 0.403
Skilled occupations 0.094 0.124 0.099
Unskilled occupations 0.496 0.501 0.509
Rural residents 0.313 0.137 0.271
In-migrated in the last 5 years 0.083 0.084 0.088
Average hourly wage (R$) 2.21 3.14 2.46
Skilled occupations 5.07 6.72 5.55
Unskilled occupations 1.70 2.28 1.92
Wage inequality (Gini) 0.542 0.528 0.556
This table displays descriptive statistics of the Brazilian labour market in 2000,
averaged at the microregion level. Column (1) includes all microregions, column (2)
includes only microregions among the top 20% of ISm, and column (3) includes only
microregions in the top 20% of XDm. All figures are shares of the total workforce,
except as indicated. The workforce is defined here as the total number of citizens
between 18 and 60 years old. Average hourly wage is in current Real.
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Table 2.3: Log average hourly wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Panel A. All sectors
ISm -3.46 -3.19 -0.70 -3.57 -1.06
(2.90) (2.87) (2.48) (2.84) (2.40)
XDm 1.98*** 1.76** 2.26*** 1.84*** 2.33***
(0.62) (0.74) (0.73) (0.71) (0.71)
Panel B. Agricultural/extractive sectors
ISm 1.15 -0.92 2.40 -6.39 0.36
(6.31) (7.61) (7.82) (6.94) (7.26)
XDm 5.98*** 6.31*** 6.74*** 7.02*** 6.96***
(1.93) (2.29) (2.08) (1.93) (1.93)
Panel C. Manufacturing sectors
ISm -7.84*** -7.69*** -7.19*** -8.51*** -7.16***
(1.42) (1.24) (1.42) (1.43) (1.42)
XDm 2.93*** 2.95*** 3.22*** 2.78*** 3.23***
(0.61) (0.64) (0.68) (0.62) (0.69)
Panel D. Nontraded sectors
ISm -4.23 -3.85 -1.70 -4.72* -1.69
(2.62) (2.47) (2.04) (2.45) (2.03)
XDm 0.94* 0.61 0.95* 0.93* 0.94*
(0.49) (0.50) (0.55) (0.51) (0.53)
Region FE NO NO YES NO YES
Lag dep. var. NO NO NO YES YES
KP F stat 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on
changes between 2000 and 2010 in log average hourly wages, as captured by βI
and βX from equation (1). Panel A presents results for all sectors, Panel B for
agricultural and extractive sectors, Panel C for manufacturing sectors, and Panel
D for nontraded sectors. Each column corresponds to a different regression with
specification indicated. In the columns marked with IV, we instrument imports
from (exports to) China using a measure based on growth in Chinese exports
to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-
country average. The unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients
and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that the unit of the coefficients is
roughly percentage increase. All regressions include a constant and the following
controls: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000
share of workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing,
2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in informal
jobs, 2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per
capita in 2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (5) include region fixed effects,
and in columns (4) and (5) include the lag of the dependent variable for the period
1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by share
of national workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters.
Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less
than 10%).
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Table 2.4: Log average hourly wages by formality and occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Panel A. Formal jobs
ISm -6.37*** -5.83*** -3.46* -4.67*** -2.77
(1.74) (1.60) (1.91) (1.38) (1.74)
XDm 1.45*** 1.12** 1.40*** 0.91** 1.23***
(0.48) (0.47) (0.43) (0.46) (0.42)
Panel B. Informal jobs
ISm 2.47 3.24 6.00 2.55 5.20
(5.31) (5.50) (5.20) (5.43) (5.02)
XDm 2.34** 2.14* 2.64** 2.24** 2.76***
(1.03) (1.17) (1.08) (1.13) (1.03)
Panel C. Skilled occupations
ISm -0.62 -0.85 0.71
(3.13) (3.36) (3.15)
XDm 1.13* 0.72 1.16**
(0.60) (0.64) (0.59)
Panel D. Unskilled occupations
ISm -5.22*** -5.14*** -2.22
(1.79) (1.76) (2.01)
XDm 2.33*** 2.24*** 2.47***
(0.72) (0.81) (0.67)
Region FE NO NO YES NO YES
Lag dep. var. NO NO NO YES YES
KP F stat 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on
changes between 2000 and 2010 in log average hourly wages, as captured by
βI and βX from equation (1). Panel A presents results for workers in formal
jobs, Panel B for workers in informal jobs, Panel C for workers in skilled occu-
pations, and Panel D for workers in unskilled occupations. A skilled occupation
is defined as an occupation of skill level 3 or 4 according to the ISCO-08 clas-
sification. Each column corresponds to a different regression with specification
indicated. In the columns marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports
to) China using a measure based on growth in Chinese exports to (imports from)
all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country average. The
unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors
are multiplied by 100, so that the unit of the coefficients is roughly percentage
increase. All regressions include a constant and the following controls: 2000
workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of work-
force in extractive sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share
of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in informal jobs, 2000
share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per capita
in 2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and
in columns (4) and (5) include the lag of the dependent variable for the period
1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by share
of national workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters.
Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or *
(less than 10%).
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Table 2.5: Inequality and social assistance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Panel A. Wage inequality (Gini coefficient)
ISm 1.34*** 1.40*** 1.12** 1.40*** 1.11**
(0.39) (0.41) (0.46) (0.41) (0.46)
XDm 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09
(0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12)
Panel B. Bolsa Famı´lia
ISm -0.20 -0.15 0.07
(0.30) (0.33) (0.19)
XDm -0.25* -0.25** -0.14*
(0.14) (0.13) (0.07)
Region FE NO NO YES NO YES
Lag dep. var. NO NO NO YES YES
KP F stat 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks,
as captured by βI and βX from equation (1), on two outcomes. In Panel
A, the dependent variable is the change in microregion-level wage inequal-
ity, as measured by the wage Gini coefficient, between 2000 and 2010. In
Panel B, the dependent variable is the share of workforce participating in
Bolsa Famı´lia in 2010. Each column corresponds to a different regression
with specification indicated. In the columns marked with IV, we instru-
ment imports from (exports to) China using a measure based on growth
in Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, rel-
ative to a weighted cross-country average. The unit of observation is a
microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors in both panels are
multiplied by 100, so that the coefficients in Panel B are in percentage
points. All regressions include a constant and the following controls: 2000
workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of
workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing,
2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in
informal jobs, 2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic poly-
nomial of income per capita in 2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (5)
include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5) include the lag of
the dependent variable for the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991
levels. All regressions are weighted by share of national workforce. Small
p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less
than 10%).
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Table 2.6: In-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
ISm -0.86* -0.89* -0.83** -0.92* -0.83**
(0.44) (0.46) (0.35) (0.54) (0.41)
XDm 0.21** 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.17
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
Region FE NO NO YES NO YES
Lag dep. var. NO NO NO YES YES
KP F stat 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export
shocks on changes between 2000 and 2010 in the share of the work-
force that in-migrated to the microregion in the previous five years, as
captured by βI and βX from equation (1). Each column corresponds
to a different regression with specification indicated. In the columns
marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China using
a measure based on growth in Chinese exports to (imports from) all
countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country aver-
age. The unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and
standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that the coefficients represent
percentage point changes. All regressions include a constant and the
following controls: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricul-
tural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share
of workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce in nontraded
sectors, 2000 share of workforce in informal jobs, 2000 share of work-
force in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per capita in
2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (5) include region fixed effects,
and in columns (4) and (5) include the lag of the dependent variable
for the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regres-
sions are weighted by share of national workforce. Standard errors are
clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters. Small p-values are represented
by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 2.7: Private sector employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Panel A. All sectors
ISm 0.56* 0.67* 1.24*** 0.28 0.92***
(0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.38) (0.34)
XDm 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
Panel B. Agricultural/extractive sectors
ISm -0.39 -0.25 -0.16 -0.01 0.06
(0.26) (0.28) (0.32) (0.25) (0.28)
XDm 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.06
(0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13)
Panel C. Manufacturing sectors
ISm -0.20 -0.29 0.05 0.34 0.65
(0.52) (0.55) (0.67) (0.56) (0.71)
XDm -0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.16 -0.15
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Panel D. Nontraded sectors
ISm 1.18* 1.21* 1.34* 1.39* 1.43*
(0.63) (0.67) (0.73) (0.72) (0.78)
XDm 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.04 0.11
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14)
Region FE NO NO YES NO YES
Lag dep. var. NO NO NO YES YES
KP F stat 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export
shocks on changes between 2000 and 2010 in the share of the work-
force employed in the private sector, as captured by βI and βX from
equation (1). Panel A presents results for all sectors, Panel B for
agricultural and extractive sectors, Panel C for manufacturing sec-
tors, and Panel D for nontraded sectors. Each column corresponds
to a different regression with specification indicated. In the columns
marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China us-
ing a measure based on growth in Chinese exports to (imports from)
all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country
average. The unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coeffi-
cients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that the coeffi-
cients represent percentage point changes. All regressions include a
constant and the following controls: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of
workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in extrac-
tive sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of
workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in informal
jobs, 2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial
of income per capita in 2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (5)
include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5) include the
lag of the dependent variable for the period 1991-2000, instrumented
with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by share of national
workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters.
Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than
5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 2.8: Informality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Panel A. Formal jobs
ISm 0.83*** 0.80*** 1.16*** 0.88** 1.25***
(0.29) (0.29) (0.37) (0.36) (0.44)
XDm 0.36** 0.31** 0.31** 0.32** 0.32***
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12)
Panel B. Informal jobs
ISm -0.28 -0.13 0.08 0.11 0.30
(0.38) (0.43) (0.48) (0.39) (0.45)
XDm -0.28** -0.24 -0.24 -0.21 -0.21
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Region FE NO NO YES NO YES
Lag dep. var. NO NO NO YES YES
KP F stat 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks
on changes between 2000 and 2010 in the share of the workforce employed
in formal and informal private sector jobs, as captured by βI and βX from
equation (1). Panel A presents results for formal jobs and Panel B for infor-
mal jobs. Each column corresponds to a different regression with dependent
variable and specification indicated. In the columns marked with IV, we in-
strument imports from (exports to) China using a measure based on growth
in Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative
to a weighted cross-country average. The unit of observation is a microre-
gion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so
that the coefficients represent percentage point changes. All regressions in-
clude a constant and the following controls: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of
workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in extractive sec-
tors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce in
nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic poly-
nomial of income per capita in 2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (5)
include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5) include the lag of the
dependent variable for the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels.
All regressions are weighted by share of national workforce. Standard errors
are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters. Small p-values are represented
by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 2.9: Formal private sector employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Panel A. Agricultural/extractive sectors
ISm 0.09 -0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.05
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
XDm 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Panel B. Manufacturing sectors
ISm -0.27 -0.28 -0.16 0.45 0.53
(0.55) (0.57) (0.62) (0.65) (0.73)
XDm -0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.11
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Panel C. Nontraded sectors
ISm 1.04** 1.09** 1.26*** 0.75 1.00**
(0.45) (0.50) (0.43) (0.57) (0.45)
XDm 0.20* 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.11
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14)
Region FE NO NO YES NO YES
Lag dep. var. NO NO NO YES YES
KP F stat 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export
shocks on changes between 2000 and 2010 in the share of the work-
force employed in formal private sector jobs, as captured by βI and
βX from equation (1). Panel A presents results for agricultural and
extractive sectors, Panel B for manufacturing sectors, and Panel C for
nontraded sectors. Each column corresponds to a different regression
with specification indicated. In the columns marked with IV, we in-
strument imports from (exports to) China using a measure based on
growth in Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding
Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country average. The unit of obser-
vation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors are
multiplied by 100, so that the coefficients represent percentage point
changes. All regressions include a constant and the following con-
trols: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors,
2000 share of workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share of workforce
in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000
share of workforce in informal jobs, 2000 share of workforce in rural ar-
eas, and a cubic polynomial of income per capita in 2000. Regressions
in columns (3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and in columns (4)
and (5) include the lag of the dependent variable for the period 1991-
2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by
share of national workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesore-
gion, 138 clusters. Small p-values are represented by *** (less than
1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 2.10: Informal private sector employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Panel A. Agricultural/extractive sectors
ISm -0.48** -0.24 -0.22 -0.12 -0.10
(0.23) (0.23) (0.28) (0.22) (0.26)
XDm -0.10 -0.11 -0.18 -0.07 -0.13
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
Panel B. Manufacturing sectors
ISm 0.07 -0.01 0.20 -0.00 0.21
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14)
XDm -0.06* -0.06* -0.04 -0.06* -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Panel C. Nontraded sectors
ISm 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.28 0.27
(0.35) (0.38) (0.47) (0.36) (0.46)
XDm -0.09 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.02
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12)
Region FE NO NO YES NO YES
Lag dep. var. NO NO NO YES YES
KP F stat 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and ex-
port shocks on changes between 2000 and 2010 in the share of the
workforce employed in informal private sector jobs, as captured by
βI and βX from equation (1). Panel A presents results for agri-
cultural and extractive sectors, Panel B for manufacturing sectors,
and Panel C for nontraded sectors. Each column corresponds to
a different regression with specification indicated. In the columns
marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China
using a measure based on growth in Chinese exports to (imports
from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-
country average. The unit of observation is a microregion (N=558).
Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that the
coefficients represent percentage point changes. All regressions in-
clude a constant and the following controls: 2000 workforce, 2000
share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in
extractive sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing, 2000
share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in
informal jobs, 2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic
polynomial of income per capita in 2000. Regressions in columns
(3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5)
include the lag of the dependent variable for the period 1991-2000,
instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by share
of national workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion,
138 clusters. Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%),
** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 2.11: Occupational skill level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Skilled occupations Unskilled occupations
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Panel A. All sectors
ISm -0.21 -0.04 0.10 0.77* 0.71 1.14**
(0.22) (0.33) (0.38) (0.41) (0.50) (0.55)
XDm 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Panel B. Agricultural/extractive sectors
ISm -0.03 -0.04* -0.04 -0.36 -0.21 -0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.25) (0.27) (0.30)
XDm 0.06** 0.05* 0.05* 0.01 0.00 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14)
Panel C. Manufacturing sectors
ISm -0.30** -0.28** -0.26* 0.09 -0.00 0.30
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.43) (0.48) (0.60)
XDm 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.13 -0.11
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Panel D. Nontraded sectors
ISm 0.11 0.27 0.38 1.07** 0.94* 0.96*
(0.20) (0.31) (0.35) (0.54) (0.56) (0.58)
XDm -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.17 0.21
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17)
Region Fixed Effects YES YES
KP F stat 334.7 250.3 334.7 250.3
This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on changes
between 2000 and 2010 in the share of the workforce employed in skilled and unskilled
occupations, as captured by βI and βX from equation (1). Panel A presents results for
all sectors, Panel B for agricultural and extractive sectors, Panel C for manufacturing
sectors, and Panel D for nontraded sectors. Each column corresponds to a different
regression with dependent variable and specification indicated. The dependent variable
in columns 1 to 3 is the change in the share of workforce in skilled occupations, and
in columns 4 to 6 it is the change in the share of workforce in unskilled occupations. A
skilled occupation is defined as an occupation of skill level 3 or 4 according to the ISCO-08
classification. In the columns marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to)
China using a measure based on growth in Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries,
excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country average. The unit of observation is
a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that
the coefficients represent percentage point changes. All regressions include a constant and
the following controls: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors,
2000 share of workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing,
2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in informal jobs,
2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per capita in
2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (6) include region fixed effects. All regressions are
weighted by share of national workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion,
138 clusters. Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or
* (less than 10%).
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Chapter 3
Access to Raw Materials and
Local Comparative Advantage:
The Effects of India’s Freight
Equalization Policy
In order that industrialisation may benefit the economy of the country as
a whole, it is important that disparities in levels of development between
different regions should be progressively reduced. The lack of industries
in different parts of the country is very often determined by factors such
as the availability of the necessary raw materials....
– Industrial Policy Resolution, Government of India, 1956
3.1 Introduction
Access to raw materials is a potentially important determinant of industrial loca-
tion and the geography of economic development. Proximity to stocks of natural
resources or other industrial raw materials might give a region a comparative ad-
vantage in industries whose products are intensive in locally available intermediates.
Conversely, the competitiveness of firms in locations distant from their material in-
puts might suffer from the disadvantage of the additional freight costs associated
with transporting those materials to their plants for processing. In this chapter, we
examine the effects of a policy that aimed to ‘level the playing field’ for regions near
and far from essential raw materials. India’s Freight Equalization Policy, adopted in
1956, was designed to ensure that long-distance and short-haul shipments of steel,
cement and fertilizers were subject to identical total freight costs, equalizing prices
of those commodities for downstream firms across the country.
We focus here on steel, which was mainly produced in the ‘iron and steel belt’
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of Eastern India at the time of the policy’s adoption. Some sources (discussed in
the next section) have suggested that this region was deprived of its comparative
advantage in steel-intensive downstream industries due to the Freight Equalization
Policy. Below, we assess the evidence for this hypothesis in three steps, using data
from the period around the policy’s adoption. We first examine whether iron and
steel prices were actually equalized across states after the imposition of the policy,
using input data as reported by firms in downstream industries. We then use data
on interstate trade to consider whether quantities shipped of iron and steel became
less responsive to distances between exporters and importers in the years after the
policy was adopted. Finally, we directly assess whether the location of steel-intensive
industries was influenced by the policy, using data on manufacturing output across
industries and states.
The evidence presented here does not make a strong case that the Freight Equal-
ization Policy was effective in changing the spatial pattern of India’s industrial out-
put. In particular, regressions comparing trends across states in the output of the
steel-using engineering industry to changes in other industries’ output do not suggest
that steel-intensive industries moved further away from steel mills as a consequence
of the policy. Moreover, estimation of gravity equations suggests that there was little
or no change in the distance elasticity of trade in iron and steel after the adoption
of freight equalization.
However, rather than suggesting that access to raw materials was unimportant
for industrial development in India, this might be because the policy did not succeed
in eliminating differences in access to raw materials. Our results suggest that prices
of iron and steel increased with a state’s distance to the nearest steel mill before
1956, but that these price differences were only partially offset after the introduction
of freight equalization. It is thus difficult to draw confident conclusions about the
effect of access to steel on industrial location in India from the results of this study.
This chapter fits into a literature (also discussed in the first chapter) studying the
link between advantageous access to raw materials and manufacturing performance
(e.g. Wright 1990, Irwin 2003). The question of whether proximity to raw materials
affects the location of industries has also sometimes been studied in concert with
the influence of access to other inputs (such as skilled labour) in the literature on
industrial agglomeration. Ellison and Glaeser (1999) find that ‘natural advantages’
of these kinds are able to partly explain the present-day geographic concentration
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of industries in the United States. On the other hand, Klein and Crafts (2012)
suggest that natural advantages, including better access to coal, helped determine
the location of manufacturing within the US in the late 19th century, but that their
influence faded out in the early 20th century. The effect of proximity to coal on
economic development is also examined by Fernihough and O’Rourke (2014), who
conclude that access to coal had a substantial effect on the growth of European
cities between 1750 and 1900.
Our study also contributes to the literature assessing the effects of industrial
policy. Other studies of the myriad industrial policies of post-independence India
often focus on the effect of these policies’ removal rather than their imposition: for
example, Chari (2011) examines the effect of entry and size restrictions imposed on
firms by India’s licensing requirements by studying the impact of a 1985 episode
of liberalization. Finally, our results may help inform the study of the dramatic
differences in regional performance in India since its independence. Lahiri and Yi
(2009) point out that the fortunes of West Bengal (a state within India’s ‘iron and
steel belt’) and Maharashtra diverged dramatically between 1960 and 1993, and
attempt to explain West Bengal’s far inferior income gains using a multi-sector
growth model.
The chapter now proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 provides further background on
the Freight Equalization Policy. Section 3.3 then presents empirical results regarding
the policy’s effects on iron and steel prices, interstate trade in iron and steel and the
output of steel-intensive industries. The data used by the study is also introduced
over the course of this section. Finally, Section 3.4 provides concluding remarks.
3.2 Background
As indicated in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, India’s Industrial Pol-
icy Resolution of 1956 set out the aim of reducing economic inequality between the
country’s regions, and identified interregional differences in access to raw materials
as one cause of this inequality. By mid-1956, the Indian government had instituted
a system of ‘freight pooling’, often referred to as the Freight Equalization Policy,
for three important raw materials – steel, cement and fertilizers – and was consid-
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ering implementing such a system for coal (Economic Weekly 1956).1 In the case of
steel, according to the annual report of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for
1956-57:
With effect from the 11th June 1956 uniform prices have been fixed for
all Rail Head Stations in India, and the prices of both steel and pig iron
have been increased to meet the extra costs of transport involved, which
are now met out of the equalisation funds. This step, it is hoped, would
result in better geographical distribution of industries and also stimulate
the dispersal of industries all over the country.2
To accomplish the fixation of iron and steel prices across India, the difference
between the consumer price and the ex-factory ‘retention price’ was paid into a self-
financing equalization fund, which covered the cost of freight (Singh 1989). This
system required the expected average distance travelled by shipments of steel to be
estimated in advance, so that payments into the equalization fund were sufficient to
cover the total cost of all shipments (Raza and Aggarwal 1986). Ex-factory prices
were initially set by the Indian government’s Tariff Commission, but starting in
1964, an institution specific to the steel sector (the Joint Plant Committee) took
over the setting of ex-factory and consumer prices and administration of the freight
equalization fund (Singh 1989). Freight equalization for steel continued until 1992
and was replaced with a ‘freight ceiling’ policy setting a maximum freight rate;
this was in turn removed in 2001 (Hindu Business Line 2001). Below, we will
limit our consideration of the effects of the Freight Equalization Policy to the years
immediately after its implementation.
Various sources have claimed that the Freight Equalization Policy was effective
in changing patterns of trade and industrial output. For example, Mills and Becker
(1986) stated that the policy “leads to excessive transport of the commodities, be-
cause users have no incentive to buy from the nearest source”, while Mohan (1983)
1We could find no evidence that freight equalization was actually implemented for coal, though
several secondary sources suggest that this was the case. For example, Chakravorty and Lall (2007)
note that “[t]he Freight Equalization Policy of 1956 equalized the prices for ‘essential’ items such
as coal, steel and cement nationwide.”. The 1977 report of the Inter-Ministerial Group on Freight
Equalisation of Commodities lists only pig iron, steel, cement and fertilizers as subject to freight
equalization schemes at that time (Government of India Planning Commission 1977).
2The report also notes that the maximum freight rate for shipments of steel had previously
been fixed at 60 rupees per ton as of May 1954 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry 1957). Here,
we use 1956, the year in which prices were to be fully equalized across regions, as the date of the
initiation of the Freight Equalization Policy for steel.
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argues that price equalization of commodities “robbed the producing areas... of their
comparative advantage in industries using these products”. A 2008 World Bank re-
port on Orissa suggests that recent growth in that state was partly due to the end
of the Freight Equalization Policy, which “had annulled the state’s comparative
advantage as the location for metal industries” (World Bank 2008).
However, an inter-ministerial task force charged with assessing the feasibility of
extension of the Freight Equalization Policy to raw cotton reported in 1977 that the
effect of steel freight equalization on regional comparative advantage was probably
very limited (Government of India Planning Commission 1977). Using data on the
input consumption of steel-intensive industries, the task force calculated the relative
cost savings due to freight equalization for firms relatively more distant from steel
mills. These were found to be small: for example, producers of machine tools 2000
km away from their steel suppliers were found to have reaped a cost advantage from
the policy of just 0.7% of the price of final output as compared to firms located 250
km from a steel mill.
3.3 Empirical analysis
3.3.1 Iron and steel input prices
Because the Freight Equalization Policy was designed to equalize iron and steel prices
across locations in India, we first examine its effect on these prices. To do so, we
use information on input data from the Census of Indian Manufactures, a statutory
census of manufacturing firms that was conducted in India annually between 1946
and 1958 and was the predecessor to the present-day Annual Survey of Industries.
This census asked firms about the quantity and value of various material inputs
consumed in production, and reported this data by state and industry in published
volumes. Most of the manufacturing firms for which iron and steel was intensively
used in production were included in the broadly defined ‘General Engineering and
Electrical Engineering’ industry, and so we focus our analysis on materials usage
data for this industry. In particular, we define the average unit value for a given
iron and steel product (such as ‘pig iron’) in each state and year as the total value
of that product used in the engineering industry in rupees, divided by the total
quantity used in tons.
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Using Indian manufacturing data from this period presents some challenges.
First, states with small numbers of firms in a given industry are consolidated into a
residual ‘other states’ category in the published data, and in the earliest years of the
Census of Manufactures, this results in relatively fewer observations associated with
individual states. We begin our analysis in 1951, since before this year information
from firms in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan is not separately identified in data
on the engineering industry.3 Second, there were major changes in India’s state
borders in 1956, which makes it difficult to concord state-level observations over
time. However, we are able to construct a dataset of eleven states whose borders
stay relatively consistent – though far from perfectly so – over the period studied.
Finally, so that our results are not driven by outliers in the unit value data, we drop
observations for which unit values are particularly distant from the product-year
median.4
We then examine the hypothesis that the Freight Equalization Policy eliminated
the gap in steel prices between locations close to steel mills and locations distant from
steel mills. At the beginning of the period of study, India had only two integrated
steel plants – in Jamshedpur, Bihar and Burnpur, West Bengal – and although three
other integrated steel plants set up operations in the late 1950s, only one of these
had begun producing steel by 1958, and this was less than 50 km away from the
existing Burnpur mill.5 We define the distance between a state and the nearest steel
mill as the distance between the state’s largest city (according to the 1951 Census
of India) and the nearer of the two plants in Jamshedpur and Burnpur; this variable
is therefore defined at the state level and is invariant across time.6 Column (1)
of Table 3.1 demonstrates the large variation in the distances of each state to the
nearest steel mill by this measure: while Calcutta in West Bengal was less than 200
km from the nearest mill as of 1950, Amritsar in Punjab was nearly 1500 km from
either of these integrated steel plants.
3Note that this sample excludes Mysore (later Karnataka) and Travancore-Cochin (later Ker-
ala), since these two states do not join the dataset until 1954.
4In particular, we drop the top 5% and bottom 5% of observations, across all iron and steel
products, according to observed unit value divided by product-year median unit value.
5These three plants were in Durgapur, West Bengal; Rourkela, Orissa; and Bhilai, Madhya
Pradesh.
6Because the largest city in Madhya Pradesh in 1951 (Nagpur) was absorbed into Maharashtra
as of 1956, we use the state’s second largest city in 1951 (Jabalpur) for this exercise instead.
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We begin by running the following regression:
unitvaluepst = α + βdists + γdists ∗ policyt + φpt + pst (3.1)
The estimated parameters of primary interest, βˆ and γˆ, reveal whether steel prices
rose with distance to integrated steel mills dists, and the extent to which this was
offset in the three years following adoption of the Freight Equalization Policy (1956
to 1958). Distance enters the equation linearly on the assumption that freight rates
are charged in rupees per ton-kilometer. Product-time fixed effects ensure that
identification relies on across-state variation in unit values in each year for each of
the nine iron and steel products for which data is available.
The results of this regression are displayed in column (1) of Table 3.2. The
estimated βˆ suggests that states whose largest cities were 100 km farther from the
nearest integrated steel mill paid an average of 5 rupees more for a ton of iron and
steel products; this estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level. The average
unit value of iron or steel products across all states before 1956 was 536 rupees per
ton, and the effect of moving a firm from West Bengal to Punjab is predicted to
correspond to a change in unit iron and steel input value of 62.5 rupees per ton, or
11.7% of this average.
However, while the estimated γˆ from this regression is negative as predicted, it
is only one-third of the magnitude of βˆ, and statistically insignificant. This finding
does not support the conclusion that the imposition of the Freight Equalization
Policy led immediately to the full offset of differences in unit values of iron and
steel inputs resulting from distance from steel mills, though it suggests that these
differences may have been partially offset. Of course, some of the differences in unit
values throughout the period of study might result from different usage patterns
of steel inputs by state; for example, firms in states more distant from steel mills
might happen to have used more expensive types of steel within product categories
throughout the period. The substitution of product-state fixed effects for the βdists
term in regression (3.1) results in estimates for γˆ that remain negative (and of similar
magnitude) but statistically insignificant (column (2) in Table 3.2).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.2 show results from identical regressions to those
in columns (1) and (2), but for all other metal inputs to the engineering industry
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(e.g. ‘brass castings’).7 Reassuringly, column (3) shows that distance from steel
plants does not seem to drive unit values for metal products other than iron and
steel. The small positive estimated coefficient for the interaction term in columns (3)
and (4) suggests that a ‘triple-difference’-type specification, comparing unit values
of iron and steel to those of other metals by distance before and after 1956, would
yield an estimated effect of the Freight Equalization Policy slightly larger than that
in column (1) or (2). This is confirmed by column (5), which displays the results of
the following specification (where ironsteelp is a dummy for iron and steel products):
unitvaluepst = α + γironsteelp ∗ dists ∗ policyt + φpt + ψst + θps + pst (3.2)
In practice, the integrated steel mills in West Bengal and Bihar produced a
very large share of India’s iron and steel during the 1950s, but not all of its steel.
According to the Census of Indian Manufactures, these two states produced 91.0% of
iron and steel products by value in 1951 and 80.8% in 1958. Much steel was produced
in smaller plants across India using scrap as an input. However, some products
appear to have been produced almost exclusively by the vertically integrated steel
mills: while just 61% of steel bars and rods were produced in West Bengal and
Bihar in 1958, these two states were the origin of 99.8% of steel plates and sheets.
As discussed by Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2015) in their study of the US steel
industry, this was due to technological constraints: historically, only the furnaces of
vertically integrated plants could produce the higher-quality steel required for steel
sheet, while smaller plants dependent on scrap metal produced lower-quality steel
used for products such as steel bars.
I thus rerun regression (3.1) separately for the two steel product categories
‘Plates, sheets and strips’ and ‘Bars and rods’, using either dists or state fixed
effects as covariates. As shown in columns (1) and (3) of Table 3.3, before 1956,
both products’ unit values increased with distance from an integrated steel mill at a
rate of approximately 10 rupees per 100 km. However, while there was no change in
this pattern for bars and rods after the adoption of the Freight Equalization Policy
(see columns (3) and (4)), the distance effect was almost entirely offset from 1956
for plates, sheets and strips. Moreover, the estimated γˆ for steel plates, sheets and
7As with iron and steel products, we drop the top 5% and bottom 5% of observations across
all products of other metals according to observed unit value divided by product-year median unit
value.
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strips is statistically significant in the specifications with and without state fixed
effects (columns (1) and (2)). Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the estimated dis-
tance effect over time for steel plates, sheets and strips, from a regression similar to
(3.1) but with a full set of interactions between distance from a steel plant and year.
One possible explanation for these results is that firms throughout India may
already have had access to nearby producers of steel bars and rods, so that the
Freight Equalization Policy did not change the pattern of prices available to firms
across states. In this case, the significant differences between the prices of steel bars
and rods across provinces might be due to persistent factors unrelated to freight
costs. Alternatively, it might be that freight costs were relevant for both sets of goods
– of which West Bengal and Bihar were the largest producers in both cases – but
that only products of vertically integrated steel plants were actually subject to the
Freight Equalization Policy. While most sources discussing the Freight Equalization
Policy do not specify which firms were subject to the policy, a document from India’s
National Council of Applied Economic Research (1964) suggests that:
The main producers, viz. Hindustan Steel, Tata Iron and Steel and
Indian Iron and Steel charge the lowest price (i.e. Column I) f.o.r. des-
tination (i.e. freight paid) and this price is uniform at all railheads in
India. Other producers, i.e. re-rolling mills, sell at Column I rate f.o.r.
works (i.e. freight to be paid by consumer).
Notably, these results do not seem to be driven by something special about demand
for plates and sheets across states. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.3 reproduce the
regressions in columns (1) and (2) for the product category ‘circles, plates, sheets and
strips’ for brass, copper and aluminum; these produce very small and statistically
insignificant estimates of βˆ and γˆ.
3.3.2 Internal trade in iron and steel
We next examine the hypothesis that equalization of freight rates across locations
reduced the elasticity of trade in steel to distance between exporter and importer.
For this, we use annual data on trade by rail and river between Indian states pub-
lished by India’s Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics. This source
includes information on the quantity of ‘iron and steel bars, sheets, girders and other
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commercial forms of iron and steel’ traded by rail or river between locations in India
in each year.
Conveniently, the major changes in the borders of Indian states in 1956 are
not reflected in this dataset until 1961, which means that it is possible to conduct
an analysis of the effect of the Freight Equalization Policy using identical spatial
units through 1960. We thus digitized data on trade in iron and steel for each year
between 1950 and 1960 (with the exception of 1952, for which data was not readily
available). Sixteen locations are represented in all of these years, but we drop three
small and/or remote locations for which a high proportion of observations are zeroes
(Assam, Goa and Jammu and Kashmir), leaving thirteen states.8
In order to identify changes in distance elasticities due to the Freight Equalization
Policy, we estimate a series of gravity equations. Following the advice of Head and
Mayer (2015), we do so using a variety of empirical specifications in order to assess
the robustness of our estimates to possible biases due to heteroskedasticity (Santos
Silva and Tenreyro 2006). We begin by estimating a standard gravity equation for
trade between exporters i and importers j using ordinary least squares:
ln quantityijt = α + δ ln distij + φit + ψjt + ijt (3.3)
Here, δˆ is the estimated elasticity of quantity traded with respect to geographic
distance distij. We then proceed to estimate analogous gravity regressions using
Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PML) and Gamma PML.9
Column (1) of Table 3.4 shows that these three methods result in estimated
distance elasticities for interstate trade in iron and steel ranging from −1.55 to
−2.60.10 In column (2), an interaction between distance and the post-1956 period
is added to specification (3.3), in order to assess the extent to which the distance
elasticity falls after the adoption of the Freight Equalization Policy. None of the
three estimates indicate that the distance elasticity moved substantially towards zero
after 1956; only the OLS estimate is both positive and statistically significant, and
8Data is reported separately for some Indian ports, such as Calcutta; we add these quantities
to the quantities reported for the rest of the state (in this case, West Bengal).
9Head and Mayer (2015) suggest that the choice of the preferred estimate among these three
should be guided in part by the outcome of a test of the distribution of the error term proposed
by Manning and Mullahy (2001). We run this test using residuals from the OLS regression and
find that the result supports the Poisson model.
10Notably, the estimate from the Poisson PML regression is substantially smaller in absolute
value than the other two estimates; Head and Mayer (2015) suggest that this might be due to
small-sample bias or distance elasticities that decrease with trade volume.
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this is an order of magnitude smaller in absolute value than the estimated pre-policy
elasticity. These estimated effects of the policy change little when exporter-importer
fixed effects are substituted for the δ ln distij term in column (3).
Of course, the very small measured effect of freight equalization on iron and steel
flows might be due to the fact that the policy may have been targeted to products of
the large vertically integrated plants, as suggested in the previous section. We thus
also run a ‘triple-difference’ regression in which the effect of the policy is instead
identified by comparing distance elasticities of iron and steel exports from Bihar
and West Bengal, before and after the policy, to exports from other states whose
steel-producing plants may have been unaffected by freight equalization. This is
accomplished with the following specification, in which steelstatei is a dummy for
Bihar and West Bengal:
ln quantityijt = α + δ ln distij ∗ steelstatei ∗ policyt + φit + ψjt + θij + ijt (3.4)
The results of this regression may be found in column (4) of Table 3.4. These
provide little evidence that the Freight Equalization Policy had a short-run effect
on the distance elasticity of trade in steel: all three estimates of δˆ are statistically
insignificant and none of the three are of the predicted sign. One important caveat
to this conclusion is that as noted earlier, vertically integrated steel plants started
production in Orissa and Madhya Pradesh in 1959. If this led to a decline (in
absolute value) in the distance elasticity of steel exports from these two provinces,
the triple-difference estimates might be biased downwards. However, dropping all
trade involving either of these two states from the dataset results in estimated
coefficients that are very similar to those in column (4).
The Indian rail and river trade data also allows for distance elasticities to be
estimated for other commodities; we have digitized this data for the full set of
commodities tracked by these publications for six years between 1951 and 1960.11
In particular, we may estimate these elasticities for another commodity to become
subject to freight equalization in 1956: cement. One complication of estimating
gravity equations for interstate trade in cement is that there are many more observed
flows of zero trade between states in the matrix of interstate cement trade (32% of
all observations, as compared to 3.5% for iron and steel). We thus add a fourth
11These are 1951, 1953, 1955, 1956, 1958 and 1960.
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estimation methodology to the menu of gravity regressions for this case, a Tobit
strategy proposed by Eaton and Kortum (2001), again based on a recommendation
by Head and Mayer (2015). This approach replaces the zero flows to a given importer
with the minimum nonzero observed flow to that importer in the same year.
Applying the specification of column (2) of Table 3.4 – which includes log distance
and its interaction with the post-1956 period – to interstate trade in cement yields
the results in column (1) of Table 3.5. The estimated distance elasticities are again
negative, though substantially larger in magnitude than those for iron and steel, but
the largest positive estimate for δˆ is again an order of magnitude smaller than the
estimated pre-policy distance elasticity.
Of course, it is possible that the estimates of δˆ are being biased downward by
some contemporaneous shock correlated to bilateral distance. In this case, we might
expect to see more negative estimates of δˆ for ‘placebo’ products to which the Freight
Equalization Policy did not apply. We thus repeat the regression of Table 3.5 column
(1) for the three nonsteel products with the lowest proportion of observed zero
trade flows in the period covered by the data: glass, pulses (excluding gram) and
timber (excluding teak). This exercise provides little support for the hypothesis of
a negative bias due to a correlated shock: all twelve estimates of δˆ in columns (2)
to (4) are positive, several of them statistically significant.
3.3.3 Output of steel-intensive industries
We now consider evidence on whether the location of steel-intensive industries was
affected by the Freight Equalization Policy, by examining changes in the pattern of
manufacturing output across industries and states around the time of the policy’s
adoption. For this exercise, we combine annual output data by state and industry
from the Census of Indian Manufactures, which ended in 1958, with similar data
for 1959 to 1970 from its successor, the Annual Survey of Industries. We use the
same concordance of pre-1956 and post-1956 states introduced in the section on steel
prices; however, we must now also construct a concordance of industries between the
two datasets. Eleven states and sixteen industries are continuously represented in
the data starting from 1950. We drop the industries directly affected by the policy
– iron and steel and cement – and so fourteen industries remain in the dataset we
use here. The list of these industries may be found in Table 3.6.
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To quantify the steel intensity of the fourteen industries in the sample, we calcu-
lated the share of iron and steel in total input costs for each of these industries using
data from the 1949 Census of Indian Manufactures. This suggests that while 42% of
intermediate input value is accounted for by iron and steel products in the engineer-
ing industry, no other industry in the sample has a steel input share greater than
1%. Therefore, in the analysis below, we simply compare the engineering industry
to all other industries in the sample.
We must now return to the issue that some states’ output is assigned to a resid-
ual ‘other states’ category in the Census of Manufactures, wherever an industry is
represented by only a small number of firms in those states. Here, we divide this
output equally across the relevant states, potentially resulting in some measure-
ment error. The issue of measurement is further complicated by the fact that in the
1959-70 Annual Survey of Industries data, output of states with only one firm in a
given industry is not reported. Whenever our state and/or industry concordances
require us to incorporate a missing observation between 1959 and 1970 into a wider
state-industry cell, we assume that the missing output observation is equal to zero.
Notably, the share of zeroes and missing values in the resulting dataset is quite
large: 30% of 3234 possible nonzero observations. This is due to the inclusion
of states with relatively small manufacturing sectors (such as Assam) as well as
relatively unimportant industries (such as ‘Manufacture of paints and varnishes’).
We thus also create an alternative dataset in which only states and industries with
a number of nonzero observations at or above the median (by state and industry,
respectively) are kept in the data. This six-state, seven-industry dataset has only a
1.5% share of zeroes and missing values.12
We begin the analysis of these datasets by summarizing the broad trends for
the two states with integrated steel mills as of 1950, Bihar and West Bengal, as
compared to all other states in the data. To do so, we first chart the share of Bihar
and West Bengal in the total India-wide output of the engineering industry over
time, as well as the evolution of the share of these two states in total output across
the other thirteen industries in the sample.13 Figure 3.2 shows that while this region
12The states remaining in this sample are Bihar, Bombay, Madras, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and
West Bengal. The industries in this sample are marked with stars in Table 3.6.
13Recall that Travancore-Cochin (later Kerala) and Mysore (later Karnataka) are not in the
sample and thus not included in ‘India-wide output’, because they do not enter the Census of
Manufactures data until 1954.
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produced almost half of engineering output by value at the beginning of the sample
(mainly due to the contribution of West Bengal), its share had dropped to just over
20% by 1970. This trend coincided with convergence of the two states’ share of
output in engineering and their share of the total output of other manufacturing
industries, suggesting that the region’s comparative advantage in the engineering
industry relative to other Indian states fell sharply during this time. The figure
also provides suggestive visual evidence that the beginning of the gradual decline of
the share of engineering output in the region coincided with the imposition of the
Freight Equalization Policy in 1956.
Of course, the decline in the importance of Bihar and West Bengal in India’s
engineering output might be due to the opening of two additional integrated steel
mills in other states during this period. Both of these plants began operations in
1959, and like the Bihar and West Bengal plants, were located close to the rich
sources of coal and iron ore in Eastern India’s ‘iron and steel belt’: in Rourkela,
Orissa and Bhilai, Madhya Pradesh. However, Figure 3.3 shows that when the
exercise above is conducted instead with the pooled output of all four of these
states, there is little effect on the trends discussed above.
We now directly test the hypothesis that the Freight Equalization Policy led
to a shift in the location of the engineering industry within India, using a ‘triple-
difference’ identification strategy. We begin by comparing the output in engineering
industries in West Bengal and Bihar relative to other states to output in nonengi-
neering industries in these two states relative to others, before and after the impo-
sition of the Freight Equalization Policy. To do so, we use the following regression
specification, where engineeringi is a dummy variable for the engineering industry:
ln outputist = α+ ηengineeringi ∗ steelstates ∗ policyt + φis + ψst + θit + ist (3.5)
The estimated ηˆ from this regression may be found in column (1) of Table 3.7.
This is negative (as predicted by the hypothesis that the comparative advantage
of Bihar and West Bengal in engineering industries eroded after the Freight Equal-
ization Policy), but the result is not statistically significant; the relevant t statistic
is −0.42. Moreover, when the regression is instead conducted using the smaller
dataset discussed above, resulting in a much lower proportion of missing values for
the dependent variable, the coefficient switches sign (column (2)), while its t statistic
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remains very small in absolute value (0.26).
We next generalize the triple-difference analysis to a comparison of locations
closer to integrated steel mills to those that were farther away. By expanding the
‘treated’ group beyond West Bengal and Bihar, this strategy takes account of the
fact that the 1959 startup of new steel mills outside these states brought other
locations nearer to an integrated steel mill.14 In particular, we estimate the following
specification:
ln outputist = α + ζengineeringi ∗ distst ∗ policyt + φis + ψst + θit + ist (3.6)
Based on the hypothesis that the comparative disadvantage of being farther from
a steel mill grew less important in the location of engineering output after the Freight
Equalization Policy, the predicted sign for ζ is positive. Column (3) of Table 3.7,
which displays the estimate for ζˆ using the full sample, confirms that this estimate
is of the correct sign. However, it is again statistically insignificant, and switches
sign and remains insignificant when the narrower sample is used instead, as shown
in column (4).
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to provide evidence about whether access to raw materials
is an important determinant of the pattern of industrial development across loca-
tions. We have investigated the effects of India’s Freight Equalization Policy, which
was designed to equalize prices of steel and other key raw materials across Indian
states. According to the results of the previous section, the evidence that this pol-
icy affected the spatial distribution of steel-intensive downstream industries is weak.
While a decline in the share of the steel-producing region in India-wide output of
the engineering industry appears to have begun at the same time as the policy’s
imposition, a triple-difference regression analysis across states, industries and time
provides no indication that this relationship is causal.
However, this might be because the policy itself did not have a significant im-
pact on access to steel across India. We have shown evidence that before the 1956
adoption of the Freight Equalization Policy, the iron and steel input prices facing
14Table 3.1 displays a comparison of these distances by state in 1950 and 1970.
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downstream firms increased with their distance to the nearest integrated steel mill.
But in the first three years after the policy took effect, these differences appear
to have been only partly offset. Also, the elasticity of interstate trade in iron and
steel to the distance between importer and exporter does not seem to have declined
appreciably after the policy was imposed.
Although the results above do not yet provide significant insights into the effect
of access to raw materials on industrial location in India, a promising way forward
for research on the Freight Equalization Policy could be the closer examination of
trends associated with specific steel product categories. We have found evidence that
the policy had an impact on certain steel products exclusively produced by Eastern
India’s large integrated steel mills, as the positive relationship between prices of
steel plates and sheets and distance from these steel mills was almost eliminated
after the policy’s introduction. The analysis of output data on downstream firms
intensively using these specific products, and/or data on their internal trade, might
reveal further insights about the impact of the Freight Equalization Policy on the
pattern of India’s industrial development.
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Figure 3.1: Coefficients from regressions of unit values of steel plates, sheets and
strips on distance from nearest integrated steel mill, 1951 to 1958
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Figure 3.2: Share of Bihar and West Bengal in engineering and other manufacturing
output, 1950 to 1970
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Figure 3.3: Share of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal in engineering
and other manufacturing output, 1950 to 1970
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3.B Tables
Table 3.1: Distances of states from nearest steel mills
(1) (2)
State City 1950 distance 1970 distance
Assam Shillong 543.3 515.4
Bihar Patna 283.5 283.5
Bombay Bombay 1449.7 921.1
Delhi Delhi 1109.1 928.6
Madhya Pradesh Jabalpur 642.5 264.6
Madras Madras 1254.2 911.9
Orissa Cuttack 263.0 224.3
Punjab Amritsar 1481.8 1330.2
Rajasthan Jaipur 1144.8 851.4
Uttar Pradesh Kanpur 735.8 596.8
West Bengal Calcutta 190.4 148.1
This table shows the distance in kilometers between the largest city in
each state as of 1950 and the nearest integrated steel mill in 1950 and 1970.
Steel mills in 1950 were located in Jamshedpur, Bihar and Burnpur, West
Bengal. Additional steel mills in 1970 were in Durgapur, West Bengal;
Rourkela, Orissa; and Bhilai, Madhya Pradesh. Data on city size is from
the Census of India, 1951. Because the largest city in Madhya Pradesh
in 1951 (Nagpur) was absorbed into Maharashtra as of 1956, the state’s
second largest city in 1951 (Jabalpur) is used instead.
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Table 3.2: Unit values of inputs to engineering industry
Dependent variable: Unit value
Sample: Iron and steel Other metal All metal
products products products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance to 0.048** -0.007
steel mill (0.020) (0.006)
Distance * period -0.015 -0.018 0.013* 0.009
of policy (0.021) (0.022) (0.007) (0.008)
Distance * period -0.024
of policy * steel (0.023)
Product-year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Product-state FE NO YES NO YES YES
State-year FE NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 671 671 974 974 1645
Clusters 96 96 142 142 238
R2 0.84 0.92 0.86 0.91 0.95
This table displays the results of regressions relating unit values of inputs to the
engineering industry (in Rs/ton) to distance to the nearest integrated steel mill (in
km). The unit of observation is a product-state-year. The sample in columns (1)
and (2) includes all iron and steel products, in columns (3) and (4) all other metal
products, and in column (5) all metal products. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered
at the product-state level. Small p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%),
** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 3.3: Unit values of inputs to engineering industry by specific product
Dependent variable: Unit value
Sample: Steel plates, Steel bars Other metal
sheets and strips and rods circles, plates,
sheets and strips
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to 0.103*** 0.087*** -0.001
steel mill (0.027) (0.026) (0.008)
Distance * period -0.089* -0.089** 0.006 0.010 0.001 -0.002
of policy (0.049) (0.036) (0.053) (0.033) (0.013) (0.011)
Year FE YES YES YES YES NO NO
State FE NO YES NO YES NO NO
Product-year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Product-state FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 88 88 86 86 232 232
R2 0.60 0.85 0.49 0.85 0.41 0.62
This table displays the results of regressions relating unit values of inputs to the engineering
industry (in Rs/ton) to distance to the nearest integrated steel mill (in km). The unit of ob-
servation is a state-year in columns (1) to (4) and a product-state-year in columns (5) and (6).
The sample in columns (1) and (2) includes the steel plates, sheets and strips product category
only, in columns (3) and (4) the steel bars and rods product category only, and in column (5)
the circles, plates, sheets and strips category for metals other than iron and steel. All regressions
are estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are in round brackets. Small
p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 3.4: Distance elasticity of interstate iron and steel trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Log distance -2.60*** -2.76***
(0.15) (0.18)
Log distance * period 0.39** 0.41**
of policy (0.17) (0.17)
Log distance * period -0.32
of policy * steel state (0.26)
Observations 1505 1505 1505 1505
Panel B: Poisson PML
Log distance -1.55*** -1.50***
(0.14) (0.16)
Log distance * period -0.10 -0.01
of policy (0.09) (0.11)
Log distance * period -0.11
of policy * steel state (0.14)
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560
Panel C: Gamma PML
Log distance -2.50*** -2.57***
(0.16) (0.17)
Log distance * period 0.18 0.29*
of policy (0.16) (0.16)
Log distance * period -0.17
of policy * steel state (0.28)
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560
Exporter-year FE YES YES YES YES
Importer-year FE YES YES YES YES
Exporter-importer FE NO NO YES YES
This table displays the results of regressions relating quantity traded of
iron and steel to log distance between states. The unit of observation is an
exporter-importer-year. In Panel A, regressions are estimated using ordi-
nary least squares with log quantity as the dependent variable. In Panel
B, regressions are estimated using Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood es-
timation with quantity as the dependent variable. In Panel C, regressions
are estimated using Gamma pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimation with
quantity as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors (in round
brackets) are clustered at the exporter-importer level. Small p-values are
represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
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Table 3.5: Distance elasticity of other products’ interstate trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Product: Cement Glass Pulses Timber
Panel A: OLS
Log distance -4.28*** -2.55*** -2.15*** -3.35***
(0.37) (0.20) (0.25) (0.25)
Log distance * period -0.97** 0.52** 0.77** 0.32
of policy (0.40) (0.18) (0.24) (0.21)
Observations 636 851 811 801
Panel B: Poisson PML
Log distance -3.48*** -1.64*** -1.68*** -2.18***
(0.33) (0.14) (0.19) (0.22)
Log distance * period -0.33 0.23* 0.54*** 0.13
of policy (0.58) (0.14) (0.17) (0.11)
Observations 936 936 936 936
Panel C: Gamma PML
Log distance -8.26*** -2.72*** -2.78*** -3.70***
(1.00) (0.24) (0.26) (0.29)
Log distance * period 0.61 0.27 1.12*** 0.24
of policy (0.78) (0.22) (0.17) (0.25)
Observations 936 936 936 936
Panel D: Tobit
Log distance -8.87*** -3.17*** -3.34*** -4.64***
(0.56) (0.21) (0.34) (0.31)
Log distance * period 0.13 0.68*** 1.03*** 0.41
of policy (0.57) (0.18) (0.24) (0.27)
Observations 936 936 936 936
Exporter-year FE YES YES YES YES
Importer-year FE YES YES YES YES
Exporter-importer FE NO NO NO NO
This table displays the results of regressions relating quantity traded of various
products to log distance between states. The unit of observation is an exporter-
importer-year. In Panel A, regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares
with log quantity as the dependent variable. In Panel B, regressions are esti-
mated using Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimation with quantity as
the dependent variable. In Panel C, regressions are estimated using Gamma
pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimation with quantity as the dependent variable.
In Panel D, regressions are estimated using the Tobit methodology of Eaton and
Kortum (2001) with log quantity as the dependent variable. Robust standard
errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the exporter-importer level. Small
p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than
10%).
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Table 3.6: Industries in output dataset
*Grain milling
Manufacture of bakery products
Fruit and vegetable processing
*Sugar processing
Distilling and brewing
Manufacture of paints and varnishes
Leather tanning
*Manufacture of glass and glass products
*Manufacture of ceramics
Manufacture of paper and paperboard
*Textile manufacturing
*Manufacture of chemical products
Manufacture of non-ferrous basic metals
*General and electrical engineering
This table lists the industries included in the out-
put dataset. Industries marked with a star are also
in the version of the dataset designed to minimize
zeroes and missing values.
Table 3.7: Output of engineering and other industries
Dependent variable: Log output
Sample: All States and All States and
states and industries with states and industries with
industries few obs missing industries few obs missing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Engineering * period -0.13 0.10
of policy * steel state (0.31) (0.37)
Engineering * period 0.0001 -0.0002
of policy * distance (0.0004) (0.0004)
to steel mill
Industry-year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry-state FE YES YES YES YES
State-year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 2258 869 2258 869
Clusters 137 42 137 42
R2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96
The dependent variable in all regressions is log output value and the unit of observation is an
industry-state-year. Distance to the nearest steel mill is measured in km. The sample in columns
(1) and (3) includes the full concorded sample of states and industries, while the sample in columns
(2) and (4) includes only states and industries with a number of nonzero observations at or above
the median (by state and industry, respectively). All regressions are estimated using ordinary least
squares. Robust standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the industry-state level. Small
p-values are represented by *** (less than 1%), ** (less than 5%) or * (less than 10%).
138
Bibliography
[1] Anderson, Simon P. and Nicolas Schmitt (2003). “Nontariff Barriers and Trade
Liberalization”, Economic Inquiry 41 (1), 80-97.
[2] Anderson, T. W. and Cheng Hsiao (1981). “Estimation of Dynamic Models
with Error Components”, Journal of the American Statistical Association 76
(375), 598-606.
[3] Arago´n, Fernando M. and Juan Pablo Rud (2013). “Natural Resources and Lo-
cal Communities: Evidence from a Peruvian Gold Mine”, American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy 5 (2), 1-25.
[4] Armington, Paul S. (1969). “A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished
by Place of Production”, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 16 (1),
159-176.
[5] Autor, David H., David Dorn and Gordon H. Hanson (2013). “The China
Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United
States”, American Economic Review 103 (6), 2121-2168.
[6] Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger (1999). “An Economic Theory of GATT”,
American Economic Review 89 (1), 215-248.
[7] Balassa, Bela (1965). “Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evalua-
tion”, Journal of Political Economy 73 (6), 573-594.
[8] Baldwin, Robert E. (1984). “Trade Policies in Developed Countries”, in Ronald
W. Jones and Peter B. Kenen, eds., Handbook of International Economics Vol.
1, 571-619.
[9] Bartik, Timothy J. (1991). Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Devel-
opment Policies?, Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employ-
ment Research.
[10] Bloom, Nicholas, Mirko Draca and John Van Reenen (2011). “Trade Induced
Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and
Productivity”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 16717.
[11] Bloomberg (2011). “Rousseff Wants China Buying More Than Soybeans, Vale’s
Iron Ore”, April 10, accessed via http:// www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-
10/rousseff-wants-china-buying-more-than-soybeans-vale-s-iron-ore.html.
[12] Bown, Chad P. and Meredith A. Crowley (2014). “Emerging Economies, Trade
Policy, and Macroeconomic Shocks”, Journal of Development Economics 111
(1), 261-273.
139
[13] Bown, Chad P. and Patricia Tovar (2011). “Trade Liberalization, Antidumping,
and Safeguards: Evidence from India’s Tariff Reform”, Journal of Development
Economics 96 (1), 115-125.
[14] Brandt, Loren, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Luhang Wang and Yifan Zhang
(2012a). “WTO Accession and Performance of Chinese Manufacturing Firms”,
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 9166.
[15] Brandt, Loren, Johannes Van Biesebroeck and Yifan Zhang (2012b). “Creative
Accounting or Creative Destruction? Firm-Level Productivity Growth in Chi-
nese Manufacturing”, Journal of Development Economics 97 (2), 339-351.
[16] Branstetter, Lee G. and Robert C. Feenstra (2002). “Trade and Foreign Direct
Investment in China: A Political Economy Approach”, Journal of International
Economics 58 (2), 335-358.
[17] Branstetter, Lee and Nicholas Lardy (2008). “China’s Embrace of Globaliza-
tion”, in Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, eds., China’s Great Economic
Transformation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 633-682.
[18] British Geological Survey (2010). Mineral Information and Statistics for the
BRIC Countries 1999-2008, Keyworth, Nottingham: British Geological Survey.
[19] Bustos, Paula, Bruno Caprettini and Jacopo Ponticelli (2013). “Agricultural
Productivity and Structural Transformation: Evidence from Brazil”, mimeo.
[20] Cadot, Olivier, Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2004). “Lobbying, Coun-
terlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries”,
World Bank Economic Review 18 (3), 345-366.
[21] Caliendo, Lorenzo and Fernando Parro (2015). “Estimates of the Trade and
Welfare Effects of NAFTA”, Review of Economic Studies 82 (1), 1-44.
[22] Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach and Douglas L. Miller (2008).
“Bootstrap-based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors”, Review
of Economics and Statistics 90 (3), 414-427.
[23] Chakravorty, Sanjoy and Somik V. Lall (2007). Made in India: The Economic
Geography and Political Economy of Industrialization, New Delhi: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
[24] Chan, Alfred (2008). “An Overview of the VAT Export Refund Rules in China”,
Tax Notes International 49 (2), 159-164.
[25] Chandra, Piyush and Cheryl Long (2013). “VAT Rebates and Export Per-
formance in China: Firm-Level Evidence”, Journal of Public Economics 102,
13-22.
[26] Chang, Ha-Joon (2002). Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in
Historical Perspective, London: Anthem Press.
[27] Chari, A. V. (2011). “Identifying the Aggregate Productivity Effects of Entry
and Size Restrictions: An Empirical Analysis of License Reform in India”,
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3 (2), 66-96.
140
[28] Chen, Shaohua and Martin Ravallion (2004). “Welfare Effects of China’s Ac-
cession to the World Trade Organization”, World Bank Economic Review 18
(1), 29-57.
[29] china.com.cn (2009). “Inner Mongolia Restructuring and Integrating Rare
Earths Industry, Planning to Set Up Reserve System to Stabilize
Prices”, press conference transcript, accessed via stock.hexun.com/2009-09-
02/120928664.html.
[30] Collard-Wexler, Allan and Jan De Loecker (2015). “Reallocation and Technol-
ogy: Evidence from the US Steel Industry”, American Economic Review 105
(1), 131-171.
[31] Corden, W. M. (1966). “The Structure of a Tariff System and the Effective
Protective Rate”, Journal of Political Economy 74 (3), 221-237.
[32] Dauth, Wolfgang, Sebastian Findeisen and Jens Suedekum (2014). “The Rise
of the East and the Far East: German Labor Markets and Trade Integration”,
Journal of the European Economic Association 12 (6), 1643-1675.
[33] Deloitte Touche Tomatsu (2005). China Master Tax Guide 2005, The Hague:
Kluwer Law International.
[34] di Giovanni, Julian, Andrei A. Levchenko and Jing Zhang (2014). “The Global
Welfare Impact of China: Trade Integration and Technological Change”, Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6 (3), 153-183.
[35] Dix-Carneiro, Rafael (2014). “Trade Liberalization and Labor Market Dynam-
ics”, Econometrica 82 (3), 825-885.
[36] Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum (2001). “Trade in Capital Goods”, Eu-
ropean Economic Review 45 (7), 1195-1235.
[37] Economic Weekly (1956). “Transport Bottleneck”, July 21, accessed via
http://www.epw.in/weekly-notes/transport-bottleneck.html.
[38] Economist (2012). “Seeking Protection”, January 14, accessed via
http://www.economist.com/node/21542780.
[39] Eisenbarth, Sabrina (2014). “Is Chinese Trade Policy Motivated by Environ-
mental Concerns? An Empirical Analysis”, mimeo.
[40] Ellison, Glenn and Edward L. Glaeser (1999). “The Geographic Concentration
of Industry: Does Natural Advantage Explain Agglomeration?”, American Eco-
nomic Review 89 (2), 311-316.
[41] Ethier, Wilfred J. (2004). “Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a
Multilateral World”, Review of International Economics 12 (3), 303-320.
[42] Feinberg, Robert M. and Kara M. Reynolds (2007). “Tariff Liberalisation and
Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?”, The World
Economy 30 (6), 948-961.
[43] Feldstein, Martin S. and Paul R. Krugman (1990). “International Trade Effects
of Value-Added Taxation”, in Assaf Razin and Joel Slemrod, eds., Taxation in
the Global Economy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 263-282.
141
[44] Fernihough, Alan and Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke (2014). “Coal and the Euro-
pean Industrial Revolution”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper 19802.
[45] Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou and Nina Pavcnik (2003). “The Response of the
Informal Sector to Trade Liberalization”, Journal of Development Economics
72 (2), 463-496.
[46] Golub, Stephen S. and J. M. Finger (1979). “The Processing of Primary
Commodities: Effects of Developed-Country Tariff Escalation and Developing-
Country Export Taxes”, Journal of Political Economy 87 (3), 559-577.
[47] Gonzaga, Gustavo, Nae´rcio Menezes Filho and Cristina Terra (2006). “Trade
Liberalization and the Evolution of Skill Earnings Differentials in Brazil”, Jour-
nal of International Economics 68 (2), 345-367.
[48] Gourdon, Julien, Ste´phanie Monjon and Sandra Poncet (2014). “Incomplete
VAT Rebates to Exporters: How Do They Affect China’s Export Perfor-
mance?”, mimeo.
[49] Government of India Planning Commission (1977). Report of Inter-Ministerial
Group on Freight Equalisation of Commodities, Simla: Government of India
Press.
[50] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1994). “Protection for Sale”, Amer-
ican Economic Review 84 (4), 833-850.
[51] Grossman, Gene M. and Henrik Horn (2013). “Why the WTO? An Introduc-
tion to the Economics of Trade Agreements”, in Henrik Horn and Petros C.
Mavroidis, eds., Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 9-67.
[52] Handley, Kyle and Nuno Lima˜o (2013). “Policy Uncertainty, Trade and Welfare:
Theory and Evidence for China and the U.S.”, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 19376.
[53] Head, Keith and Thierry Mayer (2015). “Gravity Equations: Workhorse,
Toolkit, and Cookbook”, in Elhanan Helpman, Kenneth Rogoff and Gita
Gopinath, eds., Handbook of International Economics Vol. 4, Amsterdam: El-
sevier B.V., 131-195.
[54] Helpman, Elhanan, Oleg Itskhoko, Marc-Andreas Muendler and Stephen J.
Redding (2012). “Trade and Inequality: From Theory to Estimation”, National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17991.
[55] Hindu Business Line (2001). “Steel Freight Ceiling Scheme Off –
Marks Completion of Decontrol Process”, April 10, accessed via
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2001/04/10/stories/14106125.htm.
[56] Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Ralph Ossa (2011). “A Global View of Productivity
Growth in China”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
16778.
142
[57] Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Keong T. Woo (2005). “The Impact of Outsourcing to
China on Hong Kong’s Labor Market”, American Economic Review 95 (5),
1673-1687.
[58] Iacovone, Leonardo, Ferdinand Rauch and L. Alan Winters (2013). “Trade as
an Engine of Creative Destruction: Mexican Experience with Chinese Compe-
tition”, Journal of International Economics 89 (2), 379-392.
[59] Indonesia Ministry of Trade (2012). “The First Occasion of G20 Trade Minis-
terial Meeting: A New Narrative with Critical Notes”, press release.
[60] Irwin, Douglas A. (2003). “Explaining America’s Surge in Manufactured Ex-
ports, 1880-1913”, Review of Economics and Statistics 85 (2), 364-376.
[61] Klein, Alexander and Nicholas Crafts (2012). “Making Sense of the Manufac-
turing Belt: Determinants of U.S. Industrial Location, 1880-1920”, Journal of
Economic Geography 12 (4), 775-807.
[62] Kovak, Brian K. (2011). “Local Labor Market Effects of Trade Policy: Evidence
from Brazilian Liberalization”, mimeo.
[63] Kovak, Brian K. (2013). “Regional Effects of Trade Reform: What is the Cor-
rect Measure of Liberalization?” American Economic Review 103 (5), 1960-
1976.
[64] Lahiri, Amartya and Kei-Mu Yi (2009). “A Tale of Two States: Maharashtra
and West Bengal”, Review of Economic Dynamics 12 (3), 523-542.
[65] Latina, Joelle, Roberta Piermartini and Michele Ruta (2011). “Natural Re-
sources and Non-Cooperative Trade Policy”, International Economics and Eco-
nomic Policy 8 (2), 177-196.
[66] Lerner, A. P. (1936). “The Symmetry Between Import and Export Taxes”,
Economica 3 (11), 306-313.
[67] Lima˜o, Nuno and Patricia Tovar (2011). “Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence
from Commitment via International Trade Agreements”, Journal of Interna-
tional Economics 85 (2), 186-205.
[68] Los Angeles Times (2011). “Brazil’s Commodities-Heavy Trade
with China Gives Some Pause”, July 16, accessed via
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/16/world/la-fg-brazil-china-20110716.
[69] Manning, Willard G. and John Mullahy (2001). “Estimating Log Models: To
Transform or Not to Transform?”, Journal of Health Economics 20 (4), 461-494.
[70] McCaig, Brian and Nina Pavcnik (2014). “Export Markets and Labor Alloca-
tion in a Low-Income Country”, National Bureau of Economic Research Work-
ing Paper 20455.
[71] McKinnon, Ronald I. (1966). “Intermediate Products and Differential Tariffs:
A Generalization of Lerner’s Symmetry Theorem”, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 80 (4), 584-615.
143
[72] Menezes-Filho, Nae´rcio Aquino and Marc-Andreas Muendler (2011). “Labor
Reallocation in Response to Trade Reform”, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search Working Paper 17372.
[73] Mills, Edwin S. and Charles M. Becker (1986). Studies in Indian Urban Devel-
opment, New York: Oxford University Press.
[74] Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India (1957). Annual Administration Re-
port 1956-57.
[75] Mion, Giordano and Linke Zhu (2013). “Import Competition from and Off-
shoring to China: A Curse or Blessing for Firms?”, Journal of International
Economics 89 (1), 202-215.
[76] Mohan, Rakesh (1983). “India: Coming to Terms with Urbanization”, Cities 1
(1), 46-58.
[77] Moore, Michael O. and Maurizio Zanardi (2011). “Trade Liberalization and An-
tidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?”, Review of Development Economics
15 (4), 601-619.
[78] Nataraj, Shanthi (2011). “The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Productivity:
Evidence from India’s Formal and Informal Manufacturing Sectors”, Journal
of International Economics 85 (2), 292-301.
[79] National Council of Applied Economic Research (1964). Transport Require-
ments of the Iron and Steel Belt, New Delhi: National Council of Applied
Economic Research.
[80] Panza, Laura and Jeffrey G. Williamson (2013). “Did Muhammad Ali Foster
Industrialization in Early 19th Century Egypt?”, Centre for Economic Policy
Research Discussion Paper 9363.
[81] Paz, Lourenc¸o S. (2014). “The Impacts of Trade Liberalization on Informal
Labor Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Evaluation of the Brazilian Case”,
Journal of International Economics 92 (2), 330-348.
[82] Pessoa, Joa˜o Paulo (2014). “International Competition and Labor Market Ad-
justment”, mimeo.
[83] Pierce, Justin R. and Peter K. Schott (2013). “The Surprisingly Swift Decline
of U.S. Manufacturing Employment”, mimeo.
[84] Ray, Edward J. and Howard P. Marvel (1984). “The Pattern of Protection in
the Industrialized World”, Review of Economics and Statistics 66 (3), 452-458.
[85] Raza, Moonis and Yash Aggarwal (1986). Transport Geography of India: Com-
modity Flows and the Regional Structure of the Indian Economy, New Delhi:
Concept Publishing.
[86] Rodrik, Dani (2004). “Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century”, John F.
Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper RWP04-047.
[87] Santos Silva, J. M. C. and Silvana Tenreyro (2006). “The Log of Gravity”,
Review of Economics and Statistics 88 (4), 641-658.
144
[88] Singh, Ram Badan (1989). Economics of Public Sector Steel Industry in India,
New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers.
[89] Solleder, Olga (2013). “Panel Export Taxes (PET) Dataset: New Data on Ex-
port Tax Rates”, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
Working Paper 07/2013.
[90] State Administration of Taxation, Import and Export Tax Department (2002).
2001-2002 Export Commodity Code and Tax Rebate Rate Quick Reference
Handbook, Dalian: Dalian University of Technology Press.
[91] Topalova, Petia (2007). “Trade Liberalization, Poverty, and Inequality: Evi-
dence from Indian Districts”, in Ann Harrison, ed., Globalization and Poverty,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[92] Vandenbussche, Hylke and Maurizio Zanardi (2010). “The Chilling Trade Ef-
fects of Antidumping Proliferation”, European Economic Review 54 (6), 760-
777.
[93] World Bank (2008). India – Orissa in Transition: Challenges for 2006-2010,
Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
[94] World Trade Organization (2001). Accession of the People’s Republic of China.
[95] World Trade Organization (2006). Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secre-
tariat, People’s Republic of China.
[96] World Trade Organization (2008). Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secre-
tariat, China.
[97] World Trade Organization (2010). Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secre-
tariat, China.
[98] World Trade Organization (2011). China - Measures Related to the Exportation
of Various Raw Materials: Reports of the Panel.
[99] World Trade Organization (2012). Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secre-
tariat, China.
[100] Wright, Gavin (1990). “The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879-
1940”, American Economic Review 80 (4), 651-668.
[101] Yu, Zhihao (2000). “A Model of Substitution of Non-Tariff Barriers for Tar-
iffs”, Canadian Journal of Economics 33 (4), 1069-1090.
145
